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I. INTRODUCTION
A Minnesota statute requires slow-moving vehicles to display a
fluorescent orange-red sign while being operated on the state's highways.
Police issued traffic citations to members of the Old Order Amish religion
for noncompliance with the statute; they now face criminal charges.I The
Amish contend that compliance with the statute would be contrary to their
religious precepts.' However, their attorney advises them that the Free
Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution does not entitle them to a religious
exemption from the traffic regulation.3 Assume, for the purposes of this
hypothetical case, that there is no relief available under state law.4 At their
criminal trial, the Amish claim that Minnesota's traffic regulation is invalid,
as applied to them, because it conflicts with Article 18 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),5 an international human
1. See State v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. 1989).
2. See id.
3. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79
(1990) (holding that "an individual's religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with an
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate"). See infra notes 392-408
and accompanying text for further discussion of this point.
4. In the actual case, the Minnesota Supreme Court invalidated the traffic regulation, as
applied to the Amish, on the ground that it was inconsistent with the religion provisions of the
Minnesota Constitution. See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1990).
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, S. ExEc.
Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
Article 18 of the ICCPR protects freedom of religion. See id. art. 18. Commentators generally agree
that Article 18 provides greater protection for freedom of religion than is available under the Free
Exercise Clause, as interpreted in Smith. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in
the Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores: The (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom
from State and Local Infringement, 20 U. ARK. LrrrLE RocK L.J. 633, 661 (1998) ("Article 18 thus
appears to demand more protection of religious freedom than is required by the Supreme Court's
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rights treaty to which the United States is a party.6 In response, the
prosecution contends that the judge need not decide whether the Minnesota
statute conflicts with Article 18, because the United States declared, when it
ratified the treaty, that Articles 1 through 27 are not self-executing.7 Should
the judge reach the merits of the Amish's claim? Should the claim be
dismissed on the grounds that Article 18 is not self-executing?
Since 1992 the United States has become a party to three major human
rights treaties: the ICCPR, the Torture Convention,8 and the Race
Convention.9 As the preceding hypothetical illustrates, these treaties provide
greater protection for individual rights, in certain cases, than is currently
available under federal constitutional or statutory law.'" Under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution," treaties generally
prevail over inconsistent state laws, such as the Minnesota traffic regulation
objected to by the Amish. However, for each of the three treaties, the U.S.
instrument of ratification included a declaration stating that the substantive
articles of the treaty are "not self-executing" ("NSE declarations")."'
decisions in Smith and Boerne."); Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONST.
COMMENTARY 33, 43 (1997) (stating that Article 18 expresses a broader conception of religious
liberty than the Smith interpretation of free exercise). See infra Subsection VI.B.4 for further
discussion of Article 18.
6. The United States deposited its instrument of ratification for the ICCPR on June 8,
1992. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL: STATUS AS AT 31
DEC. 1995, at 122, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/14 (1996) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES].
7. See id. at 130.
8. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), reprinted in 23
I.L.M. 1027 (1984) [hereinafter Torture Convention]. The United States deposited its instrument of
ratification for the Torture Convention on October 21, 1994. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra
note 6, at 185.
9. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. ExEc. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter
Race Convention]. The United States deposited its instrument of ratification on October 21, 1994. See
MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 6, at 96.
10. For additional examples, see infra Subsections V.D.4 and VI.B.5.
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[A)lI Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.").
12. The Senate is required to provide its "advice and consent" for treaty ratification, but the
President actually ratifies treaties. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. The Senate provides its advice and
consent by means of a so-called "resolution of ratification." See 138 CONG. REc. S7634-35 (1994)
(Race Convention); 138 CONG. RC. S4783-84 (1992) (ICCPR); 136 CONG. Rc. S17491-92 (1990)
(Torture Convention). In the case of multilateral treaties, the President ratifies the treaty by depositing
a so-called "instrument of ratification" with the treaty-designated depositary. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 312, cmt. c (1987); see also
Torture Convention, supra note 8, art. 25, para. 2; ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 48, para. 2; Race
Convention, supra note 9, art. 17, para. 2.
13. For each of the three treaties, the NSE declaration included in the instrument of
ratification is identical to the NSE declaration included in the Senate resolution of ratification. For the
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Generally, private litigants cannot invoke non-self-executing treaty
provisions to trump inconsistent state laws. 14
The Carter Administration first proposed attaching NSE declarations to
human rights treaties when it transmitted four human rights treaties to the
Senate in 1978."5 Numerous scholars commented on the NSE declarations at
that time.16 A second wave of scholarship ensued in the early 1990s when
the Senate adopted NSE declarations for the Torture Convention and the
ICCPR;' 7 U.S. ratification of the Race Convention in 1994 generated
additional scholarly commentary.' 8
Torture Convention, compare 136 CONG. REc. S17491-92 (1990) with MULTILATERAL TREATIES,
supra note 6, at 187. For the ICCPR, compare 138 CONG. REc. S4783-84 (1992) with
MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 6, at 130. For the Race Convention, compare 140 CONG. REC.
S7634-35 (1994) with MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 6, at 102.
14. But see infra Part III (discussing the ambiguity surrounding the usage of the term "not
self-executing").
15. See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING FOUR
TREATIES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS, S. EXEC. Docs. C, D, E and F, 95-2, at v (1978)
[hereinafter CARTER MESSAGE]. The four treaties were the Race Convention; the ICCPR; the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [hereinafter ICESCR], adopted Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976); and the American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 (entered into force July 18, 1978), 9 I.L.M. 673.
16. See International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the Comm. on Foreign
Relations, U.S. Senate, 96th Cong. 69 (1979) [hereinafter Carter Hearings] (statement of John Norton
Moore); id. at 87 (statement of Oscar Schachter); id. at 92 (statement of Louis B. Sohn); id. at 97
(statement of Thomas J. Farer); id. at 120 (statement of Covey T. Oliver); id. at 163 (statement of
Louis B. Henkin); id. at 168 (statement of J. Philip Anderegg); id. at 251 (statement of Norman
Redlich); id. at 323 (statement of Oscar Garibaldi); id. at 330 (statement of Thomas Buergenthal);
U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: VITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS? (Richard
B. Lillich ed., 1981) [hereinafter U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES]; Charles H.
Dearborn II, The Domestic Legal Effect of Declarations That Treaty Provisions Are Not Self-
Executing, 57 TEx. L. REv. 233, 236 (1979); David Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the
Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REv. 35, 66-72 (1978).
17. See, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-
Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515 (1991); Louis Henkin,
U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
341 (1995); Frank C. Newman, United Nations Human Rights Covenants and the United States
Government: Diluted Promises, Foreseeable Futures, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1241 (1993); Jordan J.
Paust, Avoiding "Fraudulent" Executive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1257 (1993); John Quigley, The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1287 (1993);
Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control Over the Conclusion
and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571 (1991); David P. Stewart, U.S. Ratification of
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings and
Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1183 (1993); see also U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer eds., 1993) (commenting on U.S.
participation in international human rights conventions).
18. See Gay J. McDougall, Toward a Meaningful International Regime: The Domestic
Relevance of International Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 40 How. L.J. 571,
582-90 (1997); Jordan J. Paust, Race-Based Affirmative Action and International Law, 18 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 659, 664-71 (1997) (describing the Race Convention and its interaction with the ICCPR);
Nkechi Taifa, Codification or Castration? The Applicability of the International Convention to
Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination to the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 40 How. L.J. 641,
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Virtually all of the commentators have criticized the NSE declarations
on policy grounds. 9 A few commentators have argued that the NSE
declarations are invalid.2" Commentators have been remarkably silent,
however, regarding the proper interpretation of the NSE declarations.
Virtually all commentators agree, either explicitly or implicitly, that the
NSE declarations, if legally valid, preclude U.S. courts2' from applying
human rights treaty provisions directly22 to resolve cases involving alleged
human rights treaty violations by federal, state, or local governments or
officials. The few dissenters who have challenged the majority
interpretation have done so in cursory fashion.'
648-55 (1997); Connie de la Vega, Civil Rights During the 1990s: New Treaty Law Could Help
Immensely, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 423, 423-24 (1997).
19. See, e.g., Damrosch, supra note 17, at 518, 523 (arguing that "the trend toward non-
self-executing treaty declarations is unfortunate and should be resisted"); Henkin, supra note 17, at
346-48 (claiming that NSE declarations are "against the spirit of the Constitution"); Paust, supra note
17, at 1283 (concluding that "the attempted non-self-execution policy is far worse than abnegative and
absurd; it brings serious dishonor to the United States and should be abandoned"); Taifa, supra note
18, at 642-43 (stating that the Race Convention "could be a powerful instrument in the United States'
quest to eradicate racial discrimination, but has consciously been rendered impotent due to U.S.
insertion of a non-self-executing declaration"); Weissbrodt, supra note 16, at 68 ("The final result of
making the Covenants not self-executing can only be to diminish substantially the impact of the
treaties in the United States."). But see Stewart, supra note 17, at 1190-1205 (defending the package
of reservations, understandings, and declarations that the United States adopted for the ICCPR).
20. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THn UNITED STATEs 368
(1996) (stating that "an attempted 'reservation' or 'declaration' which conflicts with ajus cogens norm
must also be void, and such is the case" with respect to NSE declarations); Dearborn, supra note 16,
at 233-34 (arguing that NSE declarations "are of dubious validity, probably have no binding effect on
United States courts, and should not be used as aids in construing the treaties"); Quigley, supra note
17, at 1302-03, 1310 (contending that "the validity of the declaration on non-self-execution is
doubtful" and concluding that "U.S. courts should apply traditional jurisprudence on self-execution to
find that the Covenant is the 'law of the land' in the United States"); Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note
17, at 607-09 (criticizing NSE declarations generally); id. at 631-32 (contending that Articles 1
through 16 of the Torture Convention should be deemed to be self-executing, and that the NSE
declaration "should be disregarded by municipal courts in the United States"); Louis N. Schulze, Jr.,
The United States' Detention of Refugees: Evidence of the Senate's Flawed Ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 23 NEw ENO. J. ON CRIM. & Civ.
CONFINEMENT 641 (1997) (arguing that courts should hold that the ICCPR is self-executing despite
the NSE declaration).
21. Cf. Newman, supra note 17, at 1244-49 (contending that the ICCPR is enforceable in
administrative actions, but is not enforceable in U.S. courts).
22. when courts apply treaties "indirectly," some provision of law other than the treaty
provides the rule of decision in the particular case. In contrast, when courts apply a treaty provision
"directly," the treaty itself provides a rule of decision in the particular case. For further discussion of
the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" application of treaties, see infra Section I.A.
23. See Thomas Buergenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties, 36 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 220-21 (stating that NSE declarations prevent American courts from applying
these treaties as domestic law); Kara H. Ching, Indigenous Self-Determination in an Age of Genetic
Patenting: Recognizing an Emerging Human Rights Norm, 66 FORDHAM L. Rv. 687, 710-11 (1997)
(interpreting the NSE declaration attached to the ICCPR to mean that "Congress [must] pass enabling
legislation before the provisions can be enforced"); Conkle, supra note 5, at 661-62 (stating that
Article 18 of the ICCPR "is not yet enforceable as part of the domestic law of the United States,
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This Article is concerned with the proper interpretation of NSE
declarations. The term "not self-executing," when applied to treaty
provisions, has multiple meanings. Indeed, numerous scholarly articles have
discussed the ambiguity of the term "self-executing treaty."25 Unfortunately,
despite an extensive body of literature describing ambiguities in the usage of
the terms "self-executing" and "non-self-executing," commentaries about
NSE declarations attached to human rights treaties have tended to proceed
from the (usually unstated) assumption that the meaning of the term "not
self-executing," as used in NSE declarations, is unambiguous. This Article
attempts to remedy this oversight by applying insights from the scholarship
on the doctrine of self-execution to an analysis of NSE declarations and
human rights treaties. The Article analyzes the significance of the NSE
declarations for cases raising treaty-based human rights claims-that is,
claims by individuals that their human rights, as defined in the treaties, have
been violated by federal, state, or local governments or officials.26 The
because-according to Senate declaration-the ICCPR is not self-executing"); McDougall, supra note
18, at 588 (stating that the NSE declaration attached to the Race Convention stripped the U.S.
judiciary of any meaningful role in interpreting it); Neuman, supra note 5, at 43 (stating that the NSE
declaration attached to the ICCPR means that the treaty is "not directly enforceable in the courts");
Taifa, supra note 18, at 642-43 (stating that the Race Convention "has consciously been rendered
impotent due to U.S. insertion of a non-self-executing declaration"); Barbara Macgrady, Note, Resort
to International Human Rights Law in Challenging Conditions in U.S. Immigration Detention Centers,
23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 271, 300 (1997) ("Since Congress has made its intent clear [by adopting NSE
declarations], it is certain that the courts will not enforce these treaties in a domestic action."); see
also Malvina Halberstam, United States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, 31 GEo. WAsH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 49, 60 (1997) (stating that
the effect of adopting an NSE declaration for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women would be to "bar[ ] the invocation of any provision of the Convention
in a U.S. court, either as the basis of a claim or as a defense").
24. See Vega, supra note 18, at 456 & n.206 (contending that NSE declarations "only affect
individuals attempting to base a private cause of action on the treaty clauses" and that "the concept of
self-execution does not apply . . . to defensive invocations"); see also Paust, supra note 18, at 671
n.45 (quoting Vega).
25. See infra note 89.
26. The treaty-based human rights claims that are the focus of this Article differ
significantly from statutory human rights claims that can be raised under the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994), and/or the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), Pub. L. No.
102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)). The ATCA and the TVPA are
federal statutes that provide a domestic legal remedy for human rights violations committed by foreign
government officials. Several recent cases have raised claims under one or both of these federal
statutes. See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo,
72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Cabiri v. Assasie-
Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass.
1995); Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128
(E.D.N.Y. 1994). Suits filed under the ATCA, in particular, have attracted a great deal of scholarly
interest. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Lmv Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347
(1991); Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm, 73 MINN. L. REv.
349, 360-61 (1988). In contrast, this Article focuses on the possibility for litigants in U.S. courts to
obtain judicial remedies for violations of international human rights treaties committed by federal,
state, or local governments or officials.
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Article's central thesis is that the NSE declarations, properly construed,
permit courts to apply the treaties directly to provide a judicial remedy in
some, but not all, cases that raise meritorious treaty-based human rights
claims.
Just as there has been a remarkably broad consensus regarding the
proper interpretation of the NSE declarations, there has been an even greater
unanimity of views concerning the presumed purpose of the NSE
declarations. The conventional wisdom has been that the purpose of the NSE
declarations was precisely to preclude the "domestication" of international
human rights treaties-that is, to preclude direct application of human rights
treaties by U.S. courts to resolve treaty-based human rights claims.' This
Article contends that the conventional wisdom is, at best, only half right.
Specifically, the Article suggests that the politics of treaty ratification is best
understood as an effort to harmonize two conflicting policy objectives: (1)
ensuring compliance with U.S. treaty obligations, and (2) avoiding
domestication of international human rights treaties. The conventional
wisdom is correct, insofar as it emphasizes that the NSE declarations
manifest the latter policy objectives. However, the conventional wisdom is
wrong, insofar as it presumes that the NSE declarations reflect a deliberate
policy decision that, in the event of a conflict, the objective of avoiding
domestication of human rights treaties should always take precedence over
the objective of treaty compliance. The treaty makers never made any such
deliberate policy decision. Rather, the Executive Branch repeatedly assured
the Senate that the conditions included in the U.S. instruments of ratification
had successfully eliminated any discrepancy between treaty requirements and
preexisting domestic law, thereby ensuring that the United States could
comply fully with its treaty obligations without having to domesticate the
treaties.28 Hence, the treaty makers purposefully refused to decide which
27. See, e.g., Damrosch, supra note 17 (analyzing the trend in the U.S. Senate to use the
NSE declaration to impede judicial enforcement of treaties); Henkin, supra note 17, at 342 (asserting
that the reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs) attached to human rights treaties
indicate that the United States seeks to assure no change in U.S. laws and policies, "even where they
fall below international standards"); McDougall, supra note 18, at 588 (noting that the NSE
declaration attached to the Race Convention "essentially stripped the U.S. judiciary of any meaningful
role in interpreting" the treaties); Paust, supra note 17 (arguing that the Executive Branch could not
have acted in good faith to fulfill its treaty obligations when it issued the NSE declaration to the
ICCPR); Quigley, supra note 17, at 1297-98 (noting that ratification of the ICCPR was achieved only
after the Bush Administration ensured that the ICCPR would not be enforceable in U.S. courts);
Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 17 (analyzing the effect of NSE declarations on adjudication of
human rights claims in U.S. courts); Taifa, supra note 18 (arguing that the attachment of an NSE
declaration to the Race Convention rendered it impotent); Weissbrodt, supra note 16 (asserting that
NSE declarations deprive the U.S. courts of a role in interpreting and enforcing human rights
treaties).
28. For a detailed discussion of this point, see infra Subsection V.C.2.
1999]
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objective should take precedence in the event of a conflict because the
Executive Branch insisted that there would not be a conflict.29
Despite Executive Branch statements to the contrary, however, there is
indeed a real conflict between the two objectives. In cases like the Amish
hypothetical at the beginning of this Article, direct judicial application of
treaty provisions to resolve treaty-based human rights claims promotes the
goal of treaty compliance, but undermines the goal of avoiding
domestication. Conversely, a judicial refusal to apply the treaty provisions
would fulfill the anti-domestication objective, but subvert the goal of treaty
compliance. The reinterpretation that this Article advocates-that the NSE
declarations permit courts to apply human rights treaty provisions directly in
some, but not all, cases involving treaty-based human rights claims-is
consistent with the treaty makers' refusal to make the hard decisions about
trade-offs between conflicting policy objectives; their purposeful indecision
effectively delegated to the courts the responsibility for making these hard
decisions on a case-by-case basis. Conversely, the majority interpretation
that this Article criticizes-that the NSE declarations preclude direct judicial
application in all cases-is based on a mistaken assumption that the treaty
makers purposefully elevated the anti-domestication objective above the goal
of treaty compliance.
The Article's argument relies heavily on an analysis of statements that
Executive Branch officials made to the Senate during the ratification
process. There are three distinct reasons for adopting this methodology.
First, under Article II of the Constitution, the President is the primary
lawmaker for treaties; the Senate role is simply to provide its advice and
consent.3" Second, for each treaty, the Senate has generally acquiesced
silently to the Executive Branch's proposed NSE declaration. Third, since
the NSE declarations are facially ambiguous, courts must examine the
Senate record to ascertain the treaty makers' intent in adopting the NSE
declarations.
Part II of this Article provides background information about the
ICCPR, the Torture Convention, and the Race Convention. That Part
emphasizes the fact that all three treaties obligate the United States to ensure
29. This argument is developed at length in Part V, infra. Those who are inclined to reject
the thesis without reading further, though, should consider the following point. Just as it is extremely
unlikely that two-thirds of the Senate would have consented to ratification of the treaties without
explicit assurances from the Executive Branch that the treaties would not be incorporated into
domestic law, it is equally implausible that two-thirds of the Senate would have consented to
ratification of the treaties without explicit assurances from the Executive Branch that the United States
could and would comply fully with its treaty obligations. Hence, any explicit statement that the United
States would privilege the anti-domestication objective over the treaty-compliance objective-or that
the United States would privilege the treaty-compliance objective over the anti-domestication
objective-would have doomed the prospects for ratification.
30. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2.
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that: (1) any person who alleges a violation of his or her treaty rights
receives an individual hearing before an impartial tribunal that has authority
to adjudicate the merits of the claim; and (2) any person whose treaty rights
are violated obtains an effective remedy.
Part I describes four different concepts of "non-self-execution." Two
of these concepts are particularly relevant to an analysis of NSE
declarations. If one construes the NSE declarations in accordance with the
Foster concept of non-self-execution,31 then these declarations mean that
human rights treaty provisions cannot be applied directly by the courts in the
absence of implementing legislation. However, if one construes the NSE
declarations in accordance with the "private cause of action" concept of non-
self-execution, then these declarations mean only that human rights treaty
provisions do not create a private cause of action. Under the "private cause
of action" concept, the substantive provisions of human rights treaties could
still be invoked by defendants in both civil and criminal actions.32 Moreover,
it could be argued that the treaties' substantive provisions should be capable
of being invoked by plaintiffs who raise treaty-based human rights claims in
reliance on statutory or common law causes of action.33
Part IV examines the Senate record- associated with ratification of
human rights treaties; it shows that Executive Branch explanations of NSE
declarations changed over time from a Foster concept of non-self-execution
to a "private cause of action" concept. Whereas the Carter Administration
consistently explained its proposed NSE declarations in terms of the Foster
concept of non-self-execution, the Clinton Administration consistently
explained the NSE declaration attached to the Race Convention in terms of
the "private cause of action" concept. The Senate consented to ratification of
the ICCPR and the Torture Convention during the Bush Administration,
whose explanations of the NSE declarations oscillated between the Foster
concept and the "private cause of action" concept.
Part V discusses the politics of NSE declarations, developing in greater
detail the thesis that the treaty makers refused to make the hard decisions
involving trade-offs between conflicting policy objectives. Part VI addresses
the judicial dilemma that ensues from the treaty makers' refusal to make
31. I derive this label from the case of Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), which
gave birth to the concept.
32. For a useful discussion of the relationship between the "private cause of action" concept
and the defensive invocation of treaties, see Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-
Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 695, 719-22 (1995). See also Thomas Michael McDonnell,
Defensively Invoking Treaties in American Courts: Jurisdictional Challenges Under the U.N. Drug
Trafficking Convention by Foreign Defendants Kidnapped Abroad by U.S. Agents, 37 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1401, 1448-52 (1996) (explaining why the standards for defensive invocation of treaties are
lower than for a treaty-based private cause of action).
33. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92
COLuM. L. Rev. 1082, 1141-57 (1992).
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these decisions. If courts decline to reach the merits of non-frivolous,
nonredundant treaty-based human rights claims, they risk contravening the
intent of the treaty makers to comply with U.S. treaty obligations. If courts
do reach the merits of such claims, they risk contravening the intent of the
treaty makers to avoid domestication of the human rights treaties. In light of
this dilemma, the Article proposes an analytic framework for courts to apply
in deciding whether the merits of treaty-based human rights claims should be
reached. This Article also contends that the dilemma can be attenuated,
though not eliminated, by construing the NSE declarations in accordance
with the "private cause of action" concept.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Substantive Provisions of the Human Rights Treaties
The ICCPR primarily imposes negative obligations on states: It
obligates parties to refrain from interfering in a protected sphere of personal
liberty. The range of rights protected under the ICCPR is truly impressive,
including, inter alia, the right to life, the right to privacy, the right to
"freedom of thought, conscience and religion," and the rights to freedom
from discrimination and equality before the law.34
The Race Convention, like the ICCPR, prohibits racial discrimination
by government entities. However, the Race Convention goes further-it also
obligates governments to take affirmative steps to eliminate discrimination
by private groups.35 Whereas the ICCPR obligates states to ensure equal
treatment with respect to civil and political rights, the Race Convention also
34. See ICCPR, supra note 5, arts. 6, 17, 18, 26. The ICCPR also includes the right not to
be "subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;" the right not to
be held in slavery or servitude; the right to liberty and security of person; the right of "all persons
deprived of their liberty [to] be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person;" the right to freedom of movement within and between states; the right not to be
expelled from a state without due process of law; the right to a fair hearing before an impartial
tribunal for those facing criminal charges; the right to freedom of expression; the right of peaceful
assembly; the right to freedom of association; the right to marry; the right of every child to "such
measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor;" and the right to vote and to take part
in the conduct of public affairs. See id. arts. 7-25.
35. See, e.g., Race Convention, supra note 9, art. 2, para. l(d) ("Each State Party shall
prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by
circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization."). Article 3 obligates
parties to "prevent, prohibit and eradicate" racial segregation and apartheid. Article 4 obligates parties
to, inter alia, "declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial
superiority." Article 6 obligates parties to provide effective remedies for victims of racial
discrimination. Article 7 obligates parties to adopt measures to combat prejudice and to promote
"understanding, tolerance and friendship among nations and racial or ethnical groups." See id. arts,
3-7. When the United States ratified the Race Convention, it adopted a reservation limiting its
obligation to eliminate racial discrimination by private groups. See 140 CONG. REc. S7634 (1994).
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guarantees racial equality in the enjoyment of specified economic, social,
and cultural rights."
The Torture Convention primarily imposes affirmative obligations on
state parties, rather than negative obligations. The Torture Convention
requires governments to ensure that persons who commit acts of torture are
subjected to criminal penalties. 7 Several articles are directed primarily to
the Executive Branch: They require education of law enforcement officers,
systematic review of rules for detention of prisoners, and prompt
investigation of any complaints "wherever there is reasonable ground to
believe that an act of torture has been committed."38 Thus, many of the
Convention's provisions are not intended to create rights for individuals.
However, Articles 3 and 15 of the Torture Convention are intended to
create rights for individual torture victims. Article 3 obligates parties not to
deport or extradite "a person to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture. " " Article 15 obligates parties to ensure that "any statement which is
established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as
evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as
evidence that the statement was made."
40
B. U.S. Ratification of the Human Rights Treaties
President Carter submitted the ICCPR and the Race Convention to the
Senate, along with two other human rights treaties, on February 23, 1978.41
For all four treaties, the President proposed a package of "reservations,"
"understandings," and "declarations" (RUDs), including a declaration that
the substantive provisions of the treaties are not self-executing.42 The Senate
Foreign Relations Committee held four days of hearings on the human rights
36. See Race Convention, supra note 9, art. 5, para. (e) (obliging states to guarantee
equality before the law in the enjoyment of the right to work, the right to unionize, the right to
housing, the right to health and social services, the right to education, and the right to "equal
participation in cultural activities").
37. For example, the Convention obligates each party to "ensure that all acts of torture are
offences under its criminal law," Torture Convention, supra note 8, art. 4, para. 1; to establish
jurisdiction to prosecute torturers who are nationals of that state, or who are present in that state, or
whose victims are nationals of that state, regardless of where the act of torture occurred, see id. art.
5; to either prosecute offenders, or extradite them to another country that will subject them to
prosecution, see id. art. 7; and to assist each other in connection with criminal proceedings, see id.
art. 9.
38. See Torture Convention, supra note 8, arts. 10-12.
39. Id. art. 3.
40. Id. art. 15.
41. See CARTER MESSAGE, supra note 15.
42. See id. at vi.
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treaties, from November 14 to 19, 1979. 41 However, "[d]omestic and
international events at the end of 1979, including the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and the hostage crisis in Iran, prevented the Committee from
moving to a vote" on the treaties.' After President Carter's term ended, the
treaties remained dormant in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for
more than a decade, largely because "[t]he Reagan Administration did not
indicate any interest in ratifying" them.45
In 1988, while the ICCPR and Race Convention were dormant in the
Senate, the United States signed the Torture Convention, and President
Reagan promptly submitted it to the Senate along with a proposed package
of RUDs."' In July 1989, Senator Claiborne Pell, chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, wrote to the Bush Administration, asking it to
reconsider the proposed RUDs in light of substantial "opposition from
human rights groups and other interested parties."47  The Bush
Administration responded in December of 1989 with a revised package of
RUDs,48 including a declaration "that the provisions of Articles 1 through 16
of the Convention are not self-executing. "'4 The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee held one day of hearings on the Convention.5" The Senate
adopted the NSE declaration without change,5' and it was included in the
U.S. instrument of ratification.52 The Senate provided its advice and consent
to ratification in 1990,"3 Congress enacted implementing legislation in
1994, 54 and the United States became a party to the Convention shortly
thereafter. 5
On August 8, 1991-after the Senate consented to ratification of the
Torture Convention, but before the United States ratified it-President Bush
wrote to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "to urge the Senate to
43. See Carter Hearings, supra note 16.
44. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS: REPORT, S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 2 (1992) [hereinafter ICCPR REPORT].
45. Id.
46. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S. EXEC. REP.
No. 101-30, at 2 (1990) [hereinafter TORTURE REPORT].
47. Id. at35.
48. See id. at 36-37.
49. Id. at 12. Articles 1 through 16 define the parties' substantive obligations. Articles 17
through 33 deal with treaty administration.
50. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 1990, Treaty Doc. 100-20, Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Senate, 101st Cong. (1990) [hereinafter Torture Hearing].
51. See 136 CONG. REc. S17,492 (1990).
52. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 6, at 187.
53. See 136 CONG. REc. S17,492 (1990).
54. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-
236, § 506, 108 Stat. 382, 463 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340B (1994)).
55. The implementing legislation was enacted in April 1994, and the United States deposited
its instrument of ratification in October 1994. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 6, at 185.
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renew its consideration of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights with a view to providing advice and consent to ratification."56
President Bush proposed a set of RUDs that largely tracked the conditions
proposed by the Carter Administration. 7 One proposed declaration was
"that the provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of the ICCPR are not self-
executing."8 This provision was identical to the NSE declaration previously
proposed by President Carter." The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
held one day of hearings on the ICCPR,6" and the Committee voted
unanimously to report the ICCPR to the Senate with a recommendation
favoring ratification." The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification
of the ICCPR on April 2, 1992.62 In its resolution of ratification, the Senate
adopted verbatim the entire package of RUDs proposed by President Bush,
including the NSE declaration. On June 8, 1992, the United States
deposited its instrument of ratification, including the RUDs, with the United
Nations.'
In April 1994, the Clinton Administration urged the Senate "to give its
prompt attention to and approval of" the Race Convention.6 The
Administration proposed a set of RUDs that were broadly similar to the
conditions proposed by the Carter Administration.66 One proposed
declaration was "that the provisions of the Convention are not self-
executing."67 This is substantially identical to the NSE declaration previously
proposed by President Carter. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
held one day of hearings on the Convention. 9 On May 25, 1994, the
Committee voted unanimously to report the Convention to the Senate with a
56. ICCPR REPORT, supra note 44, at 25.
57. See id. at 10-21.
58. Id. at 19.
59. See CARTER MESSAGE, supra note 15, at xv.
60. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 102d Cong. (1992) [hereinafter ICCPR Hearing].
61. See ICCPR REPORT, supra note 44, at 3.
62. See 138 CONG. REc. S4781-84 (1992).
63. See id.
64. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 6, at 122, 130-3 1.
65. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON
THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, S. EXEC. REP. No. 103-29, at 2 (1994)
[hereinafter RACE REPORT].
66. See id. at 10-11.
67. Id. at 11.
68. Compare id. at 11 with CARTER MESSAGE, supra note 15, at viii ("It is further
recommended that a declaration indicate the non-self-executing nature of Articles 1 through 7 of the
Convention.").
69. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(EX. C, 95-2): Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 103d Cong. (1994)
[hereinafter Race Hearing].
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recommendation favoring ratification.70 The Senate provided its advice and
consent to ratification in June 1994. 7' In its resolution of ratification, the
Senate adopted verbatim the entire package of RUDs proposed by President
Clinton, including the NSE declaration.72 In October 1994, the United States
deposited its instrument of ratification, including the RUDs, with the United
Nations. 73
C. The Obligation to Enforce the Treaties Domestically
The ICCPR, the Race Convention, and the Torture Convention all
obligate parties to provide an effective remedy for any person whose rights
are violated.74 Implicit in the obligation to provide a remedy is the obligation
to ensure that any person who raises a non-frivolous allegation that his treaty
rights have been violated obtains an individual hearing before an impartial
tribunal that is authorized to adjudicate the merits of the claim. No country
can fulfill its obligation to provide remedies for violations of individual
rights if the individuals who allege such violations are left without a forum
in which to raise their claims.75
Moreover, the right to an individual hearing before an impartial
tribunal is stated explicitly in each of the treaties. For example, the Torture
Convention provides: "Each State Party shall ensure that any individual who
alleges he has been subjected to torture in any territory under its jurisdiction
has the right to complain to, and to have his case promptly and impartially
examined by, its competent authorities." 76 Similarly, the ICCPR not only
entitles individuals to an effective remedy, but also states that "any person
claiming [entitlement to] such a remedy shall have his right thereto
70. See RACE REPORT, supra note 65, at 3.
71. See 140 CONG. REC. S7634-35 (1994).
72. See id.
73. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 6, at 96, 102.
74. See Torture Convention, supra note 8, art. 14, para. 1 ("Each State Party shall ensure in
its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair
and adequate compensation .... In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture,
his dependents shall be entitled to compensation."); ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 2, para. 3(a)
(obligating parties "[tlo ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are
violated shall have an effective remedy"); Race Convention, supra note 9, art. 6 (obligating parties to
"assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies, through the competent
national tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts of racial discrimination which violate
his human rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to this Convention").
75. For further elaboration of this point, see Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights: 7he Use of
Human Right Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10
MICH. J. INT'L L. 543, 611-28 (1989). A revised version of this article is in PAUST, supra note 20, at
198-212.
76. Torture Convention, supra note 8, art. 13.
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determined by .. . [some] competent authority provided for by the legal
system of the State."77
The right to an individual hearing does not necessarily entail a right to
judicial review. The Torture Convention simply refers to an impartial
examination by "competent authorities."78 Similarly, the Race Convention
refers to "competent national tribunals.""9 The ICCPR obligates parties to
"develop the possibilities of judicial remedy,"8" but it does not mandate
judicial review of all treaty-based human rights claims. Thus, states are not
obligated to provide for judicial enforcement of treaty rights, but they are
obligated to ensure that: (1) any person who raises a non-frivolous allegation
that his or her treaty rights have been violated obtains an individual hearing
before an impartial tribunal; and (2) any person whose rights are violated
obtains an effective remedy.
Although the treaties do not require judicial enforcement, some have
argued that the United States is obligated to provide for judicial
enforcement, because, in the U.S. legal system, there is no alternative forum
other than the courts with the institutional competence to adjudicate the
merits of individual claims.8" In fact, there are at least some treaty-based
human rights claims that can be adjudicated outside of Article III courts. 2
Moreover, courts need not apply the treaties directly in cases where a
remedy is available under some other provision of U.S. law.83 However, in
cases where there is no alternative forum, and no remedy is available under
other provisions of U.S. law, the United States would be in violation of its
treaty obligations to provide for an individual hearing and an effective
remedy if courts refuse to reach the merits of non-frivolous84 treaty-based
human rights claims.
77. ICCPR, art. 2, para. 3(b); see also ICCPR, art. 14, para. 1 ("In the determination of
any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by
law."). The Race Convention is less explicit than the other treaties, but it does obligate parties to
ensure that everyone within their jurisdiction has "the right to seek from [competent national] tribunals
just and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of" treaty violations.
Race Convention, supra note 9, art. 6. The right to seek reparation necessarily implies the right to an
individual hearing.
78. Torture Convention, supra note 8, art. 13.
79. Race Convention, supra note 9, art. 6.
80. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 2, para. 3(b).
81. See, e.g., Quigley, supra note 17, at 1296 ("Since the United States has no legislative or
administrative mechanism available to individuals, the only possible remedy is judicial. Thus, as
applied to the United States, paragraph 3 of Article 2 [of the ICCPR] requires that the courts ensure
observance of the Covenant.")
82. For instance, the Secretary of State has final discretion in ruling on extradition cases.
See infra Subsection VI.B.3 for a discussion of one example.
83. See infra Subsection VI.B.2 for fuller development of this point.
84. See infra Subsection V.D.1 for further discussion of the "non-frivolous" caveat.
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Most commentators have interpreted the NSE declarations to mean that
courts are precluded from reaching the merits of treaty-based human rights
claims in such cases.85 Since this interpretation is inconsistent with U.S.
treaty obligations, it is necessary to analyze more closely the meaning of the
term "not self-executing."
III. THE MEANING OF THE TERM "NOT SELF-EXECUTING"
When courts hold that a particular treaty provision is "not self-
executing," they generally refuse to apply the treaty provision in the manner
that the litigant invoking the provision wishes it to apply.86 However, this
consistent refusal masks an underlying conceptual confusion about the
meaning of the term. A 1948 memorandum prepared for the Department of
State Legal Adviser stated that, "An examination of adjudicated cases and of
some treatises and of some of the law reviews has failed to disclose a clear
definition of the term 'Self-Executing Treaty."' 87 Three years later,
Professor Myres McDougal stated that, "this word 'self-executing' is
essentially meaningless, and ... the quicker we drop it from our vocabulary
the better for clarity and understanding."88 Nevertheless, despite repeated
exhortations by scholars to either clarify or dispense with the concept of
self-execution, courts continue to employ the term, and the ambiguity
surrounding its usage has only increased with the passage of time.
This Part describes the different meanings of the term "not self-
executing" used by courts with reference to treaties. The various non-self-
execution concepts are divided into two groups: (1) those concepts that
preclude altogether the direct judicial application of non-self-executing treaty
provisions; and (2) those concepts that limit the direct judicial application of
non-self-executing treaty provisions to certain types of claims and/or certain
types of litigants. The discussion draws heavily from the work of other
scholars who have explored the multiple meanings of the term "not self-
85. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. But see John A. Perkins, 7he Changing
Foundations of International Law: From State Consent to State Responsibility, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J.
433, 492 n.185 (1997) (stating that NSE declarations are "of limited legal effect upon the obligation of
the United States to provide 'an effective remedy'").
86. But cf. Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (E.D. Va. 1996)
(holding that Paraguay had standing to sue under certain treaties, because it is an actual party to the
contract, even though the treaties are not self-executing in the sense that they do not confer rights of
action on private individuals), aff'd, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Breard v. Greene,
118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998).
87. Memorandum from Attorney Adviser Diven to Legal Adviser Gross, Department of
State, "Definition of 'Self-Executing Treaty'" (Apr. 22, 1948), Department of State, file 711.009/4-
2248, reprinted in MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, 14 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 304, 304 (1970).
88. Myres McDougal, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (Apr. 27, 1951), in 45 PRoc. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 101, 102 (1951).
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executing." 89 The purpose of this Part, therefore, is not to break new ground
in the analysis of the doctrine of self-execution, but rather to establish a
framework for analyzing statements by Executive Branch officials who, at
different times, have offered different explanations to the Senate regarding
the meaning of NSE declarations attached to different human rights treaties.
A. Concepts That Preclude Direct Judicial Application
Courts sometimes refer to treaties as an aid for interpreting federal
statutes.9" At other times, courts apply legislation that has been enacted
pursuant to a treaty. 91 These are examples of "indirect" judicial application
of treaties. When courts apply treaties indirectly, some provision of law
other than the treaty itself provides a rule of decision in the particular case.
In contrast, when courts apply a treaty provision "directly," the treaty itself
provides a rule of decision in the particular case. Judges can apply treaty
provisions indirectly, regardless of whether they are self-executing or not.92
In fact, judges often apply treaty provisions indirectly even when the United
States is not a party to the treaty.93 However, certain concepts of non-self-
execution would preclude altogether the direct judicial application of non-
self-executing treaty provisions. This Section briefly describes two such
concepts.
89. The literature on the doctrine of self-executing treaties is extensive. Important recent
articles include Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical
Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 627 (1986); John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal
Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310 (1992) [hereinafter Jackson, Status of Treaties];
John H. Jackson, United States, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW 141 (Francis G.
Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987) [hereinafter Jackson, United States]; Jordan J. Paust, Self-
Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-
Executing Treaties and U.S. v. Postal: Win at Any Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892 (1980); Vazquez,
supra note 32; and Vazquez, supra note 33.
90. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
114 (1987) ("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with
international law or with an international agreement of the United States.").
91. See id. § IlI cmt. h (stating that, with respect to non-self-executing treaties, "it is the
implementing legislation, rather than the agreement itself, that is given effect as law in the United
States").
92. Indeed, the United States has told the U.N. Human Rights Committee that the NSE
declaration attached to the ICCPR does not preclude indirect judicial application of the ICCPR. See
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America, U.N. GAOR
Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1413th mtg. at para. 276, U.N. Doc. CCPRICI79/Add.50 (1995)
("[N]otwithstanding the non-self-executing declaration of the United States, American courts are not
prevented from seeking guidance from the Covenant in interpreting American law."); see also Sarah
H. Cleveland, Global Labor Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 76 Thx. L. REv. 1533, 1573 n.200
(1998) (quoting the Concluding Observations).
93. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing the
ICCPR and other human rights treaties to which the United States was not then a party in support of
the proposition that torture is a "violation of the law of nations" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350).
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1. Automatic Incorporation
When courts say that a particular treaty provision is self-executing,
they sometimes mean that it is automatically incorporated into domestic law
upon ratification of the treaty. Under this interpretation, the statement that a
treaty provision is not self-executing means that it has no status as domestic
law in the absence of implementing legislation.94
The earliest use of the term "self-executing" in this sense appears to
have been in Whitney v. Robertson.5 There, the Supreme Court stated that:
When the [treaty] stipulations are not self-executing they can only be enforced pursuant
to legislation to carry them into effect .... If the treaty contains stipulations which are
self-executing, that is, require no legislation to make them operative, to that extent they
have the force and effect of a legislative enactment.9
Under this concept of self-execution, self-executing treaty provisions are
automatically incorporated into domestic law upon treaty ratification; non-
self-executing provisions have no domestic legal status in the absence of
implementing legislation, even if they are obligatory as a matter of
international law.'
94. In this Article, the following statements are all considered to be semantically equivalent:
(1) a treaty provision has the status of domestic law; (2) a treaty provision has domestic legal effect;
(3) a treaty provision has domestic legal force; and (4) a treaty provision has been incorporated into
domestic law.
95. 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
96. Id. at 194.
97. The Supremacy Clause states that "[A]II Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2. The proposition that a treaty has no status as domestic law implies that it is not the "Law of the
Land" under the Supremacy Clause. Although the author is unaware of any court decision holding
explicitly that a non-self-executing treaty is not the "Law of the Land," that conclusion is implicit in
many court decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 937-38 (11th Cir. 1985)
(stating that Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas is not self-executing and that "the United
States' ratification of the treaty did not incorporate the restrictive language of Article 6 ... into its
domestic law"); Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing Co., 771 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating
that international agreements that are not self-executing "are merely executory agreements between
the two nations and have no effect on domestic law absent additional governmental action"); Spiess v.
C. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1981) (defining self-executing treaties as ones that "are
binding domestic law of their own accord, without the need for implementing legislation"); United
States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 875 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Article 6 of the United States Constitution
declares treaties made 'under the Authority of the United States [to] be the supreme Law of the Land,'
but it was early decided that treaties affect the municipal law of the United States only when those
treaties are given effect by congressional legislation or are, by their nature, self-executing.").
It is beyond the scope of this Article to present a comprehensive scheme for determining which
treaty provisions are the "Law of the Land." However, the author believes that, subject to a few
narrow exceptions, non-self-executing treaty provisions are the "Law of the Land" under the
Supremacy Clause, even if courts cannot apply them directly. This is the view shared by most
scholars. See Louis HENKn, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNrrED STATES CONSTrrUTION 203 (2d ed.
1996) ("Whether a treaty is self-executing or not ... it is supreme law of the land."); PAUST, supra
note 20, at 62-63 (discussing domestic legal effects of non-self-executing treaties); Iwasawa, supra
note 89, at 645 ("U.S. courts have consistently recognized that provisions of constitutions and statutes
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Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.98 is the most recent
Supreme Court case that employs the automatic incorporation concept of
self-execution. There, the Supreme Court stated that the Warsaw
Convention, an international air carriage treaty to which the United States is
a party, is self-executing. 99 The Court explained that the term "self-
executing" means that "no domestic legislation is required to give the
Convention the force of law in the United States. " "' This is consistent with
the Whitney concept of self-execution as automatic incorporation. Numerous
lower courts have employed this concept of self-execution.01
2. The Foster Concept of Non-Self-Execution
Although Foster v. Neilson"2 does not use the term "self-executing,"
the case is widely regarded as the source of the distinction in United States
law between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties. In Foster, Chief
Justice John Marshall stated that some treaties are addressed "to the
political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the
contract [i.e., the treaty] before it can become a rule for the Court." °3 Thus,
Marshall distinguished between: (1) treaties that address themselves to the
judicial department, which can be applied directly by the courts (self-
executing); 1" and (2) treaties that address themselves to the political
branches, which require legislative implementation before they can provide a
rule of decision for the judiciary (non-self-executing). 0 5
are the law of the land, whether or not they are self-executing. Non-self-executing treaty provisions
should not be treated any differently."); Jackson, Status of Treaties, supra note 89, at 316
(distinguishing between the issue of domestic validity-whether a treaty is the law of the land-and the
issue of direct applicability, which is equated with self-execution).
98. 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
99. See id. at 252.
100. Id.
101. See cases cited supra note 97.
102. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
103. Id. at 314.
104. Marshall stated that such treaties should "be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent
to an act of the legislature." Id.
105. Unfortunately, Chief Justice Marshall did not articulate clearly the criteria that judges
should apply in determining whether a particular treaty provision is self-executing. Just four years
after deciding Foster, the Chief Justice reversed himself and held that Article 8 of an 1819 treaty with
Spain was self-executing, despite the fact that Foster held the same treaty article to be non-self-
executing. See United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 87-89 (1833) (relying on the Spanish
text of the treaty to support the conclusion that Article 8 was self-executing). Ever since then, courts
and commentators have struggled, largely without success, to develop a coherent set of criteria for
judges to apply in determining whether a particular treaty provision requires implementing legislation
before it can provide a rule of decision for the courts. See generally Iwasawa, supra note 89 (arguing,
among other things, that the intent of the parties is not a reliable criterion for determining direct
applicability for treaties, because the parties are not generally concerned with that question); Jackson,
United States, supra note 89 (discussing the complexity of the law regarding application of treaties in
19991
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In United States v. Alvarez-Machain,t' the Supreme Court apparently
understood the term "self-executing" in accordance with the Foster concept.
With respect to the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico,
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that, "The Extradition Treaty has the force of
law, and if, as respondent asserts, it is self-executing, it would appear that a
court must enforce it on behalf of an individual .... ,1 The statement that
the treaty "has the force of law" is unqualified, implying that it is true
regardless of whether the treaty is self-executing. However, according to
Justice Rehnquist, even though the treaty has the force of law, the court's
duty to enforce the treaty on behalf of an individual depends on whether it is
self-executing. In other words, only self-executing treaties can be applied
directly by the judiciary.
No treaty provision can be directly applicable unless it is also
automatically incorporated-that is, judges cannot rely on a provision as a
rule of decision if it has no status as domestic law. However, the fact that a
treaty provision is automatically incorporated into domestic law does not
necessarily mean that judges can rely on it to provide a rule of decision in a
case. For example, an arms control treaty provision that obligates the United
States to destroy certain missiles is not directly applicable by the judiciary,
because it manifestly "addresses itself to the political, not the judicial
department."'0 8 The fact that the provision is not directly applicable by the
judiciary, however, does not mean that it is without domestic legal force. It
is analogous to a statute that authorizes funds for missile production-such a
statute has domestic legal force, but it does not provide a rule of decision for
the courts.
the domestic law of the United States); Paust, supra note 89 (arguing that the history of constitutional
interpretation suggests that no treaty is inherently self-executing except those which would seek to
declare war on behalf of the United States); Riesenfeld, supra note 89 (arguing that the hostility in
case law to the domestic applicability of customary international law or treaties is regrettable and
unsalutary); Vazquez, supra note 32 (arguing that much of the confusion over whether treaties are
self-executing stems from the failure of courts and commentators to recognize that four distinct
"doctrines" of self-executing treaties have been conflated).
Although courts and commentators generally agree that the key criterion is intent, the
unresolved questions include the following: (1) Should judges seek to ascertain the common intent of
all the treaty parties, or is the unilateral intent of the United States dispositive?; (2) Should judges rely
primarily on the text of the treaty to determine intent, or should they consult other sources as well?;
(3) Should treaties be presumed to be self-executing, absent evidence of intent to the contrary, or
should treaties be presumed to be non-self-executing, in which case the burden of proof rests with the
party who advocates a self-executing interpretation?; and (4) What is the substantive content of the
"intent" for which judges are searching? Is it an intent to create judicially enforceable private rights,
or is it an intent that the treaty should be applied directly, without the need for implementing
legislation?
106. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
107. Id. at 667.
108. Foster, 27 U.S. at 314.
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Thus, under the Foster concept of self-execution, a non-self-executing
treaty has domestic legal force, but it cannot be applied directly by the
judiciary. As will be discussed below, Executive Branch officials often
explained the meaning of NSE declarations attached to human rights treaties
in terms of the Foster concept of non-self-execution.
B. Concepts That Permit Direct Judicial Application in Some Cases
The preceding Section described concepts of non-self-execution that
share one common feature: courts are precluded from applying non-self-
executing treaty provisions directly as a rule of decision. In contrast, this
Section describes two concepts of non-self-execution that would permit
direct judicial application of non-self-executing treaty provisions in some
cases, depending on the nature of the claim and/or the identities of the
litigants. It is important to emphasize that, to the best of the author's
knowledge, no U.S. court has ever held a treaty provision to be non-self-
executing and then applied it directly to decide a case. However, courts
often apply treaty provisions directly to cases before them without
considering whether -the treaty provision is self-executing. 109 Moreover,
courts frequently discuss the concept of non-self-execution in terms that
imply the possibility of direct judicial application in some cases.
1. Self-Execution and Standing
Although courts sometimes treat the issues of standing and self-
execution as distinct inquiries,1 ' there are cases in which courts have fused
the concepts of standing and self-execution.11 For example, in United States
109. See Paust, supra note 89, at 772-73 (tracing a line of Supreme Court decisions that
simply ignores the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaty provisions). One
way to explain these cases is to say that the courts, in such cases, simply assume that the treaty
provision at issue is self-executing. However, an alternative explanation is that the courts assume that
the self-execution question is irrelevant because they understand "self-execution" in terms of the
.private cause of action" concept, see infra Subsection I.B.2, and the litigant who seeks to invoke
the treaty provision is not relying on it to establish a private cause of action.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 607 (C.D. Cal. 1990)
("Whether a treaty is self-executing is a question distinct from whether a party has standing to enforce
its terms.").
111. See, e.g., More v. Intelcom Support Servs., Inc., 960 F.2d 466, 474 (5th Cir. 1992)
("In regards to employees of contractors, the Treaty is not self-executing and therefore Plaintiffs have
no standing to complain in federal court that they did not receive benefits of which they believe the
Treaty assures them."); United States v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir. 1991) ("We have
held that a treaty must be self-executing in order for an individual citizen to have standing to protest a
violation of the treaty."); United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 798 n.11 (S.D. Fla. 1992)
(quoting the sentencing transcript, which argued that the Geneva Convention is "not self-executing;
that is, only a signatory power can invoke the rights and privileges under the treaties to the benefit of
a prisoner of war, and that indeed a prisoner of war himself had no standing to do that for himself").
1999]
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v. Bent-Santana,"2 U.S. Coast Guard officials boarded a Panamanian flag
vessel one hundred miles off the U.S. coast. The officials found drugs on
board the vessel and arrested the captain, Bent-Santana. An agreement
between the United States and Panama stipulated that "it shall be arranged
that in any boarding of a Panamanian Flag Vessel, a Panamanian Consular
Official is to be present. " ' ,' No Panamanian consular official was present
when Coast Guard officials boarded the vessel in this case. Bent-Santana
raised this argument as a defense to criminal prosecution." 4 The court
questioned whether the agreement relied upon by Bent-Santana had a
"binding force.""' 5 However, even assuming that it was a binding
agreement, the court said that "unless a treaty or intergovernmental
agreement is 'self-executing' . . . an individual citizen does not have
standing to protest when one nation does not follow the terms of such
agreement. Only Panama could invoke [the agreement] and it evinces no
such inclination."' 6 The court concluded that the defendant lacked standing
to raise the claim because the agreement was not self-executing.
Suppose, however, that Panama had objected to the boarding of the
ship because a Panamanian consular official was not present. The clear
implication of the court's analysis is that the defendant would then have a
valid defense, because Panama had the power to invoke the international
agreement on behalf of the defendant, despite the fact that the agreement
was not self-executing.117 By linking the concept of self-execution to the
concept of standing, and suggesting that countries have the power to invoke
non-self-executing agreements, but individuals do not, the court left open the
possibility that countries could invoke non-self-executing treaties on behalf
of their nationals when their nationals are involved in litigation in U.S.
courts. Under this concept of self-execution, a court can apply a non-self-
executing treaty provision directly if a U.S. treaty partner invokes the treaty
to provide a rule of decision in a particular case."' Thus, the self-execution
112. 774 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1985).
113. Id. at 1548 n.1.
114. See id. at 1550.
115. Id.
116. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
117. In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit
specifically held that a criminal defendant had -standing to raise a treaty-based objection to the court's
exercise of personal jurisdiction. See id. at 1355-57. The court based the defendant's standing on the
fact that his native country, Mexico, objected that the United States had violated its extradition treaty
with Mexico when individuals acting at the behest of the United States government kidnapped the
defendant from Mexico and forcibly abducted him to the United States. See id. Under this analysis, as
in Bent-Santana, the defendant has standing to raise a treaty-based claim only if his government
objects to the treaty violation. Verdugo-Urquidez differs from Bent-Santana, however, in that the
Ninth Circuit treated the self-execution question, Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1358 n.17,
separately from the standing question, id. at 1355-57, whereas the Eleventh Circuit fused the two
questions.
118. See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (E.D. Va. 1996) (holding
HeinOnline  -- 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 150 1999
1999] Non-Self-Executing Declarations
inquiry, in this sense, turns not on whether the court may apply the treaty
directly, but on who has the right to invoke the treaty.
At no time during the formal ratification process did any Executive
Branch official explain the NSE declarations attached to human rights
treaties in terms of the concept of standing. Thus, there is no basis for
interpreting the NSE declarations in this manner.
2. The "Private Cause of Action" Concept of Non-Self-Execution
In analyzing the domestic legal effect of treaties, courts have frequently
linked the concept of self-execution with the concept of a private right of
action, or a private cause of action." 9 Similarly, state court decisions
analyzing whether state constitutional provisions are "self-executing" have
also linked the concept of self-execution to the concept of a private cause of
action. 120
that Paraguay had standing to sue under certain treaties, because it is "an actual party to the contract,"
even though the treaties are not self-executing in the sense that they do not confer "rights of action on
private individuals"), aff'd, 134 F.2d 622 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Breard v. Greene, 118
S.Ct. 1352 (1998).
119. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 503
(9th Cir. 1992) ("[N]o private cause of action can ever be implied from a non-self-executing treaty.");
Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Courts will only find a
treaty to be self-executing if the document, as a whole, evidences an intent to provide a private right
of action."); More v. Intelcom Support Servs., Inc., 960 F.2d 466, 469 (5th Cir. 1992) (listing "the
implications of permitting a private right of action" as one of several factors courts consider in
determining whether a treaty is self-executing (quoting Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985))); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) ("Absent authorizing legislation, an individual has access to courts
for enforcement of a treaty's provisions only when the treaty is self-executing, that is, when it
expressly or impliedly provides a private right of action."); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[U]nless a treaty is self-executing, it must be
implemented by legislation before it gives rise to a private cause of action."); Republic of Paraguay,
949 F. Supp. at 1274 (stating that one definition of "self-executing" is that "a treaty . . . confers
rights of action on private individuals"); Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F.
Supp. 306, 311 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) ("A treaty is self-executing when it expressly or impliedly
provides a private right of action."); United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 799 (S.D. Fla.
1992) ("[]f a treaty expressly or impliedly provides a private right of action, it is self-executing and
can be invoked by the individual."); Jaffe v. Boyles, 616 F. Supp. 1371, 1378 (W.D.N.Y. 1985)
("Not every treaty violation gives rise to a cause of action for private parties: It is only when a treaty
is self-executing ... that it may be relied upon for the enforcement of such rights." (quoting Dreyfus
v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cit. 1976))); Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1425
(C.D. Cal. 1985) (-In the absence of authorizing legislation, an individual may enforce a treaty's
provisions only when it is self-executing, i.e., when it expressly or impliedly provides a private right
of action.").
120. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1137 (N.Y. 1996) ("A civil damage
remedy cannot be implied for a violation of the State constitutional provision unless the provision is
self-executing."); see also Gail Donoghue & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Life After Brown: The Future of
State Constitutional Tort Actions in New York, 42 N.Y.L. Sc. L. Rav. 447, 447 (1998) (analyzing
the implications of the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Brown "to recognize a direct
cause of action for damages based on violation of its state constitution").
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The statement that a treaty is not self-executing, in the sense that it
does not create a private cause of action, does not mean that the treaty
cannot be applied directly by the courts. As Professor Vazquez has stated:
[A] treaty that does not itself confer a right of action . . .is not for that reason
unenforceable in the courts. A right of action is not necessary if the treaty is being
invoked as a defense. Moreover, treaties have long been enforced pursuant to common
law forms of action. Furthermore, there are a number of possible federal statutory
bases for rights of action to enforce treaties, the most important being section 1983 and
the APA. Only if there is no other basis for the right of action should it be necessary to
locate a right of action in the treaty itself.
12
'
Thus, under the "private cause of action" concept, like the standing concept,
the self-execution inquiry turns on whether a particular litigant may invoke a
treaty provision in a particular case. However, the fact that a treaty
provision is not self-executing, in the sense that it does not create a private
cause of action, does not preclude direct judicial application of the provision
in all cases. 12
2
From a policy standpoint, the "private cause of action" concept makes
sense in cases where the treaty makers wish to prevent the treaty from being
utilized to create new avenues of litigation, while still permitting judicial
enforcement of the treaty in other contexts to help ensure compliance with
treaty obligations. As Part IV below reveals, Executive Branch officials
often explained the meaning of NSE declarations attached to human rights
treaties in terms of the "private cause of action" concept of non-self-
execution.
IV. EXECUTIVE BRANCH EXPLANATIONS OF NSE DECLARATIONS
President Carter first proposed attaching NSE declarations to the four
human rights treaties he submitted to the Senate in 1978. '23 Since then, NSE
declarations have consistently been added to human rights treaties at the
initiative of the Executive Branch, not the Senate. Part IV discusses how the
Executive Branch has explained NSE declarations to the Senate. Analysis of
121. Vazquez, supra note 33, at 1143. Professor Vazquez later elaborates this point in great
detail. See id. at 1143-57; see also McDonnell, supra note 32, at 1448-52 (arguing that the threshold
for asserting a treaty-based cause of action for damages is higher than that for invoking a treaty as a
defense).
122. Moreover, the statement that a treaty does not create a private cause of action says
nothing about the possibilities for administrative enforcement of the treaty. See Newman, supra note
17, at 1244-47. Indeed, not even the Foster concept of non-self-execution precludes enforcement by
administrative law judges (Ails), because the Foster concept turns on whether a treaty addresses itself
to the judicial branch or to the political branches, and ALJs are members of the political branches. See
supra Subsection Im.A.2 (discussing the Foster concept of self-execution). For discussion of an actual
case involving the possibility of administrative enforcement of Article 3 of the Torture Convention,
see infra notes 308-313 and accompanying text.
123. See supra Section II.B.
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the Senate record shows that the Carter Administration consistently
explained its proposed NSE declarations in accordance with the Foster
concept of non-self-execution, which would preclude direct judicial
application of human rights treaties in all cases. In contrast, the Clinton
Administration consistently explained its proposed NSE declarations in
accordance with the "private cause of action" concept, which would permit
direct judicial application of human rights treaties in some cases. The Bush
Administration presented different explanations at different times, shifting
back and forth between the Foster concept and the "private cause of action"
concept.
Section IV.A contends that the NSE declarations are intended to
convert what would otherwise be self-executing treaty provisions into non-
self-executing provisions. Section IV.B examines statements by Carter
Administration officials explaining the meaning of the term "not self-
executing," as used in NSE declarations. Sections IV.C, IV.D, and IV.E,
respectively, discuss Executive Branch explanations of the NSE declarations
attached to the Torture Convention, the ICCPR, and the Race Convention.
A. Switching Self-Executing Provisions into Non-Self-Executing Provisions
During Senate hearings on human rights treaties in 1979, Senator Jacob
Javits asked several witnesses to submit, for the record, answers to the
following question: "Are the treaties in and of themselves self-executing?"124
The Carter Administration replied that all four treaties are non-self-
executing.1" However, it noted, "[i]n the United States the final
determination as to whether a treaty is self-executing or not is made by the
judiciary." 26 According to the Carter Administration, the courts would
make this determination by examining "the terms of the treaty and.. . its
legislative and drafting history" to ascertain "the intent of the parties."1 27
Even without the NSE declarations, the Administration claimed, the courts
would probably find the treaties to be non-self-executing. The purpose of the
NSE declarations, therefore, was simply to provide "further evidence of the
U.S. intention." 128 Thus, the Carter Administration claimed that it was not
trying to convert self-executing treaty provisions into non-self-executing
treaty provisions. Rather, the parties had always intended for the treaties to
124. Carter Hearings, supra note 16, at 275.
125. See id. at 315 ("In our judgment the substantive provisions of the four human rights
treaties submitted to the Senate in February 1978 are in and of themselves non-self-executing.").
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
1999]
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be non-self-executing, and the NSE declarations were designed to assist the
courts in the difficult task of deciphering the intent of the parties.2 9
Aside from the Carter Administration, seven other witnesses submitted
written responses to Senator Javits's question. They generally agreed that
most of the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)"30 would not be self-executing, even without
an NSE declaration.' However, all except one of the nongovernment
witnesses contended that most of the ICCPR's provisions would be self-
executing, absent the NSE declaration,'32 and the one dissenter conceded that
"certain language of this Covenant may lend support to" a self-executing
interpretation."' Only five of the seven nongovernment witnesses
specifically addressed the Race Convention; they all agreed that at least
some provisions of the Race Convention would be self-executing, absent the
NSE declaration.'34 In short, almost no one bought the government's story.
129. See id. at 40-41 (prepared statement of Jack M. Goldklang, attorney adviser in the
Department of Justice) ("In broadly based multilateral treaties such as these, it is difficult to infer a
common intent among the parties since nations have different practices on this subject .... In such a
situation the intent of the Executive and Senate at the time of ratification become significant and it is
their duty to make that intention clear." (emphasis added)).
130. ICESCR, supra note 15.
131. See Carter Hearings, supra note 16, at 277 (statement of Oscar Schachter) ("[M]any of
the provisions of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Economic [sic] Rights could not be self-
executing."); id. at 280 (statement of J. Philip Anderegg); id. at 284 (statement of International
Human Rights Law Group) ("Many provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights . . . are more statements of aspiration than concrete directives which courts could
interpret."); id. at 288 (statement of Louis Henkin) ("[A]most all of the provisions in the Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are not self-executing."); id. at 289-90 (statement of Morton
Sklar) ("While I have characterized the Covenant on Economic and Social Rights ... as non-self-
executing in general, some of [its] provisions do have a self-executing character."); id. at 291
(statement of Dean Norman Redlich) ("The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights would
clearly not be self-executing even in the absence of the declaration."); id. at 300 (statement of Oscar
Garibaldi) (stating that the "vast majority of the provisions in the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights" are non-self-executing).
132. See id. at 277 (statement of Oscar Schachter) (suggesting that many, but not all, of the
ICCPR's provisions would be self-executing); id. at 280 (statement of J. Philip Anderegg) (stating that
all but a few articles of the ICCPR would be self-executing); id. at 284-85 (statement of International
Human Rights Law Group) (contrasting the ICCPR to the ICESCR, and concluding that many
provisions of the ICCPR "would be interpreted by the courts as self-executing, directly granting
justiciable rights to individuals"); id. at 287 (statement of Louis Henkin) ("Most of the provisions of
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights would be self-executing."); id. at 290 (statement of Morton
Sklar) (comparing the ICCPR to the ICESCR, and suggesting that "the drafters of these documents"
deliberately chose "these two different approaches . . . to establish the automatically binding
character" of the ICCPR); id. at 299 (statement of Oscar Garibaldi) (contending that "most of the text
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights . . . would be automatically incorporated into our
municipal law, and would be directly applicable by our courts").
133. Id. at 291 (statement of Dean Norman Redlich).
134. See id. at 277 (statement of Oscar Schachter) (stating that clear "examples of provisions
that would be self-executing are found in . . . the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination"); id. at 280 (statement of J. Philip Anderegg) (stating that "Articles 2(1)(a),
2(1)(b), 3, 4(c) and 5" of the Race Convention would be self-executing); id. at 284 (statement of
International Human Rights Law Group) (stating that many provisions of the Race Convention "are
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The nongovernment witnesses believed that the purpose of the NSE
declarations was to convert what would otherwise be self-executing treaty
provisions into non-self-executing provisions. Subsequent commentators
have generally shared this view.'35
It is important to understand the Carter Administration's argument as
to why the treaties would be non-self-executing, even without the NSE
declarations. The ICCPR is a prime example. The Carter position was based
primarily on the language of Article 2(2), which states:
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance
with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights
recognized in the present Covenant.136
The Carter Administration argued that this language reflects the parties'
shared intent that implementing legislation would be necessary for ICCPR
rights to be directly applicable in the courts.137
The Carter argument implicitly relies on a Foster concept of self-
execution. However, even if one defines self-execution in terms of the
Foster concept, the Carter argument is plainly wrong. State parties to
multilateral treaties, and to the ICCPR in particular, have a variety of
domestic legal systems. In some states, all treaties require implementing
legislation before they can be applied by the courts.' In many states,
though, implementing legislation is never required, and all treaties can be
applied directly by the courts.39 The drafters of the ICCPR were well aware
of the varying systems for incorporating treaties into domestic law. Hence,
more statements of aspiration than concrete directives which courts could interpret," but that several
articles "are imperative in tone, precise and specific in language," and therefore should be construed
to be self-executing); id. at 288 (statement of Louis Henkin) (stating, with respect to the Race
Convention, that "most of [its] provisions would probably be self-executing, though some would
not"); id. at 289 (statement of Morton Sklar) (contending that most of the provisions of the Race
Convention are not self-executing, but that "some of [its] provisions do have a self-executing
character").
135. See, e.g., Damrosch, supra note 17, at 516-17 ("It is the assumption of this essay that
in [NSE] declarations of this kind, the Senate has attempted to switch self-executing treaty provisions
into the non-self-executing category.").
136. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 2, para. 2.
137. See Carter Hearings, supra note 16, at 315. In a recent case raising claims under the
ICCPR and the Torture Convention for nonconsensual medical experimentation, the district court
adopted a very similar rationale in support of its conclusion that neither treaty provides a private right
of action. See White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1386-87 (E.D. Wash. 1998).
138. The United Kingdom is the classic example of a state in which no treaties are self-
executing, in the Foster sense. For a description of the U.K. system, see Lord Templeman, Treaty-
Making and the British Parliament, 67 CHI.-KENT L. Rv. 459, 467-71 (1991).
139. For example, in France all treaties are self-executing in the Foster sense. See Francois
Luchaire, The Participation of Parliament in the Elaboration and Application of Treaties, 67 CH.-
KENT L. REv. 341, 350-53 (1991).
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Article 2(2) of the ICCPR specifies that each party will "take the necessary
steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes" to give effect to the
rights recognized in the ICCPR. 141 The drafters did not say that legislation
was required, because such a requirement would have been inconsistent with
the "constitutional processes" of many countries. Instead, the text obliges
parties to "adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary.""4
Thus, far from reflecting a mutual intent to require implementing legislation,
the language of Article 2(2) reflects a mutual intent to permit each party to
decide for itself whether implementing legislation is necessary.
Numerous commentators have pointed out the fallacy in the Carter
Administration's interpretation of Article 2(2), both in the context of the
1979 Senate hearings, 14' and in subsequent scholarly articles.'43 The
Executive Branch apparently learned from this experience, because no
subsequent Administration has suggested that Article 2(2) renders the
ICCPR non-self-executing, or that comparable language in any other human
rights treaty makes it non-self-executing. Thus, despite the Carter
Administration's protestations to the contrary, it is reasonable to conclude
140. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 2, para. 2.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. See, for example, Oscar Schachter's statement during the 1979 hearings:
There is a further general point that warrants consideration. This relates to the articles
in the Treaties imposing an obligation to adopt legislative or other measures as may be
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the treaty. . . . The State
Department's letter of transmittal relating to the American Convention suggests that
Article 2 indicates that the provisions of the Convention are not self-executing ...
Presumably the same inference is drawn as to Article 2 of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. That inference seems to me plainly wrong. How can an obligation to
adopt legislative or other measures as may be necessary be read as requiring legislation
that is not necessary? When the constitution provides that a treaty shall be the law of
the land and when a provision of that treaty can be directly applied by a court, then it is
obvious that no legislation is necessary for that purpose. The constitution has ensured
that the treaty provision is given effect. To read Article 2 as requiring legislation for
every article of the treaty even though the constitution has made such legislation
unnecessary in respect of many articles is to ignore the clear language of Article 2.
Carter Hearings, supra note 16, at 277-78 (statement of Oscar Schachter).
143. See, e.g., Vazquez, supra note 32, at 709-10. Professor Vazquez criticizes the Third
Circuit's interpretation of a so-called "domestic implementation clause" in a patent treaty, which is
similar to Article 2(2) of the ICCPR. See id. (discussing Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,
595 F.2d 1287, 1298 (3d Ci. 1979)). The clause states: "Every country party to this Convention
undertakes to adopt, in accordance with its constitution, the measures necessary to insure the
application of this Convention." Vazquez, supra note 32, at 709 (quoting Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, art. 17, 13 U.S.T. 1, 41, 828 U.N.T.S. 107, 149).
The Third Circuit, in an argument very similar to the Carter Administration's interpretation of Article
2(2), held that this language demonstrated that the parties intended the treaty to be non-self-executing.
See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1298-99. Professor Vazquez contends that "[tihe quoted treaty
provision tells us that parties must enact the domestic measures that are 'necessary' to ensure the
application of the Convention; it does not make legislation 'necessary' if it otherwise would not be.
For this reason, such provisions should not . . . render a treaty non-self-executing under Foster."
Vazquez, supra note 32, at 710.
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that the NSE declarations are intended to convert what would otherwise be
self-executing treaty provisions into non-self-executing provisions. 1"
Commentators disagree as to whether the NSE declarations are legally
binding on the judiciary.145 This Article does not attempt to answer that
question. However, this Article assumes that the intent of the U.S. treaty
makers is an important factor that courts must weigh in determining whether
particular treaty provisions are self-executing. 146 Given the manifest intent of
the President and the Senate to render the treaties non-self-executing, the
question remains-How did the President and the Senate understand the term
"not self-executing"? The remainder of Part IV addresses this question.
B. The Carter Administration
In February 1978, President Carter transmitted to the Senate the two
Covenants, the Race Convention and the American Convention on Human
Rights 47 The so-called "letter of transmittal" from the President to the
Senate did not mention NSE declarations. However, attached to the letter of
transmittal was a "letter of submittal" from the Secretary of State to the
President, which set forth the proposed declarations. The letter of submittal
stated that "declarations that the treaties are not self-executing are
recommended. With such declarations, the substantive provisions of the
treaties would not of themselves become effective as domestic law."148 The
words "of themselves" are clearly intended to signify that implementing
legislation is required. The statement that the treaties would not "become
effective" could mean either: (1) that they would have no domestic legal
status in the absence of implementing legislation; or (2) that courts could not
apply them directly (Foster non-self-execution).
144. Absent the NSE declaration, courts would probably find many provisions of the Torture
Convention to be non-self-executing, but most courts would probably hold Articles 3 and 15, and
perhaps others as well, to be self-executing. See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 17, at 631 (claiming
that "it is likely that the [Torture] Convention will be deemed self-executing, at least in part, by an
international judicial body or municipal court in the United States").
145. The Restatement suggests that the NSE declarations are binding. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(4) (1987) ("An international
agreement of the United States is 'non-self-executing' . . . if the Senate in giving consent to a treaty,
or Congress by resolution, requires implementing legislation."). However, several commentators have
challenged that assertion. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) ("While courts interpret
treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly
charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight."); Cameron Septic Co. v.
Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39, 48-50 (1913) (placing great weight on the views expressed by Congress and
the Executive Branch in supporting its conclusion that the treaty provision at issue was not self-
executing). But see Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 526-28 & 526 n.2 (1951) (holding that
the treaty provision at issue was self-executing, despite the Secretary of State's view to the contrary).
147. See CARTER MESSAGE, supra note 15.
148. Id. at vi.
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Having introduced the concept generally, the letter of submittal then
discussed each treaty separately. With respect to the Race Convention, the
letter states: "It is further recommended that a declaration indicate the non-
self-executing nature of Articles 1 through 7 of the Convention. Absent such
a statement, the terms of the Convention might be considered as directly
enforceable law on a par with Congressional statutes." '49 The use of the
phrase "directly enforceable law" expresses the Carter Administration's
understanding that the NSE declaration would preclude the courts from
applying directly Articles 1 through 7 of the Race Convention. Immediately
after the statement quoted above, the letter says: "While the terms of the
Convention, with the suggested reservations and understanding, are
consonant with United States law, it is nevertheless preferable to leave any
further implementation that may be desired to the domestic legislative and
judicial process. [Therefore,] [t]he following [NSE] declaration is
recommended."' 5 The reference here to the "judicial process" is puzzling.
If the Convention is not "effective as domestic law,""' and is not "directly
enforceable law on a par with Congressional statutes,"'5 2 it is unclear what
role the judicial process could play in treaty implementation, absent
implementing legislation.
The letter of submittal also recommends NSE declarations with respect
to Articles 1 through 15 of the ICESCR,'53 and Articles 1 through 27 of the
ICCPR 54 In proposing NSE declarations for the two Covenants, the letter
of submittal does not offer any additional explanation of the meaning of the
term "not self-executing," but simply refers back to the explanation
provided with respect to the Race Convention. "I
During Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the human
rights treaties, Roberts Owen, the State Department Legal Adviser,
explained the concept of non-self-execution as follows: "A treaty is self-
executing, and thus automatically the law of the land upon entry into force,
or non-self-executing, requiring implementing legislation before it becomes
a rule for the courts, depending upon its terms and the intention of the
parties adhering to it."' 56 It is unclear from this statement whether Mr.
149. Id. at viii. Articles 1 through 7 are the articles that define the substantive rights
protected under the Convention. The remaining articles deal with topics such as the creation of an
international committee to monitor implementation of the convention, signature, entry into force, and
other aspects of treaty administration. Clearly, no one would suppose that the articles relating to treaty
administration would be "directly enforceable law."
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. Id. at vi.
152. Id. at viii.
153. See id. at xi.
154. See id. at xv.
155. Id.
156. Carter Hearings, supra note 16, at 29 (statement of Roberts B. Owen).
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Owen thought that a non-self-executing treaty is automatically incorporated
into domestic law. However, Mr. Owen clearly believed that a non-self-
executing treaty requires implementing legislation before it can provide a
rule of decision for the courts (Foster non-self-execution)." 7
After the hearings, in a written response to questions submitted by
Senator Javits, Mr. Owen added this explanation of the NSE declarations:
"Under U.S. law a self-executing treaty provision, like a statute, may be
applied directly by the courts as a rule of decision in a particular case. A
treaty provision that is non-self-executing may not be enforced directly by
the courts, but rather requires implementing legislation.""5 8 Again, this
explanation is phrased in terms of the Foster concept of non-self-execution.
Thus, although statements by the Carter Administration are not entirely
unambiguous, the basic thrust of their comments is that the human rights
treaties, with NSE declarations attached, would be non-self-executing in the
Foster sense-i.e., they would require implementing legislation before they
could provide a rule of decision for the courts. As noted earlier,'59 Foster
non-self-execution would preclude direct judicial application of the treaties
in all cases.
However, none of the four treaties was ratified during the Carter
Administration, and subsequent administrations developed their own
explanations of the NSE declarations. Thus, statements by the Carter
Administration, while of historical interest, should not be considered
authoritative explanations of the meaning of the NSE declarations. 6 For
authoritative statements, we must turn to the explanations provided by
subsequent administrations, during whose tenures the treaties were actually
ratified.
157. It is noteworthy that Mr. Owen's explanation is almost a direct quote from Foster. Mr.
Owen stated that a non-self-executing treaty requires "implementing legislation before it becomes a
rule for the courts." Id. In Foster, Chief Justice Marshall stated that, for some treaty provisions, "the
legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court." Foster v. Neilson, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
158. Carter Hearings, supra note 16, at 314-15 (letter from Roberts B. Owen, Legal
Adviser, U.S. Department of State, to Senator Javits (Feb. 6, 1980)).
159. See supra Subsection III.A.2.
160. In the 11 years from 1979, when the Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the
four treaties submitted by the Carter Administration, until 1990, when the Senate provided its advice
and consent for ratification of the Torture Convention, the composition of the U.S. Senate changed
significantly. There were nineteen members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time of
the 1990 hearings on the Torture Convention. See Torture Hearing, supra note 50, at ii. Only four of
them were Committee members in 1979. See Carter Hearings, supra note 16, at ii. It is highly
unlikely that any of the Senators bothered to read the text of the 1979 Senate hearings. So, as a
practical matter, the record of the 1979 hearings probably had relatively little effect on the Senate's
understanding of the NSE declarations in the 1990s.
1999]
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C. The Torture Convention
1. The Reagan Administration
President Reagan transmitted the Torture Convention to the Senate on
May 20, 1988.16' Along with the letter of transmittal, the Reagan
Administration included a "summary and analysis" of the Convention.'62 In
that document, the Reagan Administration proposed a declaration "that the
provisions of Articles 1 through 16 of the Convention are not self-
executing."1 63
The Reagan Administration explained its proposed NSE declaration as
follows: "The following declaration is therefore recommended, to clarify
that the provisions of the Convention would not of themselves become
effective as domestic law.' This sentence is taken almost verbatim from
the Carter Administration's explanation of its proposed NSE declarations.'65
Like the Carter Administration's statement,' 66 the Reagan explanation could
mean either: (1) that the provisions have no domestic legal status, absent
implementing legislation; or (2) that they would not provide a rule of
decision for the courts, absent implementing legislation. Regardless, the
statement takes on a somewhat different meaning in the context of the
Torture Convention, because the Reagan Administration envisioned
implementing legislation for the Torture Convention, whereas the Carter
Administration did not envision implementing legislation for any of the
human rights treaties that it submitted to the Senate.' 67
The Reagan Administration stated that implementing legislation would
be necessary "only to establish Article 5(1)(b) jurisdiction over offenses
committed by U.S. nationals outside the United States, and to establish
Article 5(2) jurisdiction over foreign offenders committing torture abroad
who are later found in territory under U.S. jurisdiction."' 61 Congress
enacted the requisite implementing legislation in 1994; the legislation was
limited in scope to implement only Article 5-and no other provision-of the
161. See TORTURE REPORT, supra note 46, at 2.
162. See id. at 11-28.
163. Id. at 12.
164. Id. (emphasis added).
165. See CARTER MESSAGE, supra note 15, at vi ("With such declarations, the substantive
provisions of the treaties would not of themselves become effective as domestic law.").
166. See supra notes 147-148 and accompanying text.
167. In his prepared statement to the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Owen stated on
behalf of the Carter Administration that the NSE declarations do "not mean that vast new
implementing legislation is required, as the great majority of the treaty provisions are already
implemented in our domestic law." Carter Hearings, supra note 16, at 29.
168. TORTURE REPORT, supra note 46, at 20. In its subsequent report, the Foreign Relations
Committee reiterated that "additional implementing legislation will be needed only with respect to
Article 5, dealing with areas of criminal jurisdiction." Id. at 10.
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Convention.'69 In light of the Reagan Administration's explanation of the
NSE declaration-i.e., that the Convention's provisions would not "become
effective as domestic law" 70 in the absence of implementing legislation-one
might infer that the Reagan Administration intended to preclude provisions
of the Torture Convention other than Article 5 from ever having domestic
legal effect.
That inference is contradicted, though, by the subsequent testimony of
Abraham Sofaer, the State Department Legal Adviser, who probably drafted
the "summary and analysis" of the Convention' on behalf of the Reagan
Administration, and who later testified to the Senate as a member of the
Bush Administration."2 Thus, the Reagan Administration's view of the
domestic legal status of Torture Convention provisions other than Article 5
remains an enigma. Regardless, the Reagan Administration's view is not
dispositive, because the Senate did not act on the Torture Convention during
President Reagan's term in office. Hence, it is necessary to examine
statements by Bush Administration officials to ascertain the proper
relationship between the NSE declarations and the implementing legislation.
2. The Bush Administration
In a December 10, 1989 letter from the State Department to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, the Bush Administration submitted a revised
package of proposed RUDs.'73 The Bush Administration's proposal repeated
the proposed NSE declaration, with the explanation that it was "retained
without modification from the 1988 transmittal."' 74 Thus, the Bush
Administration's December 1989 letter did not address the crucial question
whether the implementing legislation would make the entire Convention
effective as domestic law.
169. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-
236, § 506, 108 Stat. 382, 463-64 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340B (1994)). Apart from
defining certain terms, the scope of the implementing legislation was indeed limited to the two issues
identified by the Reagan Administration.
170. TORTURE REPORT, supra note 46, at 12.
171. See id. at 11-28.
172. Abraham D. Sofaer, one of the principal spokespersons for the Bush Administration
during the Senate hearings on the Torture Convention, also served as Legal Adviser during the
Reagan Administration. One might expect, based on Mr. Sofaer's tenure in his position, that the
Reagan and Bush Administrations would have explained the NSE declaration attached to the Torture
Convention in similar terms. Thus, it is rather puzzling that the language used by the Reagan and
Carter Administrations was very similar; both were phrased in terms of the Foster concept of non-
self-execution. In contrast, as discussed below, see infra notes 175-183 and accompanying text, Mr.
Sofaer's explanation of the Convention, in his capacity as a spokesperson for the Bush Administration,
seems in certain respects to be much closer to the Clinton Administration's "private cause of action"
concept of non-self-execution.
173. See TORTURE REPORT, supra note 46, at 35-38.
174. Id. at 37.
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However, in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on January 30, 1990, Mr. Sofaer, who remained as the State Department
Legal Adviser, made a series of statements that, taken together, clearly
indicate the Bush Administration's view that the entire Convention, and not
just Article 5, would become effective as domestic law once the requisite
implementing legislation had been enacted. First, in his prepared statement,
Sofaer said:
If the Convention were simply a political statement, imprecision would cause no
difficulties. However, because the Convention is a legal instrument and creates legal
obligations, and especially because it requires establishment of criminal penalties under
our domestic law, we must pay particular attention to the meaning and interpretation of
its provisions, especially concerning the standards by which the Convention will be
applied as a matter of U.S. law. The administration in fact believes that a number of
reservations, declarations and understandings to the Convention are necessary to ensure
that we know precisely the scope of the domestic and international legal obligations the
United States will assume when the Convention is ratified.175
Mr. Sofaer stated that the "Convention will be applied as a matter of U.S.
law," and that the United States would assume "domestic . . . legal
obligations . . . when the Convention is ratified."" 6 These statements
strongly suggest that the entire Convention will "become effective as
domestic law" once the treaty is ratified.177
Viewing the preceding statement in isolation, one might infer that the
Convention applies, as a matter of domestic law, only to those portions of
Article 5 that were the subject of implementing legislation-i.e., only to acts
of torture committed outside the United States.7 However, in an oral
response to a question posed by Senator Helms during the hearing, Mr.
Sofaer made quite clear that, in his view, the domestic legal effect of the
Torture Convention would not be limited to acts of torture committed
outside the United States:
Senator HELMS. All right. Hypothetically again, if a law enforcement official in New
York tortures a suspect in custody in New York whose alleged criminal activity took
place in New York, would this torture convention apply?
Mr. SOFAER. Yes. 17
In other words, the Convention will apply, as a matter of domestic law, not
just to acts of torture committed overseas, which are the subject of
implementing legislation, but also to acts of torture committed within the
United States, which are not the subject of implementing legislation.
175. Torture Hearing, supra note 50, at 8 (emphasis added).
176. Id.
177. The United States did not deposit its instrument of ratification until after the
implementing legislation was enacted. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
179. See Torture Hearing, supra note 50, at 41.
HeinOnline  -- 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 162 1999
1999] Non-Self-Executing Declarations
After additional discussion between Senator Helms and Mr. Sofaer,
Senator Helms asked whether international law is superior to domestic
law. '8 Mr. Sofaer replied: "Well, it would be with respect to anything that
was torture because it would be part of domestic law. If you adopt this
treaty, it is not just international law. The standard becomes part of our
law." 8' The clear implication of Mr. Sofaer's testimony is that the entire
Torture Convention, not just those provisions specifically addressed in the
implementing legislation, became effective as domestic law once the
implementing legislation was enacted in April 1994'82 and the United States
deposited its instrument of ratification in October 1994.83
The proposition that the implementing legislation made the entire
Convention effective as domestic law seems to imply that the NSE
declaration has no effect whatsoever after ratification of the Convention. The
Senate record associated with ratification of the Genocide Convention 84
reveals that the Senate sometimes does attach declarations to treaties that are
not intended to have any effect after treaty ratification.8 5 However, the NSE
180. Id. at 42.
181. Id.
182. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-
236, § 506, 108 Stat. 382, 463-64 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340B (1994)).
183. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 6, at 185.
184. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec.
9, 1948, S. EXEC. Doc. 0, 81-1 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951)
[hereinafter Genocide Convention]. President Truman first asked the Senate to approve the Genocide
Convention in 1949. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 99-2, at 2 (1985). "Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon,
Ford, and Carter each renewed this request. On September 6, 1984, President Reagan became the
seventh President to urge the Senate to give its consent to ratification." Id. The Senate finally
consented on February 19, 1986. See 132 CONG. REc. S1377 (1986). Implementing legislation was
enacted in November 1988. See Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (The Proxmire
Act), Pub. L. No. 100-606, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 3045 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1093
(1994)). The United States deposited its instrument of ratification with the United Nations on
November 25, 1988. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 6, at 88.
For an insightful analysis of the political controversy that delayed U.S. ratification of the
Genocide Convention for almost 40 years, see NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES AND THE SENATE 37-64 (1990).
185. The United States did not adopt an NSE declaration for the Genocide Convention. The
Senate resolution of ratification included a declaration that "the President will not deposit the
instrument of ratification until after the implementing legislation referred to in Article V [of the
Convention] has been enacted." 132 CONG. REc. S1378 (1986). The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee explained this declaration as follows: "The Committee's declaration reinforces the fact that
the Convention is not self-executing. In other words, no part of the Convention becomes law by itself.
The Convention is effective only through legislation implementing its various provisions." S. EXEC.
REP. No. 99-2, at 26 (1985). Of course, no treaty is "law" in the United States until after it has been
ratified. The purpose of the Committee's declaration was to ensure that the President would not ratify
the Convention until after implementing legislation had been enacted. In accordance with the Senate
declaration, the President did not deposit the U.S. instrument of ratification until after the
implementing legislation was enacted. See supra note 183. Hence, in the case of the Genocide
Convention, a Senate declaration that the Foreign Relations Committee explained in terms of the
concept of non-self-execution had no effect whatsoever after treaty ratification, because the
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declaration attached to the Torture Convention clearly signals some intention
to limit the domestic legal application' of the Convention. 8 ' In light of that
intention, there are two possible ways to construe the NSE declaration that
are consistent with Mr. Sofaer's testimony.
First, although Mr. Sofaer stated that the Torture Convention "would
be part of domestic law"'8 7 and "will be applied as a matter of U.S. law,"188
he never explicitly stated that the courts could apply the Convention directly.
Thus, one possible way to construe the NSE declaration, in light of Mr.
Sofaer's testimony, is to say that the Convention was automatically
incorporated into domestic law upon ratification, but that the NSE
declaration means that the Convention cannot be applied directly by the
courts. Under this interpretation, the NSE declaration has an independent
effect, separate from the implementing legislation. This interpretation makes
sense in cases where it is possible to give effect to the Convention as the
"Law of the Land" without direct judicial application.'89 However, Mr.
Sofaer's testimony suggests that the NSE declaration should not be construed
as a bar to direct judicial application of the Convention in cases where that is
the only feasible way to implement the Convention as a matter of domestic
law.' 90
Second, even assuming that the implementing legislation made the
entire Convention effective as domestic law, the implementing legislation
itself imposes limitations on the domestic application of the Torture
Convention. The statute states: "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed
as . . . creating any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by
declaration's purpose (to ensure enactment of implementing legislation) was fulfilled prior to
ratification.
186. There are two factors that distinguish the Torture Convention from the Genocide
Convention. First, the Genocide Convention Implementation Act, on its face, appears to be designed
to implement the entire Genocide Convention. See Genocide Convention Implementation Act, § 2(a);
Genocide Convention, supra note 184, arts. I-XIX. In contrast, the implementing legislation for the
Torture Convention, on its face, appears to be designed to implement only a small piece of the
Torture Convention. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, § 506; Torture Convention, supra note
8, arts. 1-16. Second, when the Reagan Administration transmitted the Torture Convention to the
Senate, it proposed, in addition to the NSE declaration, a declaration that was almost identical to the
one included in the Senate resolution of ratification for the Genocide Convention. See TORTURE
REPORT, supra note 46, at 20 (recommending a declaration that "[tihe United States will not deposit
the instrument of ratification until after the implementing legislation of the Convention has been
enacted"). The Bush Administration later proposed deleting this declaration on the grounds that it was
unnecessary. See id. at 37. The Bush Administration, however, retained the NSE declaration. This
strongly suggests that the purpose of the NSE declaration is different from the purpose of the
declaration attached to the Genocide Convention.
187. Torture Hearing, supra note 50, at 42.
188. Id. at 8.
189. See infra Subsection VI.B.3 for one example of how the Convention can be given
domestic legal effect without direct judicial application.
190. As a practical matter, such cases are likely to arise infrequently.
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any party in any civil proceeding."19 If one interprets "this chapter" to
mean "this chapter or the Convention which it implements," then this
statement establishes a clear limit on the domestic legal effect of the
Convention-as a matter of domestic law, the Torture Convention does not
apply to civil proceedings. This limitation on the domestic legal application
of the Torture Convention is similar, in some respects, to the limitation
imposed by the "private cause of action" concept of non-self-execution,
which the Clinton Administration adopted in its explanation of the NSE
declaration attached to the Race Convention."g Hence, under this
interpretation, the purpose of the NSE declaration is effectively implemented
by means of the limiting language in the statute.
In sum, the Reagan Administration stated that the NSE declaration
attached to the Torture Convention meant that the Convention would not
"become effective as domestic law" in the absence of implementing
legislation. However, the Bush Administration testified that the entire
Convention would become effective as domestic law after enactment of the
implementing legislation. This implies that the NSE declaration imposes no
barrier to domestic legal application of the Convention, now that
implementing legislation has been enacted. However, the legislation itself
appears to preclude application of the Convention in any civil proceeding.
Moreover, in cases where the Convention can be given effect as domestic
law without direct judicial application of its terms, it is reasonable to
construe the NSE declaration as an expression of the treaty makers' intent to
avoid direct judicial application.
D. The ICCPR
On August 8, 1991, President Bush sent a letter to Senator Pell, urging
the Senate to reconsider the possibility of providing its consent to ratification
of the ICCPR.193 On November 21, 1991, the Bush Administration
submitted a package of proposed reservations, understandings, and
declarations for the ICCPR, along with an explanation thereof.194 The
191. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, § 506.
192. The "no civil proceedings" limitation is similar to the "private right of action" concept
of non-self-execution, inasmuch as both would allow criminal defendants to invoke the treaties.
However, there are two key differences between these concepts. First, the "no civil proceedings"
limitation would preclude defensive invocation of the Torture Convention in a civil proceeding,
whereas the "private cause of action" concept of non-self-execution would permit defensive invocation
of the Race Convention in a civil proceeding. Second, the "private cause of action" concept arguably
permits invocation of the Race Convention by plaintiffs in civil suits where the plaintiff is relying on
some other provision of law to establish a private cause of action. The "no civil proceedings"
limitation would clearly preclude invocation of the Torture Convention by plaintiffs in civil suits.
193. See ICCPR REPORT, supra note 44, at 2.
194. See id. at 10-21.
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package included a proposed declaration "that the provisions of Articles 1
through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing."'"'
The Bush Administration explained the NSE declaration as follows:
"The intent is to clarify that the Covenant will not create a private cause of
action in U.S. courts.""'9 This is the first instance in which any
administration used the term "private cause of action" to explain the
meaning of an NSE declaration. As noted above,'9 the term "private cause
of action" is a fairly narrow technical term. If the NSE declaration means
only that the ICCPR will not create a private cause of action, and nothing
more, then the ICCPR could still be invoked by defendants in civil or
criminal litigation initiated by the government. 98 Moreover, one could argue
that federal statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, could be used to create a
cause of action to enforce ICCPR rights.' 99
However, the Bush Administration's explanations of the NSE
declaration attached to the ICCPR were not entirely consistent. At a hearing
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Richard Schifter, the
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs,
submitted a prepared statement that said, in relevant part: "The substantive
provisions of the ICCPR should be declared to be non-self-executing. This
would mean that the ICCPR provisions, when ratified, will not by
themselves create private rights enforceable in U.S. courts; that could only
be done by legislation adopted by the Congress."200 The statement that the
ICCPR provisions "will not by themselves create private rights enforceable
in U.S. courts" is ambiguous. The phrase "private rights" could be
understood to mean "private rights of action," in which case this statement
is equivalent to the explanation provided in the November 21 package. On
the other hand, Mr. Schifter's statement could be understood to mean that
the ICCPR does not create any judicially enforceable private rights, in which
case it would not be capable of being invoked by defendants in litigation
initiated by the government.
After the Committee hearings, Senator Helms submitted written
questions about the ICCPR, to which the Bush Administration provided
written answers.2"' In one such question, Senator Helms asked: "Do you
believe that treaties can change domestic law? Do you believe that treaties
195. Id. at 19.
196. Id.; see also ICCPR Hearing, supra note 60, at 14 (reprinting the Bush Administration's
explanation of its proposed declaration).
197. See supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
198. The ICCPR does not address litigation initiated by a private party, because the ICCPR
governs only relations between a government and its citizens, not relations between private parties.
199. See Vazquez, supra note 33, at 1146-54.
200. ICCPR Heating, supra note 60, at 18 (statement of Richard Schifter). In his oral
statement, Mr. Schifter repeated this language almost verbatim. See id. at 15.
201. See id. at 79-84.
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should change domestic law? In our American legal system, does
international law ever supersede domestic law? "202 The Bush Administration
replied:
Under the Supremacy Clause, ratified treaties are the law of the land, equivalent to
federal statutes. . . . Consequently, properly ratified treaties can and do supersede
inconsistent domestic law. In interpreting the Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court
has long distinguished between treaties which are self-executing and those which are
not, the latter being said not to create directly enforceable rights absent subsequent
implementing legislation. With respect to the Covenant, the Administration has
proposed to declare Articles 1-27 non-self-executing'
On the one hand, the Bush Administration appears to be suggesting that the
ICCPR will be "the law of the land," and will supersede inconsistent
domestic law, despite the fact that it is not self-executing. In that respect, the
above quotation appears to be consistent with the Clinton Administration's
interpretation of the NSE declaration attached to the Race Convention2 4 and
with Mr. Sofaer's testimony about the domestic effects of the Torture
Convention.0 5 On the other hand, the statement that non-self-executing
treaties do not "create directly enforceable rights" implies that the ICCPR,
with the NSE declaration, is non-self-executing in the Foster sense of the
term. In that respect, the Bush Administration's answer to Senator Helms's
question is inconsistent with its initial explanation, which suggested that the
NSE declaration meant that the ICCPR did not create a private cause of
action.20 6
Thus, courts that strive to interpret the NSE declaration are presented
with a quandary. At times, the Bush Administration explained the NSE
declaration in accordance with the "private cause of action" concept of non-
self-execution. At other times, the Bush Administration explained the NSE
declaration in accordance with the Foster concept. One possible resolution of
this quandary would be for courts to construe the NSE declaration for the
ICCPR in a manner that is consistent with the Executive Branch's
202. Id. at 80.
203. Id. (citations omitted).
204. See infra Section I.E.
205. See supra notes 175-183 and accompanying text.
206. Granted, the statement that a treaty provision does not "create directly enforceable
rights," ICCPR Hearing, supra note 60, at 19, is not logically inconsistent with the statement that the
provision does not "create a private cause of action," ICCPR RPORT, supra note 44, at 19, because
the latter statement is ambiguous as to whether the provision can be applied directly in favor of
defendants. Even so, if the Bush Administration had consciously considered the differences between
the Foster and "private cause of action" concepts of non-self-execution, and had decided in favor of
the Foster concept, then it is unlikely that the Bush Administration would have stated that the intent of
the NSE declaration "is to clarify that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S.
courts." Id. Thus, at a minimum, the Bush Administration's shifting explanations indicate either that
the Administration was being deliberately ambiguous, or that it had not considered the different
implications of the Foster concept versus the "private cause of action" concept.
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explanations of the NSE declarations attached to the Torture Convention and
the Race Convention. In principle, this is eminently reasonable. After all,
the wording of all three NSE declarations is almost identical." 7 Moreover,
when the Bush Administration proposed its NSE declaration for the ICCPR,
it stated that the declaration was "virtually identical to... the one adopted
by the Senate with respect to the Torture Convention.""' Similarly, the
Clinton Administration stated that the NSE declaration attached to the Race
Convention reflected the "same approach" 09 as the approach adopted with
respect to the ICCPR and the Torture Convention.
There are two reasons, though, why the Reagan and Bush
Administrations' explanations of the NSE declaration for the Torture
Convention are a poor guide for judges attempting to construe the NSE
declaration for the ICCPR. First, the attempt to construe the NSE
declaration for the Torture Convention poses its own interpretive
difficulties.210 Second, the proper interpretation of the NSE declaration for
the Torture Convention is colored by the fact that the United States enacted
implementing legislation for the Torture Convention before it ratified the
Convention. In contrast, the United States ratified the ICCPR without any
implementing legislation.21" ' Thus, despite the similarities in wording
between the two NSE declarations, the fact that the United States adopted
implementing legislation for one treaty, but not the other, may require
different interpretations of the two declarations.
If judges look to the Race Convention as a guide for interpreting the
NSE declaration attached to the ICCPR, they do not encounter either of
these problems. The Clinton Administration clearly and consistently
explained the NSE declaration for the Race Convention in terms of the
"private cause of action" concept.212 Also, the United States ratified the
Race Convention without implementing legislation,213 as it did for the
ICCPR. Thus, one could argue that courts should construe the NSE
declaration for the ICCPR in accordance with the "private cause of action"
207. Compare the following: (1) "Mhe United States declares that the provisions of articles
I through 27 of the [ICCPR] are not self-executing." MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 6, at 130;
(2) "[Ihe United States declares that the provisions of articles 1 through 16 of the [Torture]
Convention are not self-executing." Id. at 187; (3) "Mhe United States declares that the provisions of
the [Race] Convention are not self-executing." Id. at 102.
208. ICCPR REPORT, supra note 44, at 19.
209. Race Hearing, supra note 69, at 18.
210. See supra Section 1V.C.
211. In its package of proposed RUDs, the Bush Administration stated explicitly that
"implementing legislation is not contemplated." ICCPR REPORT, supra note 44, at 19.
212. See infra Section IV.E.
213. See RACE REPORT, supra note 65, at 6 ("The Administration believes that no new
implementing legislation is necessary for the United States to assume the obligations under the
Convention.").
HeinOnline  -- 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 168 1999
Non-Self-Executing Declarations
concept, because that would be consistent with the Clinton Administration's
explanation of the NSE declaration for the Race Convention.
E. The Clinton Administration and the Race Convention
On April 26, 1994, Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, writing
on behalf of President Clinton, sent a letter to the Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Claiborne Pell, urging the Senate "to
give its prompt attention to and approval of [the Race] Convention."214 The
letter included a package of proposed reservations, understandings, and
declarations, including a declaration "that the provisions of the Convention
are not self-executing." 215 The letter explained the NSE declaration as
follows:
The intent is to clarify that the treaty will not create a new or independently enforceable
private cause of action in U.S. courts. . . . Given the extensive provisions already
present in U.S. law, there is no discernible need for the establishment of additional
causes of action or new avenues of litigation in order to enforce the essential
requirements of the Convention.216
Two points merit attention here. First, the Clinton Administration's
explanation of the NSE declaration is phrased in terms of the "private cause
of action" concept, which leaves open the possibility that courts could apply
the treaty directly to enforce the rights of defendants in civil or criminal
proceedings initiated by the government.217 Second, permitting the treaty to
be invoked defensively in that manner would be entirely consistent with the
Administration's apparent objective of avoiding "new avenues of
litigation,"2"8 because private parties could not initiate litigation on the basis
of the Convention; they could only invoke it in proceedings initiated by the
government. 9
On May 11, 1994, Conrad Harper, the State Department Legal
Adviser, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His
testimony was consistent with this narrow interpretation of the NSE
declaration. His prepared statement says:
214. Id. at 2.
215. Id. at 26.
216. Id. at 25-26.
217. See supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text. As noted above, if the NSE
declaration means only that the treaty does not create a private cause of action, then it might also be
possible to utilize federal statutes, such as the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994)
or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), to provide a cause of action to enforce treaty rights.
218. RACE REPORT, supra note 65, at 26.
219. Neither the Clinton Administration nor any other Administration ever stated that courts
could or should apply non-self-executing provisions of human rights treaties directly to enforce the
rights of defendants in proceedings initiated by the government. However, no statement by the Clinton
Administration or the Senate forecloses that possibility.
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Finally, we have submitted a proposed declaration indicating that the Convention's
provisions are not self-executing. Under Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution, duly
ratified treaties become the supreme law of the land, equivalent to a federal statute. By
making clear that this Convention is not self-executing, we ensure that it does not create
a new or independently enforceable private cause of action in U.S. courts ...
[E]xisting U.S. law provides extensive protection and remedies against racial
discrimination sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the present Convention ...
There is thus no need for the establishment of additional causes of action to enforce the
requirements of the Convention.m
Recall that the Carter Administration suggested that the Race Convention,
with the NSE declaration attached, would not be "directly enforceable law
on a par with Congressional statutes."' In contrast, one can infer from Mr.
Harper's statement that the Race Convention, even with the NSE
declaration, is "the supreme law of the land, equivalent to a federal
statute. 9222
After delivering his prepared testimony, Mr. Harper had this exchange
with Senator Pell, the Chairman of the Committee:
THE CHAIRMAN. If you entered a treaty and the treaty runs in one direction, domestic
law runs in another, does the treaty not have priority?
MR. HARPER. The treaty is equivalent only to a Federal statute. It is not equivalent to
our-
THE CHAIRMAN. It is equivalent. I thought it was superior.
MR. HARPER. It is not superior of the Federal statute. No. It simply has the same status
under our constitutional scheme. I should note that a duly ratified treaty will supercede
prior inconsistent federal law ....
Note that Mr. Harper did not say that a self-executing treaty supercedes
prior inconsistent federal law. He said that a duly ratified treaty-
presumably including even a non-self-executing treaty-supercedes prior
inconsistent federal law. This concept of non-self-execution is very different
from the Carter Administration's concept. In the Carter view, non-self-
executing treaties cannot supercede prior inconsistent federal law, because
"the substantive provisions of the treaties would not of themselves become
effective as domestic law." 2 4 Under the Clinton Administration's "private
cause of action" concept, however, the effect of the NSE declaration is not
to preclude direct judicial application of the ICCPR altogether, but merely to
"ensure that it does not create a new or independently enforceable private
cause of action."'
220. Race Hearing, supra note 69, at 18. See also the transcript of Mr. Harper's oral
statement, id. at 13-14, which is virtually identical to his prepared statement.
221. CARTER MESSAGE, supra note 15, at viii.
222. Race Hearing, supra note 69, at 18. Note that Mr. Harper said that "duly ratified
treaties" are equivalent to a federal statute. The Race Convention is a duly ratified treaty.
223. Id. at 20.
224. CARTER MESSAGE, supra note 15, at vi.
225. Id. On October 20, 1998, the author spoke with a State Department official who was
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Political realists are likely to argue that it would be a mistake for
courts to construe the NSE declarations for any of the three treaties in
accordance with the "private cause of action" concept of non-self-execution,
because that would be contrary to the political intent of the treaty makers in
adopting the NSE declarations. Clearly, the ratification of human rights
treaties has been a subject of great political controversy in the United States
Senate. Therefore, no attempt to interpret the legal significance of the NSE
declarations would be complete without a discussion of the political context
in which those declarations were adopted. That is the subject of Part V of
this Article.
V. THE POLITICS OF NSE DECLARATIONS
Broadly speaking, one can divide treaty-based human rights claims into
three categories: (1) frivolous claims-i.e., those which are not well founded
in the treaty; (2) redundant claims-i.e., those claims which attempt to
vindicate treaty rights that are protected under other provisions of U.S. law;
and (3) non-frivolous, nonredundant claims-i.e., those claims which are
well founded in the treaty, and which attempt to vindicate treaty rights that
are not protected under other provisions of U.S. law.226 In ratifying human
rights treaties, the United States has generally attempted to eliminate the
possibility of litigants raising non-frivolous, nonredundant claims by
adopting "reservations" to modify its international legal obligations. These
adoptions exempt the United States from the obligation to protect any rights
that were not already protected under other provisions of U.S. law prior to
ratification. 7 The term "reservation" is used here, as that term is defined
personally involved in crafting the RUDs. He stated that the "private cause of action" interpretation is
consistent with the State Department's understanding of the NSE declarations. On the other hand, he
suggested that other Executive Branch agencies may not share that view. This suggests that
disagreements between agencies within the Executive Branch may be one factor that helps to explain
the change over time from the Executive Branch's initial explanation of the NSE declarations in terms
of the Foster concept to its later explanation in terms of the "private cause of action" concept. See
Telephone Interview with David Stewart, Office of Legal Adviser, Department of State (Oct. 20,
1998).
226. Examples of non-frivolous, nonredundant claims include: the right not to be subjected to
forcible, transnational abduction, see infra notes 314-320 and accompanying text; the right not to be
deported to a country where one is likely to be tortured, see infra notes 308-313 and accompanying
text; certain freedom of religion claims under Article 18 of the ICCPR, see infra notes 392-408 and
accompanying text; and the right of homosexuals to engage in private consensual sexual activities, see
infra notes 409-420 and accompanying text.
227. Several other commentators have also noted this aspect of the U.S. approach to
ratification of human rights treaties. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 17, at 342 ("By its reservations,
the United States apparently seeks to assure that its adherence to a convention will not change, or
require change, in U.S. laws, policies or practices, even where they fall below international
standards"); Quigley, supra note 17, at 1287 ("When President George Bush urged the U.S. Senate to
consent to the ratification of the [ICCPR] .... Bush assured the Senate that ratification would require
1999]
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under international law, to include any condition that "purports to exclude or
to modify the legal effect of certain provisions" of a treaty.228 As such, the
term "reservation" includes some conditions that the United States has called
"understandings," as well as conditions that the United States has called
"reservations."229
The U.S. strategy regarding treaty reservations can best be understood
as an effort to reconcile two conflicting policy objectives: (1) ensuring that
the United States would be able to comply with its treaty obligations; and (2)
preventing human rights treaties from altering domestic law.23 The Torture
Convention, the ICCPR, and the Race Convention all contain some
nonredundant rights-that is, the treaties protect some rights that are not
protected under other provisions of U.S. law. Thus, if the United States
ratified those treaties without reservations, it would be forced to choose
between: (1) refusing to protect the nonredundant rights, in which case it
would fail to satisfy the first objective; or (2) protecting the nonredundant
rights, in which case it would fail to satisfy the second objective. In theory,
by adopting the appropriate reservations, the United States could relieve
itself of any international legal obligation to protect nonredundant rights. In
that case, there would be no conflict between the two objectives. In essence,
this has been the strategy underlying the United States's approach to
ratification of human rights treaties.
The Executive Branch adopted the policy objective of avoiding the
domestication of human rights treaties in reaction to the Bricker Amendment
no change in U.S. practice").
228. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2, para. l(d), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Convention
defines the term "reservation" to mean "a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a
State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that
State." Id.
229. The U.S. Senate has defined the terms "reservation," "understanding," and
"declaration" as follows: "A reservation is usually defined as a unilateral statement made by a
contracting party which purports to exclude or modify the terms of a treaty or the legal effect of
certain provisions." S. EXEC. REP. No. 99-2, at 16 (1985). "An understanding is generally defined as
a statement which interprets or clarifies the obligation undertaken by a party to a treaty." Id. "A
declaration is generally defined as a formal statement, explanation or clarification made by a party
about its opinion or intentions relating to issues raised by the treaty under consideration. Ordinarily,
declarations do not touch upon a party's obligations under a treaty." Id. at 17.
Despite these definitions, several of the U.S. "understandings" attached to human rights
treaties appear to be designed to "exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions." See
infra Section V.B. Hence, those "understandings" are properly classified as "reservations" under
international law. See Vienna Convention, supra note 228, art. 2, para. l(d).
230. The State Department's Assistant Legal Adviser for Human Rights and Refugees has
affirmed that the Executive Branch purposefully sought to prevent human rights treaties from altering
domestic law. In his words, policymakers were guided by the principle "that the United States would
not commit itself to do anything that would require a change in present U.S. law or practice."
Stewart, supra note 17, at 1206.
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controversy of the 1950s. Section V.A provides historical background on the
Bricker Amendment. Section V.B describes briefly the RUDs that the
United States included in its instruments of ratification for the Torture
Convention, the ICCPR, and the Race Convention. Section V.C examines
the Senate record associated with ratification of the three treaties in order to
document two key points: (1) the treaty makers have consistently placed a
high value on ensuring that the United States would be able to comply with
its treaty obligations; and (2) the Executive Branch "sold" the treaties to the
Senate by giving assurance that the reservations they adopted had relieved
the United States of any international legal obligation to protect
nonredundant rights, thereby eliminating the possibility of litigants raising
non-frivolous, nonredundant claims. Section V.D addresses the relationship
between the NSE declarations and the overall United States approach to
ratification of human rights treaties.
A. The Bricker Amendment
The term "Bricker Amendment" refers to a series of proposals for
constitutional amendments, several of which were sponsored by Senator
John Bricker, that the Senate debated extensively from about 1951 until
about 1957.231 All of the proposals attempted, in different ways, to limit the
domestic legal effects of treaties and other international agreements. Most of
the proposals included language that would have precluded ratified treaties
from having any domestic legal effect in the absence of implementing
legislation.232
The Eisenhower Administration feared that some version of the Bricker
Amendment, which it viewed as an intolerable encroachment on the
President's foreign policy powers, might actually pass the Senate. In an
effort to defeat the proposed constitutional amendment, Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles testified before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee in April 1953. During that testimony, Secretary Dulles stated:
231. See Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Judiciary Comm. on S.J. Res. 3, 85th Cong. (1957); Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary Comm. on S.J. Res. 1, 84th Cong. (1955); Treaties and
Executive Agreements: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary Comm. on S.J. Res. 1
and S.J. Res. 43, 83d Cong. (1953) [hereinafter 1953 Hearings]; Treaties and Executive Agreements:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary Comm. on S.J. Res. 130, 82d Cong. (1952).
232. For example, on February 7, 1952, Senator Bricker introduced a proposed constitutional
amendment, known as S.J. Res. 130, along with 58 co-sponsors. See 98 CONG. REc. 907-08 (1952).
It provided, in part, that "[n]o treaty . . . shall alter or abridge the laws of the United States or the
Constitution or laws of the several States unless, and then only to the extent that, Congress shall so
provide by act or joint resolution." Id. at 908.
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The present administration intends to encourage the promotion everywhere of human
rights and individual freedoms, but to favor methods of persuasion, education and
example rather than formal undertakings .... Therefore, while we shall not withhold
our counsel from those who seek to draft a treaty or covenant on human rights, we do
not ourselves look upon a treaty as the means which we would now select as the proper
and most effective way to spread throughout the world the goals of human liberty to
which this Nation has been dedicated since its inception. We therefore do not intend to
become a party to any such covenant or present it as a treaty for consideration by the
Senate.233
Dulles's statement had a dual effect. On the one hand, it added legitimacy to
the argument that the treaty power should not be used to effect changes in
domestic protection of human rights. On the other hand, it helped defeat the
move for a constitutional amendment 234 by persuading at least some Senators
that restraint by the Executive Branch, rather than a constitutional
amendment, was the best way to ensure that the United States would not
domesticate human rights treaties.
Although Senator Bricker's effort to amend the Constitution failed, he
succeeded in creating a political environment in which the Senate was hostile
towards U.S. ratification of human rights treaties and suspicious of any
attempt to use the treaty power to effect domestic social reforms.23
Consequently, from the time of Dulles's speech in 1953, until President
Carter submitted four human rights treaties to the Senate in 1978, U.S.
human rights policy generally followed the approach established by John
Foster Dulles: refraining from participating in human rights treaties,236
favoring instead the "methods of persuasion, education and example rather
than formal undertakings."23' Moreover, when President Carter did finally
advocate U.S. adherence to several major human rights treaties, he felt that
it was a political necessity to assure the Senate that the treaty power would
not be used to change domestic law. No subsequent administration has
challenged the inherited political wisdom that such an assurance is the price
233. 1953 Hearings, supra note 231, at 824 (emphasis added).
234. See KAUFMAN, supra note 184, at 104-06 ("When the vote was finally taken, the
Bricker version failed to receive the requisite two-thirds vote for a constitutional amendment .... A
weaker version proposed by Senator George came closer, falling one vote short of the requirement.").
235. For a more detailed political analysis of the Bricker Amendment debate and its
relationship to U.S. ratification of human rights treaties, see id. at 94-116.
236. The United States did ratify three human rights treaties between 1953, the date of
Dulles's testimony, and 1978, when President Carter submitted four human rights treaties to the
Senate: the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions
and Practices Similar to Slavery, opened for signature Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S.
3; The Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened for signature March 31, 1953, 27
U.S.T. 1909, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; and the Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political
Rights to Women, May 2, 1948, 27 U.S.T. 3301, O.A.S.T.S. No. 3. See KAUFMAN, supra note 184,
at 119-47 (discussing the context of ratification of two of the three treaties submitted to the Senate by
the Kennedy Administration); Weissbrodt, supra note 16, at 38 n.45 (discussing the historical context
of the ratification of the three treaties).
237. 1953 Hearings, supra note 231, at 825.
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that must be paid to obtain Senate consent to ratification of human rights
treaties.238 Thus, from the Executive Branch's perspective, one key purpose
of the NSE declarations has been to forestall opposition to treaty ratification
from the "Bricker wing" of the U.S. Senate by reassuring them that human
rights treaties would not affect domestic law.239
B. Treaty Reservations
The ICCPR, the Torture Convention, and the Race Convention all
provide, in certain respects, greater protection for human rights than was
available under preexisting domestic law at the time of ratification. For
example, Article 6 of the ICCPR obligates parties not to impose the death
penalty for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age740 The
238. It is noteworthy that the proposed Bricker Amendment was not limited to human rights
treaties. Inasmuch as the Amendment would have affected all treaties, the political battle over the
Bricker Amendment can be viewed as part of a broader trend, whereby the House has come to
exercise increasingly greater control over international agreements of all types, and the Senate's
power has been correspondingly reduced. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA
Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. REv. 801 (1995) (defending the increasing use of congressional-
executive agreements, whereby U.S. international agreements are approved by a simple majority of
both houses of Congress, rather than being submitted for a two-thirds vote in the Senate, as required
in the Treaty Clause). But see Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. Rv. 1221 (1995) (questioning, in
response to the Ackerman-Golove article, the constitutionality of congressional-executive agreements
in certain cases).
Notably, the premise underlying Senator Bricker's proposal was that a President who favored
U.S. participation in a treaty would face a greater hurdle if he was forced to obtain the consent of both
houses of Congress, not just the Senate. Thus, Bricker advocated a requirement of bicameral approval
to further his objective of making it more difficult to domesticate international agreements. In
contrast, the premise underlying the Ackerman-Golove article appears to be that it is easier for the
President to "sell" a treaty to a simple majority in both Houses than it is to sell it to two-thirds of the
Senate. Thus, Professors Ackerman and Golove favor the bicameral approach, in part, because they
believe that it poses fewer obstacles to the domestication of international agreements. If Professors
Ackerman and Golove are right, then a President who favored domestication of international human
rights treaties might consider submitting an international human rights agreement to Congress as a
congressional-executive agreement, rather than proceeding under the Treaty Clause, in order to
circumvent the "Bricker wing" of the Senate. However, it is likely that political forces hostile to
domestication of international human rights agreements would take steps to limit the domestic legal
effects of any such agreement to which the United States becomes a party, regardless of whether it is
handled under the Treaty Clause or as a congressional-executive agreement.
239. For obvious reasons, formal statements to the Senate by Executive Branch officials have
been rather circumspect in describing the political calculus underlying the RUDs. However, one
Carter Administration official, in an unofficial forum, described this political calculus quite clearly.
See Arthur Rovine & Jack Goldklang, Defense of Declarations, Reservations, and Understandings, in
U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, supra note 16, at 54.
240. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. VI, para. 5 ("Sentence of death shall not be imposed for
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age . . . ."). The United States adopted a
reservation stating that "the United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints,
to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under
existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such punishment for
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age." 138 CONG. REc. S4783 (1992). The
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United States, however, permits imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by persons who are sixteen or older.24' These types of
"discrepancies" between domestic law and treaty standards posed a problem
for Executive Branch officials who favored treaty ratification, because of the
perceived political requirement to avoid domestication of the treaties.
In theory, the treaty makers could have attempted to solve this problem
in one of three ways. First, they could have ratified the treaties without any
reservations and announced that the United States did not intend to comply
with any treaty provisions that provided greater protection for human rights
than was available under preexisting domestic law.242 Such an approach
would have been inconsistent with the policy objective of ensuring U.S.
compliance with its treaty obligations.24 It is also extremely unlikely that
two-thirds of the Senate would consent to ratification of a treaty if the
Executive Branch stated explicitly that it did not intend for the United States
to comply with the treaty.
Second, the treaty makers could have ratified the treaties without any
reservations, and changed domestic law to augment the level of human rights
protection in the United States to conform to treaty standards. They could
have made the necessary changes in domestic law either by enacting the
requisite implementing legislation, or by declaring the treaties to be self-
executing.2' However, the Executive Branch rejected this option because it
believed that the "Bricker forces" in the Senate would block ratification
under this approach.
Human Rights Committee has stated that the U.S. reservation to Article 6 is "incompatible with the
object and purpose of the Covenant." U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1413th mtg., U.N.
Doe. CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (1995), reprinted in 2 INT'L HUM. RTs. REP. 638, 640 (1995) [hereinafter
Human Rights Committee]; see also William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 277,
324-25 (1995) (concluding that "[t]he Committee ought to have declared that the reservation to
Article 6 as a whole, as formulated, was invalid").
241. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding that the imposition of
capital punishment for murders committed at age sixteen or seventeen "does 'not offend the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment"); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the
execution of a person who was under sixteen years of age at the time of his or her offense").
242. In fact, the Carter Administration apparently considered proposing a "general
reservation" for all human rights treaties that "would have subordinated all such treaties to the
Constitution and laws of the United States." Weissbrodt, supra note 16, at 48. However, "[o]pponents
of such a general reservation convincingly argued that such a sweeping reservation would make
ratification meaningless, and would harm the cause of human rights." Id.
243. See infra Subsection V.C.1.
244. The term "self-executing" is used here to mean that a treaty has domestic legal force,
even without enactment of implementing legislation, and that at least some of its provisions can be
applied directly by the courts and do create a private cause of action. It is likely that the treaty makers
could have achieved this result without actually declaring the treaties to be self-executing, if they had
simply refrained from declaring them to be non-self-executing. See supra Section IV.A.
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The treaty makers, therefore, chose a third option. They ratified the
treaties with reservations that modified the U.S. treaty obligations under
international law24 in order to eliminate discrepancies between the treaty
standards and preexisting domestic law.246 This was the only option that
could satisfy the twin objectives of ensuring U.S. compliance with its treaty
obligations and avoiding the domestication of human rights treaties.
C. Treaty Conditions and Treaty Compliance
Human rights advocates have consistently criticized the practice of
attaching numerous RUDs to U.S. instruments of ratification for human
rights treaties, 47 claiming that the conditional nature of U.S. adherence
demonstrates that the United States does not take its treaty obligations
seriously. The central purpose of human rights treaties, they contend, is for
states to assume international legal obligations that augment the domestic
protection of human rights to conform to international standards. If every
state adopted the U.S. approach, and ratified the treaties subject to the
caveat that they would protect human rights only to the extent that such
rights are already protected under domestic law, global adherence to human
rights treaties would accomplish nothing.248
The treaty makers have consistently responded to these criticisms by
arguing that the RUDs, properly understood, demonstrate that the United
States takes its treaty obligations very seriously. This Section examines
statements by government officials during the ratification process for human
rights treaties. Two main points emerge from the analysis: (1) the President
and the Senate have consistently placed a high value on the importance of
ensuring .that the United States would be able to comply with all of its
245. A detailed analysis of the various RUDs attached to the Torture Convention, the ICCPR,
and the Race Convention is beyond the scope of this article. Detailed discussion of the RUDs is
included in the TORTURE REPORT, supra note 46, at 7-28; the ICCPR REPORT, supra note 44, at 6-
21; and the RACE REPORT, supra note 65, at 7-32.
246. This Article argues below that the treaty makers were not wholly successful in
eliminating the discrepancies between treaty standards and preexisting domestic law. See infra
Subsection V.D.4. Regardless, the main point here is that many, but not all, of the reservations and
understandings were intended to eliminate such discrepancies.
247. See, e.g., Race Hearing, supra note 69, at 61-63 (prepared statement of the American
Civil Liberties Union); ICCPR Hearing, supra note 60, at 101-35 (statement of the International
Human Rights Law Group); Torture Hearing, supra note 50, at 46-49 (prepared statement of Winston
Nagan, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Amnesty International USA); Carter Hearings, supra
note 16, at 48-54 (critiquing the RUDs submitted by the Lawyers Committee for International Human
Rights).
248. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 17, at 343 ("Reservations designed to reject any
obligation to rise above existing law and practice are of dubious propriety: if states generally entered
such reservations, the convention would be futile."); Weissbrodt, supra note 16, at 78 ("By offering
such an extensive and intensive set of reservations to the Covenants, however, those who drafted these
proposals may have undermined the basic purpose of ratifying the treaties. .. ").
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international legal obligations under human rights treaties; and (2) every
administration has claimed that existing law provides sufficient protection
for human rights to ensure U.S. compliance with its treaty obligations, as
modified by the reservations, and, therefore, neither implementing
legislation nor self-execution is necessary to ensure treaty compliance.
1. The Importance of Treaty Compliance
In January 1979, after President Carter transmitted the human rights
treaties to the Senate, but before the Senate held hearings on those treaties,
the International Human Rights Law Group held a conference to discuss the
treaties.249 Most of the conference participants, including many distinguished
experts in the field of international law, were critical of the Carter
Administration's proposed RUDs. In response to these criticisms, a State
Department official who spoke on behalf of the Carter Administration said:
It is very easy to sign a human rights treaty without any reservations or understandings.
Many authoritarian regimes have done so. The liberal democracies have not taken that
approach.... [O]ne can almost judge those nations that take human rights obligations
seriously by the manner in which they have approached the problems of reservations or
understandings... I would say that those Western liberal democracies that are entering
a few reservations to make their law and the treaties compatible are doing a better job,
a more serious job, and a more committed job because they are taking the treaties more
seriously than those nations that become parties with no intention of conforming their
practices to human rights treaty obligations and that make no statements indicating that
they have any problems.2 1
From the government's perspective, if the United States did not care about
complying with its treaty obligations, it could simply ratify human rights
treaties with no reservations, declare them to be non-self-executing, and then
refuse to enact implementing legislation to conform domestic law to the
treaty requirements.752 The fact that the United States has adopted various
RUDs, according to the government, demonstrates that the United States is
serious about complying with its treaty obligations.
In April 1992, when the Senate provided its advice and consent for
ratification of the ICCPR, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan defended the
249. See U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, supra note 16, at vii.
250. See Clyde Ferguson, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, supra note 16, at 41, 41-46;
Louis Henkin, The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES, supra note 16, at 20, 20-26.
251. Rovine, supra note 239, at 57-58.
252. As noted above, this approach would be very unlikely to gain the approval of the
necessary two-thirds of the Senate. See supra text accompanying notes 242-243. Moreover, this
approach runs the risk that the courts would find the treaty to be self-executing, despite the NSE
declaration. In that event, judicial decisions could effectively domesticate the treaties.
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RUD package in a manner that is strikingly similar to the Carter
Administration's defense of its proposed RUDs:
Others have raised the legitimate concern that the number of reservations in the
administration's package might imply to some that the United States does not take the
obligations of the covenant seriously. . . . [iWt is possible to place a wholly different
interpretation on the administration's package of reservations. The administration has
not taken a blanket, or catchall reservation.... Rather, it has undertaken a meticulous
examination of U.S. practice to insure that the United States will in fact comply with
the obligations that it is assuming. This can certainly be viewed as an indication of the
seriousness with which the obligations are regarded rather than as an expression of
disdain for the obligations. Certainly, there was a time when the nations of the
totalitarian block ratified obligations without reservation-obligations that they had no
intention of carrying out. Far better to ratify with the firm intention of living up to the
covenant's terms.2
3
Thus, in Senator Moynihan's view, the RUDs, far from signaling a lack of
seriousness about treaty compliance, demonstrate the importance that the
United States places on ensuring that it can comply with its treaty
obligations. Every administration from Carter to Clinton has made a similar
claim.
An examination of statements by Executive Branch officials about the
so-called "free speech" reservations to the ICCPR and the Race Convention
demonstrates that the above statements are not merely empty rhetoric. This
Article has suggested that two broad objectives guided the U.S. approach to
ratification of human rights treaties: (1) ensuring that the United States
would be able to comply with its treaty obligations; and (2) avoiding the
domestication of human rights treaties. Whereas most of the U.S.
reservations and understandings were intended to advance both objectives
simultaneously,254 it is critical to note that the free speech reservations
attached to Article 20 of the ICCPR 5 and Article 4 of the Race
Convention? 6 did not advance the second objective. Even without the
reservations, Article 20 of the ICCPR and Article 4 of the Race Convention
could not have effected changes in domestic law, because they conflict with
the First Amendment, which is higher law.7 As one Carter Administration
official stated:
253. 138 CONG. Rc. S4783 (1992) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
254. See supra Section V.B.
255. See 138 CONG. Rc. S4783 (1992) ("Article 20 does not authorize or require legislation
or other action by the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and association
protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.").
256. See 140 CONG. Ruc. S7634 (1994) ("Mhe Constitution and laws of the United States
contain extensive protections of individual freedom of speech, expression and association.
Accordingly, the United States does not accept any obligation under this Convention, in particular
under Articles 4 and 7, to restrict those rights .... ).
257. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 20(1) (obligating parties to ban "propaganda for war");
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The most effective limit on the treaty power is that a treaty cannot violate a specific
provision of the Constitution. If we did not have reservations for these [free speech]
problems, the Constitution still would prevail as the law of the United States-this is a
very important point to remember-but we would be in default as far as our
international obligations are concerned."
Thus, the only purpose served by the "free speech" reservations was to
ensure that the United States would not be in breach of its international
obligations.
Yet despite the fact that the "free speech" reservations served only the
first objective (treaty compliance), and did not advance the second objective
(avoiding domestication), every administration has insisted that the "free
speech" reservations were absolutely essential. For example, in testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1979, Jack Goldklang, an
attorney adviser in the Department of Justice, stated with respect to the free
speech reservations, "To the extent that the treaty is inconsistent with the
Constitution, we have no option. . . .Thus, reservations where we have
constitutional problems are required. "" Similarly, Roberts Owen, the State
Department legal adviser, characterized the "free speech" reservations as
"absolutely essential in order to avoid conflicts with our own
Constitution."" The statements that "we have no option" and that the "free
speech" reservations are "absolutely essential" demonstrate that the Carter
Administration simply could not conceive of the possibility of undertaking a
treaty obligation with which the United States could not comply.26'
id. art. 20(2) (obligating parties to ban "advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred"); Race
Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(a) (obligating parties to ban "dissemination of ideas based on racial
superiority"); id. art. 4(b) (obligating parties to prohibit organizations "which promote and incite
racial discrimination"). The United States could not comply with these obligations, even if it wanted
to, because the First Amendment, subject to a few narrow exceptions, forbids the federal government
from banning the dissemination of obnoxious ideas. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
381 (1992) (holding that a St. Paul bias-motivated crime ordinance was "facially unconstitutional in
that it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses");
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 cmt.
a (1987) ("[P]rovisions of international agreements of the United States are subject to the Bill of
Rights and other prohibitions, restrictions, and requirements of the Constitution, and cannot be given
effect in violation of them").
258. Carter Hearings, supra note 16, at 35 (statement of Jack Goldklang, attorney adviser,
Department of Justice).
259. Id. (emphasis added).
260. Id. at 42 (statement of Roberts B. Owen) (emphasis added).
261. The Carter Administration made it clear that, in its view, the other reservations and
understandings were less important. Consider the following exchange between Senator Claiborne Pell
and Mr. Owen:
SENATOR PELL. Do you think by affixing reservations we may be making an error in
that we would be permitting other nations also to affix reservations and reinterpret the
covenants according to their own ideologies?
MR. OWEN. The ["free speech"] reservations ... are absolutely essential in order to
avoid conflicts with our own Constitution. As to the other reservations, if the Senate
should decide that they are not necessary, I think the administration would be willing to
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The Bush Administration, in presenting the ICCPR to the Senate, also
assumed that the "free speech" reservation was essential. In testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary of State
for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Richard Schifter said: "It is
axiomatic that the United States cannot agree in a treaty to an
unconstitutional obligation. One article (Article 20) would conflict with our
Constitutional guarantee of free speech. . . .We must, accordingly, take a
strong and clear reservation to this Article."262 Similarly, Conrad Harper,
testifying on behalf of the Clinton Administration in Senate hearings on the
Race Convention, characterized the "free speech" reservation as the "most
important" of the RUDs in the Clinton package, stating that it "is required
by the First Amendment."263 In fact, the "free speech" reservation is
"required" by the First Amendment only if one views the goal of treaty
compliance as sacrosanct. Similarly, it is "axiomatic" that the United States
cannot agree to an unconstitutional obligation only if one assumes that treaty
compliance is absolutely essential. Thus, statements by Executive Branch
officials from the Carter, Bush, and Clinton Administrations about the "free
speech" reservations to the ICCPR and the Race Convention demonstrate
that each administration believed that the objective of ensuring U.S.
compliance with its treaty obligations was sufficiently important that no
compromise was possible.
The Reagan/Bush approach to the Torture Convention is consistent
with the thesis that each administration viewed the goal of ensuring U.S.
compliance with its treaty obligations as sacrosanct. When the Reagan
Administration transmitted the Torture Convention to the Senate, it stated
dispense with them. Then we would be, in effect, bringing about a more rigorous civil
rights regime.
Id. (emphasis added). The fact that the Carter Administration would be willing to dispense with the
other reservations, thereby bringing about a more rigorous civil rights regime, shows that the
objective of avoiding domestication was considered to be negotiable. In contrast, the insistence that
the free speech reservations were "absolutely essential" shows that the objective of ensuring U.S.
compliance with its treaty obligations was considered to be nonnegotiable.
262. ICCPR Hearing, supra note 60, at 18 (emphasis added).
263. Race Hearing, supra note 69, at 17 (emphasis added). President Clinton also proposed a
so-called "private conduct" reservation to the Race Convention to limit the U.S. treaty obligation to
regulate discriminatory conduct by private entities. See 140 CONG. Rc. S7634 (1994) (statement of
Senator Pell). With respect to the private conduct reservation, Mr. Harper said only that "[w]e believe
such a measure is prudent." Race Hearing, supra note 69, at 18. The private conduct reservation is
merely "prudent," and not "required," because it is not the only way to ensure U.S. compliance with
the treaty provisions requiring regulation of private discriminatory conduct. If the United States was
willing to incorporate the Race Convention into domestic law, then it could ensure compliance with
those treaty provisions either by enacting implementing legislation to enforce those provisions, or by
interpreting the provisions to be self-executing. Thus, Mr. Harper's characterization of the "private
conduct" reservation as "prudent" suggests that the Clinton Administration viewed the goal of
avoiding domestication as merely a prudential consideration.
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that implementing legislation would be needed for Article 5." In addition, it
proposed a declaration, as part of its RUD package, that stated, "The United
States will not deposit the instrument of ratification until after the
implementing legislation of the Convention has been enacted."26 The
deposit of the instrument of ratification is the act that triggers U.S.
obligations under international law. If the United States deposited its
instrument of ratification for the Torture Convention prior to enactment of
implementing legislation, it would be able to comply with most of its treaty
obligations, but it would not be able to comply with those portions of Article
5 that the legislation was intended to implement.266 The declaration that the
United States would not deposit its instrument of ratification until after
enactment of the implementing legislation was designed to ensure that the
United States would be able to comply with all its treaty obligations
beginning at the moment when those obligations became effective as a
matter of international law.
When the Bush Administration revised the Reagan package of RUDs
for the Torture Convention, it recommended deleting the declaration
concerning the timing for depositing the U.S. instrument of ratification. 6 '
However, this recommendation was not intended to signal any diminution in
the seriousness with which the Bush Administration viewed the importance
of treaty compliance. To underscore this point, Abraham Sofaer, the State
Department Legal Adviser, explained the proposed deletion as follows:
"Although we have deleted the proposed declaration ... as unnecessary, we
intend to deposit the instrument of ratification as soon as the implementing
legislation has been enacted. We should make this Convention legally
binding only after Congress has provided the means for fulfilling its
obligations."26 Thus, he reiterated the basic principle that motivated the
declaration in the first place. It is not acceptable for the United States to
ratify a treaty on the assumption that it can comply with most of the
obligations immediately upon ratification, and that it will enact legislation
later to ensure compliance with the remaining obligations. On the contrary,
the principle of complying with treaty obligations is sufficiently important
264. See TORTURE REPORT, supra note 46, at 20.
265. Id. This was modeled on a similar declaration that the Senate included as part of its
resolution of ratification for the Genocide Convention. See 132 CONG. REc. S1378 (1986) (declaring
that "the President will not deposit the instrument of ratification until after the implementing
legislation referred to in Article V has been enacted").
266. The specific provisions in Article 5 that the legislation was intended to implement
obligate the United States to impose criminal penalties for specified acts. See supra notes 168-170 and
accompanying text.
267. See TORTURE REPORT, supra note 46, at 37. The Bush Administration explained the
proposed deletion as follows: "Although it remains our intention to not deposit the instrument of
ratification until after implementing legislation of the Convention has been enacted, it is not necessary
that this declaration be included in the formal instrument of ratification." Id.
268. Torture Hearing, supra note 50, at 12 (emphasis added).
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that the United States must ensure that it is able to comply with all the
obligations before it assumes any of them.269
2. We Can Have Our Cake and Eat It Too
Thus far, we have seen that: (1) every administration placed a high
value on ensuring that the United States would be able to comply with its
treaty obligations; and (2) every administration believed that it was
politically necessary to assure the Senate that human rights treaties would
not be incorporated into domestic law.270 If the treaty makers, by means of
treaty reservations, successfully eliminated every discrepancy between treaty
requirements and preexisting domestic law, then there would be no conflict
between the objective of treaty compliance and the objective of avoiding
domestication. However, if the treaty makers, in designing the package of
reservations, inadvertently overlooked a discrepancy between treaty
requirements and preexisting domestic law, then there would be a conflict
between the objective of treaty compliance and the objective of avoiding
domestication. Hence, the question arises: If there is an actual conflict
between these two objectives, which one should take precedence?
Every administration has handled this question in roughly the same
manner: by assuring the Senate that its proposed package of reservations
successfully eliminated every discrepancy between treaty requirements and
preexisting domestic law, thereby resolving any possible conflict between
the objective of treaty compliance and the objective of avoiding
domestication. For example, in its 1978 letter of submittal, the Carter
Administration stated:
The treaties contain a small number of provisions which are or appear to be in conflict
with United States law. The most serious examples are [the restrictions on free speech].
Reservations to these and other provisions, discussed below, along with a number of
statements of understanding, are designed to harmonize the treaties with existing
provisions of domestic law. . . . The Department of Justice is of the view that, with
these reservations, declarations and understandings, there are no constitutional or other
legal objections to United States ratification of the treatiesY
There were no "legal objections"" to ratification because the Carter
Administration had designed a package of reservations that eliminated the
269. Consistent with this principle, although the Senate provided its consent for ratification in
October 1990, 136 CONG. REc. S17,491-92 (1990), the United States did not deposit its instrument of
ratification until October 21, 1994. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 6, at 185. Implementing
legislation was enacted on April 30, 1994. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 506, 108 Stat. 382, 463 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-
2340B (1994)).
270. See supra Section V.A.
271. CARTER MESSAGE, supra note 15, at vi.
272. Id.
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"small number" 273  of discrepancies between treaty requirements and
preexisting domestic law. By utilizing the reservations to "harmonize the
treaties with existing provisions of domestic law,"274 the Administration
ensured that the United States can fulfill all of its international legal
obligations under the treaties without having to change domestic law.
In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Roberts
Owen, the State Department Legal Adviser during the Carter
Administration, provided similar assurances to the Senate. He noted that
"critics fear" that the divergence between domestic law and treaty
requirements "will cause changes in that domestic law outside the normal
legislative process."275 He replied that "we need not fear a confusion of
standards due to possible conflicts between the treaty provisions and
domestic law," because the Administration's package of RUDs eliminates
any divergence between domestic law and treaty requirements.276
In the few instances where it was felt that a provision of the treaties could reasonably
be interpreted to diverge from the requirements of our constitution or from federal or
state law presently in force, the Administration has suggested that a reservation or
understanding be made to that provision. In our view, these reservations... permit us
to accept the treaties in a form consonant with our domestic legal requirements.'m
Mr. Owen's statement implies that the Carter Administration had
successfully eliminated every discrepancy between treaty requirements and
preexisting domestic law. 78 If that assessment were correct, then there
would be no need to confront difficult decisions about trade-offs between the
objective of treaty compliance and the objective of avoiding changes in
domestic law. The United States could fully satisfy both objectives.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Carter Hearings, supra note 16, at 29 (statement of Roberts B. Owen).
276. Id. at 30.
277. Id.
278. Unofficially, Jack Goldklang, who testified before the Senate on behalf of the
Department of Justice, seemed less confident that the Carter Administration had successfully
eliminated every discrepancy between treaty requirements and preexisting domestic law. At a
conference attended by international law scholars and human rights activists, he stated:
I do not know how many of you in the audience have actually sat down and tried to
read through the texts of all of these treaties. I found it fascinating that on a panel filled
with highly skilled lawyers, nobody pointed out an ambiguity or a possible
inconsistency with our domestic law that we had overlooked in our messages to the
Senate. I am sure, however, that if we have hearings before the Senate, we will be met
with dozens of such examples. They exist. Ingenious committee counsel could
challenge us and make us explain every last clause in these treaties.
Rovine & Goldklang, supra note 239, at 64. However, no Carter Administration official ever made
such a frank admission in any formal presentation to the Senate, nor did any representatives of any
subsequent administration. Thus, whatever private doubts Executive Branch officials may have
harbored, they consistently told the Senate that their proposed reservations would successfully
eliminate all discrepancies between treaty requirements and preexisting domestic law.
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The Reagan and Bush Administrations also sought to assure the Senate
that the United States could comply fully with its international legal
obligations under the Torture Convention, as modified by the proposed
reservations, without having to make changes in domestic law (other than
the minor changes embodied in the implementing legislation for Article 5).
When the Reagan Administration transmitted the Torture Convention to the
Senate, it included a detailed article-by-article analysis that explained, for
each substantive article of the treaty: (1) how existing domestic law already
satisfied most of the treaty requirements; and (2) how its proposed
reservations and understandings would fill the remaining "gaps" between the
treaty requirements and preexisting domestic law.279
During Senate hearings, Abraham Sofaer, the State Department Legal
Adviser, explained why changes in domestic law were not necessary to
ensure U.S. compliance with the treaty:
Existing U.S. law makes any acts falling within the Convention's definition of torture a
criminal offense, as well as a violation of various civil statutes. Potential remedies
include incarceration, compensation, and the full range of equitable relief. Any Public
official in the United States, at any level of government, who inflicts torture (or
instigates, consents to, acquiesces in, or tolerates torture) would be subject to an
effective system of control and punishment in the U.S. legal system.na
The Executive Branch apparently succeeded in its effort to persuade the
Senate that the proposed reservations had eliminated any potential
discrepancy between treaty requirements and preexisting domestic law. The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopted the Bush Administration's
proposed RUDs, and expressed its "strong belief that they [the RUDs]
resolve fully any potential conflicts between the Convention and U.S.
law." 81 Given the assumption that they had eliminated all discrepancies
between treaty requirements and preexisting domestic law, there was no
perceived need for the treaty makers to confront difficult decisions about
279. See TORTURE REPORT, supra note 46, at 13-28. Of course, in the case of the Torture
Convention, the treaty makers decided to fill one "gap" by means of implementing legislation, rather
than a reservation. Interestingly enough, the one area where they felt it was politically acceptable to
use a human rights treaty to effect changes in domestic law did not actually augment protection for
individuals against government interference. Rather, the legislation expanded the power of
government to prosecute criminals. See supra notes 168-170 and accompanying text. Similarly,
implementing legislation for the Genocide Convention was also designed to expand the power of
government to prosecute criminals. See Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (The
Proxmire Act), Pub. L. No. 100-606, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 3046 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-
1093 (1994)). Thus, the political calculus seems to be that it is politically unacceptable to use human
rights treaties to augment protection of individual freedom from government interference, but it is
politically acceptable to use human rights treaties to expand the power of government to prosecute
human rights violators.
280. Torture Hearing, supra note 50, at 8 (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer).
281. TORTURE REPORT, supra note 46, at 4.
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trade-offs between the objective of treaty compliance and the objective of
avoiding changes in domestic law.
When the Bush Administration submitted to the Senate its proposed
RUDs for the ICCPR, it also sought to assure the Senate that the United
States could comply fully with the ICCPR, as modified by the proposed
reservations, without having to domesticate the ICCPR. The Bush
Administration said:
In general, the substantive provisions of the Covenant are consistent with the letter and
spirit of the United States Constitution and laws, both state and federal. Consequently,
the United States can accept the majority of the Covenant's obligations and
undertakings without qualification. In a few instances, however, it is necessary to
subject U.S. ratification to reservations, understandings or declarations in order to
ensure that the United States can fulfill its obligations under the Covenant ....
This statement implies, without saying so explicitly: (1) that the Bush
Administration has identified every discrepancy between treaty requirements
and preexisting domestic law; and (2) that therefore the United States can
rely on preexisting domestic law to fulfill all of its obligations with respect
to those ICCPR provisions for which the Administration did not propose a
reservation or understanding.283
In its report on the ICCPR, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
stated: "The overwhelming majority of the provisions in the Covenant are
compatible with existing U.S. domestic law. In those few areas where the
two diverge, the Administration has proposed a reservation or other form of
condition to clarify the nature of the obligation being undertaken by the
United States." 284 This statement suggests that the Committee believed that
the Bush package of RUDs successfully harmonized the ICCPR
requirements with preexisting domestic law, thereby enabling the treaty
282. ICCPR REPORT, supra note 44, at 10.
283. During testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary of
State Schifter also sought to assure the Senate that the Administration's proposed package of RUDs
eliminated any potential discrepancy between the ICCPR and domestic law. However, his assurance
that the Administration had identified every possible discrepancy was more implicit than explicit. He
said:
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights basically sets forth the individual rights and
freedoms which are enjoyed by all Americans and which have played a key role in the
birth of our nation and throughout our history .... Our basic human rights are secure
in America through their incorporation in the Bill of Rights and other provisions of the
Constitution ....
ICCPR Hearing, supra note 60, at 18. Mr. Schifter then noted that the Administration had proposed
reservations for "those few provisions of the Covenant which are not in accord with existing law,"
thereby implying that all those provisions that were not subject to RUDs are in accord with existing
law. Id. He also emphasized that the Bush package "reflects the carefully considered views of the
various governmental departments which are most directly concerned," implying that the
Administration had thoroughly considered all other possible discrepancies between the ICCPR and
preexisting domestic law. Id.
284. ICCPR REPORT, supra note 44, at 4.
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makers to sidestep difficult decisions about trade-offs between the objective
of treaty compliance and the objective of avoiding changes in domestic law.
The Clinton Administration was perhaps more explicit than any of its
predecessors in providing assurances to the Senate that the United States
could comply fully with its international legal obligations under a human
rights treaty, as modified by the reservations, without having to domesticate
the treaty in question-the Race Convention. In its proposed package of
RUDs, the Clinton Administration stated:
As was the case with the prior treaties, existing U.S. law provides extensive protections
and remedies sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the present Convention [as
modified by the RUDs]. Moreover, federal, state and local laws already provide a
comprehensive basis for challenging discriminatory statutes, regulations and other
governmental actions in court, as well as certain forms of discriminatory conduct by
private actors. Given the extensive provisions already present in U.S. law, there is no
discernible need for the establishment of additional causes of action or new avenues of
litigation to enforce the essential requirements of the Convention.
In short, the United States does not need to domesticate the Convention to
ensure compliance with its treaty obligations, because: (1) preexisting
domestic law already fulfills most of the Convention's requirements; and (2)
the reservations eliminate completely any discrepancies between the
Convention and preexisting domestic law. As with the other treaties, this
assumption rendered it unnecessary for the treaty makers to confront trade-
offs between the objective of treaty compliance and the objective of avoiding
changes in domestic law.
Given the Executive Branch's desire to obtain Senate consent for
ratification, it was tactically advantageous to claim that there was no need to
make trade-offs between treaty compliance and avoiding changes in domestic
law. If the Executive Branch had indicated a willingness to sacrifice the
latter objective in favor of treaty compliance, it would have met stiff
resistance from the Bricker wing of the Senate. If the Executive Branch had
indicated a willingness to sacrifice the goal of treaty compliance in favor of
avoiding changes in domestic law, it would have met stiff resistance from
human rights advocates in the Senate, not to mention those who believed that
treaty compliance was important as a matter of principle. Thus, the "we can
have our cake and eat it too" sales pitch was a clever tactic for advancing
the short-term goal of obtaining Senate consent for treaty ratification. Part
VI explains, however, that the treaty makers left a difficult problem for the
285. RACE REPORT, supra note 65, at 25-26 (emphases added). Conrad Harper, the State
Department Legal Adviser, made a very similar statement in testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. In particular, he repeated the claim that existing provisions of U.S. law are
"sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the present Convention." Race Hearing, supra note 69, at
18.
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judiciary by deliberately avoiding the difficult trade-offs between conflicting
policy objectives.
D. NSE Declarations and the Politics of Ratification
Assume that the treaty makers were so successful in crafting
reservations and understandings to the Torture Convention, the ICCPR, and
the Race Convention that they eliminated every discrepancy between
domestic law and treaty requirements. In that case, the only possible claims
that litigants could raise under the treaties would be either frivolous, i.e.,
not well founded in the treaties, or redundant, i.e., already covered under
existing provisions of domestic law. A litigant who raised a frivolous claim
would lose, regardless of whether the court applied the treaty directly as a
rule of decision in the case. A litigant who raised a redundant claim would
win, regardless of whether the court applied the treaty directly as a rule of
decision in the case.'86 Thus, as a practical matter, the treaties would have
absolutely no effect on domestic legal outcomes, even if they were self-
executing.287 Therefore, if the reservations actually eliminated every
discrepancy between treaty requirements and preexisting domestic law, the
NSE declarations would have no domestic legal effect, because the treaties
would have no domestic legal effect, even without the NSE declarations.
Moreover, the NSE declarations would have no effect on U.S.
compliance with its international legal obligations, because every claimant
entitled to relief under a treaty would obtain that relief on the basis of some
other redundant provision of U.S. law. 8 In sum, if the assurances the
Executive Branch provided the Senate were true-i.e., if the reservations
successfully eliminated every discrepancy between treaty requirements and
preexisting domestic law-then the NSE declarations would have no
relevance either to the objective of treaty compliance or to the objective of
avoiding changes in domestic law. The declarations would be mere "window
dressing," tactically useful to reassure the Bricker wing of the Senate, but in
fact substantially unrelated to any broader policy objective.
286. If the court applied the treaty directly, the litigant would win on the basis of the treaty.
If the court refused to apply the treaty directly, the litigant would win on the basis of the redundant
legal provision. Either way, the essential outcome would be the same.
287. Here, the term "self-executing" is used to mean that the treaties create a private cause of
action and are directly applicable by the courts.
288. The treaties do not obligate the United States to ensure that courts apply the treaty
provisions directly as rules of decision in particular cases. No broadly based multilateral treaty could
include such an obligation, because many countries, such as the United Kingdom, have domestic legal
systems in which courts never apply treaties directly. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
Thus, even if the treaties are non-self-executing, the United States fulfills its international legal
obligations under the treaties if: (1) those who claim that their treaty rights were violated obtain an
individual hearing before an impartial tribunal; and (2) claimants who are entitled to a remedy obtain a
remedy. See supra Section 1.C.
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1. Two Possible Theories
In light of the above, there are two possible ways to explain the role of
the NSE declarations in the context of the overall U.S. approach to treaty
ratification. These approaches will be referred to as the "safety valve"
theory and the "window dressing" theory. According to the safety valve
theory, the treaty makers recognized that, despite their best efforts, they
might not have eliminated every single discrepancy between treaty
requirements and preexisting domestic law, and that therefore individuals
might still be able to raise some nonredundant, non-frivolous claims. Hence,
the NSE declarations were intended as a safety valve to preclude judges
from reaching the merits of non-frivolous, nonredundant claims that the
treaty makers had overlooked when they developed the U.S. reservations.
As noted above, the United States has an international legal obligation under
the ICCPR, the Torture Convention, and the Race Convention to ensure that
every person who raises a non-frivolous, nonredundant claim that his or her
treaty rights have been violated obtains an individual hearing before an
impartial tribunal.2 9 If the NSE declarations are intended to preclude judges
from reaching the merits of non-frivolous, nonredundant treaty-based human
rights claims, then those declarations are inconsistent with the U.S. treaty
obligation to provide an individual hearing before an impartial tribunal.2'
Because a judge's failure to reach the merits of a nonredundant, non-
frivolous claim would place the United States in breach of its treaty
obligations, the safety valve theory assumes that the United States made a
deliberate policy decision that, in the event of a conflict, the objective of
avoiding domestication should always take precedence over the objective of
treaty compliance.29" '
289. See supra Section II.C. Although the relevant treaty articles-Articles 2(3) and 14(1) of
the ICCPR, Article 14 of the Torture Convention, and Article 6 of the Race Convention-do not
distinguish between frivolous and non-frivolous claims, it would be unreasonable to interpret these
provisions to require the United States to provide an individual hearing for every frivolous claim.
Similarly, although the articles do not distinguish between redundant and nonredundant claims, the
United States fulfills its treaty obligations with respect to redundant claims if it provides relief under
another provision of U.S. law.
290. But see infra Subsection VI.B.3 (discussing cases in which the United States can fulfill
its obligation to provide an individual hearing by providing an alternative, non-judicial forum).
291. Most commentators have assumed that the NSE declarations do signal a deliberate
choice by the treaty makers to elevate the objective of avoiding domestication over the objective of
treaty compliance. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 17, at 1257 ("It was a sad day in American legal
history when ... the U.S. Senate... unquestionably accepted the Bush Administration's declaration
that the [ICCPR] should not be self-executing. . . . Rarely has a formal attempt at adherence to a
treaty been so blatantly meaningless and so openly defiant of its terms."). For a more nuanced
assessment of the political horse-trading embodied in the NSE declarations, see Round Table
Discussion on International Human Rights Standards in the United States: The Case of Religion or
Belief, 12 EMORY INT'L L. Rav. 973, 993 (1998) (statement of Douglas Laycock) (suggesting that the
ratification of human rights treaties with numerous RUDs is a result of conflicts among "different
1999]
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In contrast, according to the window dressing theory, the treaty makers
deliberately avoided making any decision concerning possible trade-offs
between the objective of treaty compliance and the objective of avoiding
changes in domestic law. They believed, or acted as if they believed, that
the reservations eliminated all discrepancies between treaty requirements and
preexisting domestic law,2" thereby enabling the United States to satisfy
both the objective of treaty compliance and the objective of avoiding changes
in domestic law, without having to choose between the two. Under this
view, the NSE declarations were merely window dressing, intended to
secure the votes of the Bricker forces in the Senate, but without sacrificing
the objective of treaty compliance.
2. A Defense of the Window Dressing Theory
There are several reasons why the window dressing theory provides a
better explanation of the treaty makers' intentions than the safety valve
theory. First, the safety valve theory is inconsistent with both: (1) the treaty
makers' manifest intention to ensure U.S. compliance with its treaty
obligations;293 and (2) the treaty makers' expressed belief that the
reservations they adopted had eliminated any discrepancies between treaty
requirements and preexisting domestic law.294 In contrast, the window
dressing theory suffers from neither deficiency.
Second, the United States did nothing to modify its international legal
obligations to provide remedies for treaty violations or to provide an
individual hearing for persons who allege violations of their treaty rights.295
political factions who can succeed in controlling different organs of governments because of the
doctrine of separation of powers").
292. The window dressing theory is consistent with the thesis that officials recognized the
possibility that they might not have eliminated every discrepancy between treaty requirements and
preexisting domestic law, and that therefore individuals might still be able to raise some
nonredundant, non-frivolous claims. The crux of the theory is that the relevant policy-making organs,
in the process of formal deliberations, discounted such a possibility sufficiently that they never
confronted the difficult trade-offs that would arise if an individual did raise a nonredundant, non-
frivolous claim.
293. See supra notes 249-269 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 270-285 and accompanying text.
295. One might wonder whether the NSE declarations themselves modify these international
legal obligations. The answer is clearly "no." Executive Branch spokespersons have consistently
stated that the NSE declarations do not derogate from U.S. obligations under international law. See,
e.g., RACE REPORT, supra note 65, at 26 ("Declaring the Convention to be non-self-executing in no
way lessens the obligation of the United States to comply with its provisions as a matter of
international law."); see also Carter Hearings, supra note 16, at 29-30 (statement of Roberts B.
Owen, State Department Legal Adviser) ("This understanding as to the non-self-executing nature of
the substantive provisions of the treaties would not derogate from or diminish in any way our
international obligations under the treaties; it touches only upon the role the treaty provisions will play
in our domestic law."). Nongovernment witnesses also agreed that the NSE declarations do not
modify U.S. obligations under international law. See, e.g., ICCPR Hearing, supra note 60, at 59
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If the treaty makers did not intend for the United States to comply with its
obligations under Article 2(3) of the ICCPR to provide remedies and an
individual hearing,296 they could have attached a reservation to Article 2(3);
however, they chose not to do so. If the treaty makers did not intend for the
United States to comply with its obligations under Article 6 of the Race
Convention to provide remedies and an individual hearing,297 they could
have attached a reservation to Article 6, but they chose not to do so. 298
Similarly, if the treaty makers did not intend for the United States to
comply with its obligations under Articles 13 and 14 of the Torture
Convention, 99 they could have attached appropriate reservations; however,
they chose not to do so.3" The fact that the United States did nothing to
modify its obligations to provide remedies and an individual hearing strongly
suggests that the treaty makers intended to comply with those obligations.
The safety valve theory is not persuasive because it suggests that the treaty
makers did not intend to comply with those obligations. In contrast, the
window dressing theory is entirely consistent with the conclusion that the
treaty makers intended for the United States to comply with its obligations to
provide remedies and an individual hearing.
Third, the safety valve theory is unpersuasive because there is not a
single statement in the Senate record associated with U.S. ratification of the
Torture Convention, the ICCPR, or the Race Convention indicating that the
treaty makers intended, by means of the NSE declaration, to elevate the
objective of avoiding domestication above the objective of treaty
compliance. To the contrary, the record is replete with statements indicating
that the treaty makers thought that the NSE declarations were fully
consistent with the objective of treaty compliance. For example, the Senate
(prepared statement of William T. Lake on behalf of the International Human Rights Law Group)
("[A] declaration that the treaty is non-self-executing would not absolve the United States from its
duty under international law to bring its domestic laws into compliance with the Covenant.")
296. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of Article 2(3).
297. See id. for a discussion of Article 6.
298. It is noteworthy that the main substantive provisions of the Race Convention are
included in Articles 1 through 7. The U.S. reservations address portions of Articles 1 through 5 and
7, but not Article 6. See 140 CoNo. Rc. S7634-35 (1994).
299. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of Articles 13 and 14.
300. The United States did adopt an understanding with respect to Article 14, stating "[t]hat it
is the understanding of the United States that article 14 requires a State Party to provide a private right
of action for damages only for acts of torture committed in territory under the jurisdiction of that State
Party." MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 6, at 187. However, this statement does not offer any
indication that the United States does not intend to comply with its obligation to provide a private right
of action for damages. To the contrary, the statement strongly implies that the United States does
intend to provide such a private right of action, but only for acts of torture committed in territory
under U.S. jurisdiction. The Reagan Administration confirmed this intention. See TORTURE REPORT,
supra note 46, at 24 ("Existing U.S. law already establishes private rights of suit sufficient to
implement Article 14.").
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Foreign Relations Committee explained the NSE declaration attached to the
Race Convention as follows:
In view of the extensive provisions present in U.S. law to provide protections and
remedies sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Convention, the Administration
sees no need for the establishment of additional causes of action or new avenues of
litigation in order to enforce the essential requirements of the Convention. Therefore,
the Administration proposes a declaration to the effect that the Convention is non-self-
executing.
3
01
In short, the United States adopted an NSE declaration because self-
execution is unnecessary to achieve treaty compliance; it is unnecessary
because preexisting provisions of U.S. law are "sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the Convention."" The fact that the treaty makers justified
the NSE declarations by claiming that such declarations are entirely
consistent with the objective of treaty compliance supports the window
dressing theory.
Finally, assume that the safety valve theory is correct. Specifically,
assume that the treaty makers adopted the NSE declarations because they
made a deliberate policy choice to elevate the goal of avoiding domestication
above the goal of treaty compliance. If the treaty makers had made such a
deliberate policy choice, one would think that they would have decided to
either: (1) subordinate the goal of treaty compliance in every case by
precluding judges from applying the treaties directly in any case (Foster non-
self-execution); or (2) subordinate the goal of treaty compliance only in
some cases by precluding judges from applying the treaties directly only in
some cases (the "private cause of action" concept). The safety valve theory
is consistent with either choice (1) or choice (2), because either one
represents a deliberate policy decision. However, the theory is inconsistent
with a failure to choose between (1) and (2), because this failure indicates
the absence of any deliberate policy decision. Thus, the fact that the
Executive Branch in general, and the Bush Administration in particular,
shifted between the Foster concept of non-self-execution and the "private
cause of action" concept30 3 makes the safety valve theory appear less
plausible.
In contrast, the window dressing theory helps make sense of the
seemingly inadvertent oscillation between the Foster concept and the
"private cause of action" concept. According to the window dressing theory,
the treaty makers believed, or acted as if they believed, that the reservations
eliminated all discrepancies between treaty requirements and preexisting
domestic law. If the treaty makers genuinely believed that, then the
301. RACE REPORT, supra note 65, at 8 (emphasis added).
302. Id.
303. See supra Part IV.
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difference between the Foster concept of non-self-execution and the "private
cause of action" concept would have seemed relatively unimportant to them,
because under either concept the United States would still be able to comply
fully with its treaty obligations without having to domesticate the treaties.
In sum, the evidence supports the window dressing theory, which says
that the treaty makers did not make a deliberate policy choice to elevate the
objective of avoiding domestication above the objective of treaty
compliance. Nor did the treaty makers renounce the objective of avoiding
domestication in favor of promoting treaty compliance. Rather, the window
dressing theory suggests that the treaty makers valued both objectives
equally, and that they deliberately avoided making any decision concerning
possible trade-offs between the two objectives. Hence, judges should strive
to give effect to both objectives, without categorically favoring one over the
other.
3. The Harmonization Theory
Some might claim that the preceding analysis ignores a third possible
theory that is different from either the safety valve or the window dressing
theory. Under this theory, which I call the "harmonization" theory, the NSE
declarations should be construed as a general directive to the courts to
interpret human rights treaty provisions so as to harmonize the treaties with
constitutional, statutory, and common law. There are two versions of this
theory: a weak version and a strong version.
The weak version is that judges should, whenever possible, strive to
construe treaty provisions so as to harmonize them with corresponding
constitutional and statutory provisions. If judges can plausibly interpret an
ambiguous statutory provision to conform to a relatively clear treaty
provision, or interpret an ambiguous treaty provision to conform to a
relatively clear statutory provision, then judges can avoid the need to make
trade-offs between the goal of treaty compliance and the desire to avoid
domestication. 3 This is because, insofar as U.S. treaty obligations conform
with other provisions of domestic law, there is no conflict between the two
objectives. Hence, the weak version of the harmonization theory is
304. As such, the weak version is essentially a restatement of the so-called Charming Betsy
canon, which derives from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Murray v. The Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804), in which he stated that "an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains." Id. at 118. For
further discussion of the Charming Betsy canon, see infra notes 367-372, 405-408 and accompanying
text; see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking
the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 484 (1998) (contending that the canon
"is best thought of today as a device to preserve the proper separation of powers between the three
branches of the federal government").
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consistent with the window dressing theory, because it accords equal weight
to the twin objectives of treaty compliance and avoiding domestication.
The strong version of the harmonization theory construes the NSE
declarations to mean that courts should, in every case, interpret human rights
treaty provisions so that they provide no greater protection for individual
rights than is available under other provisions of constitutional, statutory, or
common law. The strong version is problematic for two reasons. First, it
assumes that the treaty makers intended to privilege the objective of avoiding
domestication over the objective of treaty compliance. That assumption is at
odds with the Senate record, which shows that the treaty makers valued both
objectives equally. Second, the strong version is at odds with fundamental
separation of powers principles. As Chief Justice Marshall stated almost two
hundred years ago, "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."3"5 That principle applies to treaties, just
as it does to other laws.3"' Although the judiciary properly accords great
weight to Executive Branch interpretations of specific treaty provisions,0 7
the Executive Branch would be exceeding its constitutional authority if it
attempted to issue a general directive to the judiciary, instructing it to
interpret every provision of a human rights treaty so that no provision offers
any greater protection for human rights than is already available under other
provisions of domestic law.
4. Limits of the Weak Version
The weak version of the harmonization theory is a useful corollary to
the window dressing theory, in that it instructs judges to interpret human
rights treaty provisions, whenever possible, so as to harmonize them with
corresponding constitutional and statutory provisions. However, there are
some cases in which it is simply not possible to harmonize the treaties with
other provisions of domestic law. Two examples will suffice.
In one case, the Immigration and Naturalization Service sought to
deport Zakari Abu, a native and citizen of Nigeria, on the grounds that he
had unlawfully entered the United States after having previously been
deported. 0 The immigration judge found that, due to Abu's prior
participation in a failed coup attempt, he would be "immediately arrested
305. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
306. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
111, cmt. e (1987) ("Cases arising under treaties to which the United States is a party ... are 'Cases
... arising under... the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made.., under their Authority,'
and therefore within the Judicial Power of the United States under Article M, Section 2 of the
Constitution." (quoting U.S. CONST. art. nI, § 2)).
307. See, e.g., Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982).
308. See Matter of Abu, No. A29 499 143 (I.N.S. Feb. 19, 1997) (pending on cross-appeal
to B.I.A.).
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and murdered by the government of Nigeria if he returns to that country."" 9
Yet the judge also concluded that Abu was ineligible for relief under U.S.
immigration laws, because he had a prior felony conviction in the United
States."' Article 3 of the Torture Convention prohibits the deportation of
any individual to a country where he is more likely than not to be
tortured."' Accepting as true the immigration judge's factual finding that
Abu would almost certainly be murdered upon his return to Nigeria,
deportation of Abu to Nigeria would be a flagrant violation of the U.S.
obligations under Article 3.312 Hence, Abu's case presents a stark conflict
between federal statutes and U.S. treaty obligations, because Article 3
clearly prohibits Abu's deportation to Nigeria, but no relief was available to
him under federal statutes. 3
In another case, Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a citizen and resident of
Mexico, was forcibly kidnapped from his office in Mexico and flown to the
United States, where he was arrested by officials of the U.S. Drug
309. Id. at 17.
310. See id. at 7-12. Abu's felony conviction occurred when, under instructions from a
superior military officer, he carried an attach6 case into the United States that, without Abu's
knowledge, contained narcotics in a hidden compartment.
311. Article 3 states: "No State Party shall expel, return ('refouler') or extradite a person to
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture." Torture Convention, supra note 8, art. 3, para. 1. In its instrument of
ratification, the United States adopted an understanding, interpreting the "substantial grounds" test to
mean that "it is more likely than not that he would be tortured." MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note
6, at 187.
312. Judge Richardson considered the application of Article 3 in Abu's case, but mistakenly
concluded that the Convention "does not yet carry the force of law in the United States," because it is
not self-executing. See Matter of Abu, No. A29 499 143, at 14. Therefore, he did not explicitly reach
the question of whether deportation to Nigeria would violate Article 3, although he left little room for
doubt about how he would decide that issue.
Note that Judge Richardson, by holding that the Convention "does not yet carry the force of
law," was effectively interpreting the NSE declaration in accordance with the automatic incorporation
concept, not the Foster concept. See supra notes 121-134 and accompanying text. Judge Richardson's
interpretation of the NSE declaration is controverted by the General Counsel's Office of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, which has stated that, notwithstanding the NSE declaration,
"Article 3 is United States law, equal in force to a federal statute." Memorandum from INS Office of
General Counsel to Regional Counsel, District Counsel and All Headquarters Attorneys 2 (May 14,
1997) (on file with the author).
313. Despite his conclusion that Abu was not eligible under U.S. law for any form of relief
from deportation, Judge Richardson could not, in good conscience, allow Abu to be deported to a
place where he would be summarily executed. Judge Richardson resolved this dilemma by holding
that deportation to Nigeria would violate customary international law. See Matter of Abu, No. A29
499 143, at 14-17. He ordered:
that the case be held in abeyance pending a change in the circumstances of the
respondent which would allow him to return to Nigeria without being subject to official
torture or until such time as Congress enacts legislation implementing the Torture
Convention and relief can be granted to the respondent under such legislation.
Id. at 19. Thus, Abu is being held in indefinite detention in the United States, in apparent violation of
Article 9 of the ICCPR, which prohibits "arbitrary arrest or detention." ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 9.
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Enforcement Agency (DEA).31 4  DEA agents were "responsible for
respondent's abduction, although they were not personally involved in it."3"5
Alvarez-Machain argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to try him on
criminal charges, because the DEA agents' conduct violated both the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause and the extradition treaty between the
United States and Mexico." 6 The Supreme Court ultimately held that
Alvarez-Machain did not have "a defense to the jurisdiction of this country's
courts."3I 7 In contrast, the Human Rights Committee has held in at least two
separate cases that transnational forcible abductions violate Article 9(1) of
the ICCPR,18 and that the appropriate remedy for such a violation is to
release the kidnapping victim and permit him to depart the country.3 19 The
United States did not adopt a reservation to Article 9(1). Therefore, if
something like the Alvarez-Machain case occurred again in the future,320 and
the defendant raised Article 9(1) of the ICCPR as a defense to the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts, the defendant would have a non-frivolous,
nonredundant claim.
These two examples are not exhaustive, but they serve to illustrate a
crucial point. Despite the treaty makers' best efforts to eliminate all
discrepancies between treaty requirements and preexisting domestic law,
there are still a variety of non-frivolous, nonredundant claims that litigants
could raise under these treaties."' Such claims pose difficulties for judges,
which are the subject of Part VI.
314. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992).
315. Id.
316. See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 601 (C.D.Cal. 1990), United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 655.
317. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 657.
318. "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.... No one shall be deprived
of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by
law." ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 9, para. 1.
319. See Case of Lilian Celiberti de Casariego, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
185, U.N. Doe. A/36/40 (1981), reprinted in 68 I.L.R. 41 (1981) (holding that forcible abduction of
a Uruguayan-Italian citizen to Uruguay from Brazil violated Article 9(1), and that Uruguay was
obligated to release the victim and allow her to leave the country); Case of Sergio Ruben Lopez
Burgos, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 76, U.N. Doc. A136/40 (1981), reprinted in 68
I.L.R. 29 (1981) (holding that forcible abduction of Uruguayan citizen to Uruguay from Argentina
violated Article 9(1), and that Uruguay was obligated to release the victim and allow him to leave the
country). For a more detailed analysis of international human rights law, as it applies to forcible trans-
border abductions, see Paul Michell, English-Speaking Justice: Evolving Responses to Transnational
Forcible Abduction After Alvarez-Machain, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 383, 436-47 (1996).
320. There are other recent cases, in addition to Alvarez-Machain, that involve international
kidnapping by U.S. government agents. See, e.g., United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754
(9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991).
321. For other examples of non-frivolous, nonredundant claims, see infra Section VI.B.
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VI. THE JUDIcIAL DILEmmA
When litigants do raise non-frivolous, nonredundant treaty-based
human rights claims, courts are presented with a dilemma. On the one hand,
if courts refuse to reach the merits of such claims, they risk contravening the
manifest intent of the treaty makers to comply with treaty obligations, in
particular, the obligation to ensure that persons who raise such claims
receive an individual hearing before an impartial tribunal. On the other
hand, if courts do reach the merits of such claims, they risk domestication of
the human rights treaties,322 which would be contrary to the assurances that
the Executive Branch provided the Senate. In short, the judge cannot carry
out the treaty makers' intent to both: (1) comply with the treaty; and (2)
avoid domestication.
,To help resolve the dilemma, the judge might examine the Senate
record to ascertain how the Executive Branch explained the meaning of the
NSE declarations. The judge would find that Executive Branch explanations
inadvertently shifted over time from a Foster concept of non-self-execution
to a "private cause of action" concept. If the case is a civil suit in which the
plaintiff is relying on the ICCPR to create a private cause of action, the
claim is barred under either concept of non-self-execution. If the claimant
has been charged with a crime and is invoking the ICCPR defensively,
however, the difference between the Foster concept and the "private cause
of action" concept is critical. Should the judge apply the "private cause of
action" concept, and reach the merits of the claim, or should the judge apply
the Foster concept, and decline to reach the merits?
Part VI explores this judicial dilemma. Section VL.A briefly
summarizes actual cases in which litigants have raised claims under the
Torture Convention, the ICCPR and/or the Race Convention. Section VI.B
proposes an analytic framework for judges to utilize in deciding whether to
reach the merits of treaty-based human rights claims.
A. Summary of Judicial Decisions
Since the United States joined the Race Convention in 1994, there has
been only one published disposition that even mentions the Convention.323 In
that case, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Proposition 227, an
322. Of course, there would invariably be some cases in which courts would decide on the
merits that the individual's claim, though non-frivolous, is non-meritorious. In such cases, no change
in domestic law would be needed to satisfy the treaty requirements. On the other hand, there would
also be cases in which courts would decide that an individual's claim is meritorious. In such cases, the
treaties would change domestic legal outcomes from what they would otherwise have been.
323. See Valeria v. Wilson, No. C-98-2252-CAL, 1998 WL 400119 (N.D. Cal. July 15,
1998).
1999]
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initiative that changed the public educational system in California for
students with limited English language proficiency. An amicus brief
contended that Proposition 227 violated the Race Convention and the
ICCPR, though the court concluded that the arguments raised by the amicus
brief "are not properly within the scope of this action,"3 24  apparently
because the plaintiffs had not raised those claims.
In contrast, the Torture Convention has attracted much greater
attention in the courts. Since 1990, when the Senate gave its advice and
consent for ratification of the Torture Convention, there have been sixteen
published dispositions in which courts have mentioned the Torture
Convention.3" Of those sixteen dispositions, eight involved claims against
foreign governments and/or officials for human rights abuses committed
outside the United States.326 In three other cases, the court discussed the
Torture Convention sua sponte, but did not base its decision on the
Convention.327 Thus, only five of the sixteen published dispositions involve
cases in which litigants have raised claims, based on the Convention,
alleging that federal, state, or local governments or officials have committed
324. Id. at *20.
325. There are also four unpublished dispositions that cite the Convention: Anabtawi v.
I.N.S., No. 93-2565, 1996 WL 380352 (4th Cir. June 27, 1996); Visser v. Penn, No. 94-5152, 1994
WL 479570 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 25, 1994); Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, No. 1:90-CV-2010-GET, 1993 WL
814304 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 1993); and United States v. Quiceno De La Pava, No. 91 CR 206, 1993
WL 50943 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 1993).
326. Of those eight dispositions, five involve claims against the estate of Ferdinand Marcos,
the former President of the Philippines. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1996);
In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litig., 94 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Estate of
Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Estate of Ferdinand E.
Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights
Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Haw. 1995). The Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994),
provides the basis for federal court jurisdiction over the Marcos litigation. See Estate of Marcos, 978
F.2d at 498-501. The Torture Convention is relevant, because Section 1350 confers jurisdiction for
torts "committed in violation of the law of nations," and the Convention is one of several documents
establishing that torture does violate the law of nations. See id. at 499 n. 14.
Two other cases also involve claims based, at least in part, on the Alien Tort Claims Act. See
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (concerning victims from Bosnia-Herzegovina who
sued the leader of the Bosnian Serb forces); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995)
(regarding expatriate citizens of Guatemala who sued the former Guatemalan Minister of Defense).
The final case in this category is Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1992), which concerned plaintiffs who alleged eighteen causes of action arising out of the torture of
Jos6 Siderman and the expropriation of the Sidermans' property by Argentine military officials.
Detailed discussion of these cases is beyond the scope of this Article because this Article addresses the
possibilities for raising treaty-based human rights claims for human rights abuses committed by U.S.
federal, state, and local governments and officials.
327. See Ratnam v. I.N.S., 154 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that although Sri
Lanka had acceded to the Torture Convention, the government continued to torture Tamil rebels);
United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 775 (9th Cir. 1995) (Noonan, J., concurring)
(suggesting that he might view the case differently if the United States had been a party to the Torture
Convention at the time the defendant was kidnapped from Honduras by U.S. Marshals); United States
v. Ekwunoh, 888 F. Supp. 369, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (making brief reference to the Torture
Convention to help justify a sentence reduction under the Sentencing Guidelines).
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human rights violations. In three of those five cases, the court did not even
mention the NSE declaration, but nevertheless declined to reach the merits
of the treaty-based human rights claims for other reasons.328
There were only two cases in which the court explicitly addressed the
legal effect of the NSE declaration: White v. Paulsen329 and In re Extradition
of Cheung.330 Cheung is discussed in detail below. 1 White involved claims
by former prisoners that they had been subjected to nonconsensual medical
experiments while they were prisoners in the custody of the State of
Washington." 2 The plaintiffs raised claims under state tort law, the U.S.
Constitution, customary international law, the Torture Convention, and the
ICCPR.333 The Court held that neither the Torture Convention nor the
ICCPR gives rise to a private cause of action. 4 In reaching this conclusion,
the court relied primarily on the language of the treaties, 335 and only
secondarily on the NSE declarationsY.6 Regardless of the rationale, the court
was almost certainly correct to conclude that the treaties do not create a
private cause of action. 7
328. See White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 437-39 & 440 n.2. (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that
where a Texas state prisoner petitioned for habeas corpus relief, challenging his death sentence under
the ICCPR, the Torture Convention, and the Eighth Amendment, the prisoner's treaty and
constitutional claims were barred under the nonretroactivity doctrine of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989), and that his treaty claims were precluded by Senate reservations); Ozdemir v. I.N.S., 46 F.3d
6, 8 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that where the petitioner alleged, inter alia, that deportation to Turkey
would violate his rights under Article 3 of the Torture Convention, "[w]e have no jurisdiction to
decide this issue because it was not raised" to the Board of Immigration Appeals); Price v. Dixon, 961
F. Supp. 894, 896, 903 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (adopting, without discussing, a magistrate judge's
recommendation of summary judgment against a prisoner who claimed abuses in violation of the
torture convention).
329. 997 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Wash. 1998).
330. 968 F. Supp. 791 (D. Conn. 1997).
331. See infra Subsection VI.B.3.
332. See White, 997 F. Supp. at 1382.
333. The ICCPR prohibits "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," stating
expressly that "no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific
experimentation." ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 7. The Torture Convention also prohibits "cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Torture Convention, supra note 8, art. 16, para. 1.
The United States adopted reservations to both articles, limiting U.S. obligations under the treaties so
that the United States is obligated to protect the subject rights only to the extent that they are already
protected by the U.S. Constitution. See 138 CONG. Rc. S4783 (1992); 136 CONG. REc. S17,491
(1990).
334. See White, 997 F. Supp. at 1385-87.
335. See id. The court's argument, based on the language of the treaty, parallels the Carter
Administration's argument that the human rights treaties were inherently non-self-executing even in
the absence of NSE declarations. See supra Section V.A. For the reasons noted above, the "language
of the treaty" argument is not persuasive. See id.
336. With respect to the NSE declaration(s), the court stated that "this declaration may not
carry controlling weight on this issue, [but) the view of the Senate is entitled to substantial deference
given the role the United States Constitution confides in the Senate with regard to the process of
making treaties the law of the United States." White, 997 F. Supp. at 1387.
337. See infra Subsection VI.B.5 for further elaboration of this point.
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Since April 2, 1992, when the Senate provided its advice and consent
for ratification of the ICCPR, there have been twenty-four published
dispositions in which courts have mentioned the ICCPR" 8 Seven of those
twenty-four cases have been discussed above, because they also make
reference to the Race Convention or the Torture Convention.' 9 In nine of
the other seventeen cases, the litigants did not raise claims under the
ICCPR.3 Thus, there are only eight cases that do not mention the Torture
Convention or the Race Convention in which litigants raised ICCPR-based
claims. In one of those eight cases, the court reached the merits of the claim
without discussing the NSE declaration.34" ' In six other cases, the courts
338. In addition, there have been five unpublished dispositions in which Courts have
mentioned the ICCPR. See Weber v. Brayton, No. c-95-2-154 RMW, 1995 WL 429238 (N.D. Cal.
July 13, 1995); Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, No. 1:90-CV-2010-GET, 1993 WL 814304 (N.D. Ga. Aug.
20, 1993); Denegri v. Chile, Civ. A. No. 86-3085, 1992 WL 91914 (D.D.C. April 6, 1992);
Domingues v. State, No. 29896, 1998 WL 433791 (Nev. July 3, 1998); State v. Keene, No. 14375,
1996 WL 531606 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 20, 1996).
339. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1996); White v. Johnson, 79
F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1996); Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992); Valeria v.
Wilson, No. C-98-2252-Cal, 1998 WL 400119 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 1998); White v. Paulsen, 997 F.
Supp. 1380 (E.D. Wash. 1998); In re Extradition of Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791 (D. Conn. 1997);
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass 1995).
340. In two of those nine cases, the courts made only passing reference to the ICCPR. See
United States v. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. 2218, 2234 n.16 (1998); Austin v. Hopper, No. CIV.A.95-T-637-
N, 1998 WL 497693, at *59 n.222 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 10, 1998). In the other seven cases, the courts
referred to the ICCPR as an aid to interpreting statutory or constitutional provisions. See Martinez v.
City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing the ICCPR in support of the
proposition "that there is a clear international prohibition against arbitrary arrest and detention" in the
context of a claim under the Alien Tort Claims Act); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp.
1239, 1252 n.11 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (holding the Cuban Air Force liable for extrajudicial killings of
U.S. citizens, and citing the ICCPR in support of the proposition that extrajudicial killing violates
international law); United States v. Bakeas, 987 F. Supp. 44, 46 n.4 (D. Mass. 1997) (citing the
ICCPR as part of the rationale for departure from the Sentencing Guidelines); Mojica v. Reno, 970 F.
Supp. 130, 151-52 (E.D. N.Y. 1997) (citing the ICCPR and the Charming Betsy principle in support
of its conclusion that Section 440(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), could not be applied retroactively to petitioners); Caballero v.
Caplinger, 914 F. Supp. 1374, 1378, 1379 n.6 (E.D. La. 1996) (mentioning briefly, in a habeas case,
the ICCPR and other human rights instruments to support the conclusion that a federal statute
deprived petitioner, an alien, of his due process rights, because the statute allowed the Immigration
and Naturalization Service to place him in custody and "does not provide any procedures for
protecting [his] liberty interest" in remaining free pending deportation); Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d
732, 740 (Utah 1996) (referring, in a civil suit by a prisoner against prison officials, to the ICCPR
and other international human rights instruments in the context of discussing the proper interpretation
of the "unnecessary abuse" standard under the Utah Constitution); Kazi v. Dubai Petroleum Co., 961
S.W.2d 313, 315-18 (Tex. App. 1997, writ granted) (holding that the ICCPR establishes "equal
treaty rights" between the United States and India within the meaning of the Texas wrongful death
statute, and that therefore the lower court erred by dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
a wrongful death action by Indian citizens).
341. In Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1996), the
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of regulations restricting travel to Cuba. See id. at 1433.
They also alleged that the regulations conflict with Article 12 of the ICCPR. See id. at 1441. The
court did not discuss the NSE declaration. The majority addressed the merits of the ICCPR claim,
holding that Article 12(2) merely protects the right to "leave any country;" it does not protect the
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declined to reach the merits of ICCPR-based claims for reasons that had
nothing to do with the NSE declaration.342
There was only one case in which the court explicitly addressed the
legal effect of the NSE declaration. In Igartua de la Rosa v. United States,343
residents of Puerto Rico alleged that their inability to vote in the U.S.
presidential election violated their constitutional and ICCPR rights. The
court rejected their constitutional claim on the merits,3" and dismissed their
ICCPR claim with the conclusory assertion that the claim "is without
merit."34 The court's cursory treatment of the plaintiffs' ICCPR claim was
unfortunate. Article 25 of the ICCPR specifically provides that "[e]very
citizen shall have the right. . to vote. "346 The court stated explicitly that
right of U.S. citizens to travel to a particular foreign destination, such as Cuba. See id. at 1441-42.
Judge Kozinski, in a concurring opinion, argued that most of the plaintiffs' claims, including the
ICCPR claim, were not ripe, because petitioners had not "applied for and been denied a license." Id.
at 1443 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
342. See United Mexican States v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
the Eleventh Amendment barred suit by Mexico against a state attorney general in a case in which
Mexico argued that execution of a Mexican citizen would violate the ICCPR); Roman-Nose v. New
Mexico Dept. of Human Servs., 967 F.2d 435, 437 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that, in a pro se action
challenging the termination of parental rights by the State of New Mexico as a violation of the
ICCPR, the court did not "know of any manner by which Plaintiff can obtain relief from state actions
which violate international treaties"); United States v. Dunifer, 997 F. Supp. 1235, 1238 n.5 (N.D.
Cal. 1998) (declining to review ICCPR-based claims that the defendant had raised before the Federal
Communications Commission but had not reasserted in court); United States v. Any and All Radio
Station Transmission Equip., 976 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 (D. Minn. 1997) (dismissing ICCPR-based
and other challenges to FCC regulations on the ground that exclusive jurisdiction to determine the
validity of FCC regulations is vested in the U.S. Court of Appeals); Backlund v. Hessen, 904 F.
Supp. 964 (D. Minn. 1995) (interpreting a suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 (1994), claiming
violations of Articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR, as an attempt to apply the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (1994), and holding the statute inapplicable); Rodgers v. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation and
Correction, 632 N.E.2d 1355 (Ohio App. 1993) (rejecting prisoner's claim that defendant violated his
ICCPR rights on the grounds that: (1) defendant is immune from liability; and (2) the Ohio Court of
Claims, in which plaintiff filed suit, lacked jurisdiction over the allegations in the complaint).
343. 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994).
344. The gist of the court's constitutional analysis is summarized in the following paragraph:
While appellants are citizens of the United States, the Constitution does not grant
citizens the right to vote directly for the President. Instead, the Constitution provides
that the President is to be chosen by electors who, in turn, are chosen by "each state
m ..in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct." Pursuant to Article II,
therefore, only citizens residing in states can vote for electors and thereby indirectly for
the President. Since Puerto Rico is concededly not a state, it is not entitled under
Article II to choose electors for the President, and residents of Puerto Rico have no
constitutional right to participate in that election.
Id. at 9-10 (citations omitted).
345. Id. at 10 n.1.
346. Article 25 provides, in relevant part: "Every citizen shall have the right and the
opportunity . . . without unreasonable restrictions. .. to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors." ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 25 (emphasis
added).
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"appellants are citizens of the United States."' 7 Thus, the ICCPR clearly
protects their right to vote. The court noted that U.S. citizens residing in
Puerto Rico are "eligible to vote in the federal election for the Resident
Commissioner."348 However, it is questionable whether the United States is
fulfilling its treaty obligation under Article 25 by allowing citizens who
reside in Puerto Rico to vote for Resident Commissioner, while denying
them the opportunity to vote for President. 49 Thus, the plaintiffs in this case
raised a non-frivolous, nonredundant claim."
After concluding that the ICCPR claim was without merit, the court
stated, "Even if Article 25 could be read to imply such a right, Articles 1
through 27 of the ICCPR were not self-executing . . . and could not
therefore give rise to privately enforceable rights under United States
law." 3 ' The phrase "privately enforceable rights" is somewhat ambiguous
and perhaps overbroad." 2 Regardless, the court correctly concluded that the
NSE declaration barred this particular claim, because the plaintiffs attempted
to rely on the ICCPR to create a private cause of action.
347. Igartua de la Rosa, 32 F.3d at 9.
348. Id. at 11 n.3.
349. The parameters of the Article 25 right to vote are not well defined. The most detailed
scholarly commentary on the ICCPR indicates that "Art. 25(b) does not establish which organs are to
be filled by election.... What is decisive is that those State organs in which both legal and defacto
power is concentrated are either directly or indirectly legitimated by elections." MANFRED NOWAK,
U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 443 (1993). Moreover,
Article 25 requires "that voters have a certain minimum amount of political influence." Id. at 444.
Finally, "restrictions on the principle of free elections, such as the prohibition that certain parties or
groups may not take part in elections, require special, factual justification, since they would otherwise
have to be deemed unreasonable within the meaning of Art. 25." Id. at 450. Thus, although the
plaintiffs in Igartua de la Rosa might or might not have a meritorious claim, it is clearly a non-
frivolous claim.
350. The court also argued that the ICCPR cannot "override . . . constitutional limits."
Igartua de la Rosa, 32 F.3d at 10 n.1. This statement is true, but irrelevant. If the Constitution
prohibited Puerto Rican residents from voting for President, the fact that a treaty cannot override
constitutional limits would be relevant. The Constitution, however, does not include any such
prohibition. It merely provides that the President is chosen by electors who are chosen by "each
state." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Because residents of Puerto Rico are not residents of a "state,"
they are denied the opportunity to vote for President. The court concludes that only a "constitutional
amendment or a grant of statehood to Puerto Rico, therefore, can provide appellants the right to vote
in the presidential election." Igartua de la Rosa, 32 F.3d at 10. The court's conclusion is erroneous.
The court discusses the Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff (1994), which
allows U.S. citizens who reside outside the United States to vote for President by absentee ballot in
the state in which they last resided, provided that they otherwise qualify to vote in that state. See
Igartua de la Rosa, 32 F.3d at 10. The Act does not accord rights to Puerto Rican residents, because
they do not reside "outside the United States." However, that statutory provision could easily be
amended to provide a similar right to residents of Puerto Rico. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits
Congress from enacting such legislation. Indeed, the United States may have an obligation to do so
under Article 25 of the ICCPR.
351. IgartuadelaRosa, 32F.3dat 10n.1.
352. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
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This brief summary of the case law shows that litigants rarely raise
treaty-based human rights claims. Moreover, when litigants do raise such
claims, courts usually do not even mention the NSE declaration. Out of
fourteen cases in which litigants did raise treaty-based human rights
claims,353 only three judicial opinions mention the NSE declaration,354 and in
two of those cases the issue is relegated to a single footnote. In short, both
advocates and judges have failed to appreciate the possibilities for judicial
application of human rights treaties to which the United States is a party.
B. A Proposed Framework for Judicial Decision-Making
This Section presents a proposed decision-making model for judges to
apply in determining whether to address the merits of treaty-based human
rights claims.
1. Is It a Frivolous Claim?
If either a plaintiff or a defendant presents a frivolous treaty-based
human rights claim, the court should not entertain the claim. For example,
in one recent case an Ohio prisoner claimed that the state's prohibition
against conjugal visits and masturbation by prisoners violated his
constitutional and ICCPR rights.356 The ICCPR provides that prisoners
"shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of
the human person.""' In light of prison conditions in many facilities today,
one could imagine many non-frivolous claims that prisoners could raise
under this particular ICCPR provision.58 However, the claim that the
353. See United Mexican States v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cit. 1997); Freedom to
Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1996); White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432 (5th
Cit. 1996); Ozdemir v. I.N.S., 46 F.3d 6 (5th Cit. 1994); Igartua de la Rosa, 32 F.3d at 8; Roman-
Nose v. New Mexico Dept. of Human Servs., 967 F.2d 435 (10th Cit. 1992); Valeria v. Wilson, No.
C-98-2252-CAL., 1998 WL 400119 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 1998); White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380
(E.D. Wash. 1998); United States v. Dunifer, 997 F. Supp. 1235, 1238 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1998); United
States v. Any and All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 976 F. Supp. 1255 (D. Minn. 1997);
Matter of Extradition of Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791 (D. Conn. 1997); Price v. Dixon, 961 F. Supp.
894 (E.D.N.C. 1997); Backlund v. Hessen, 904 F. Supp. 964 (D. Minn. 1995); and Rodgers v. Ohio
Dept. of Rehabilitation and Correction, 632 N.E.2d 1355 (Ohio App. 1993).
354. See Igartua de la Rosa, 32 F.3d at 10 n.1; White, 997 F. Supp. at 1380; Extradition of
Cheung, 968 F. Supp. at 803 n.17.
355. See Igartua de la Rosa, 32 F.3d at 10 n.1; Extradition of Cheung, 968 F. Supp. at 803
n.17.
356. See Rodgers v. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation and Correction, 632 N.E.2d 1355 (Ohio
App. 1993).
357. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 10, para. 1. Surprisingly, the United States did not adopt any
reservation or understanding to modify its obligations under Article 10(1), although it did adopt one
reservation and one understanding with respect to Article 10(2) and 10(3). See 138 CONG. REC.
S4783-84 (1992).
358. In its comments on the report submitted by the United States, the Human Rights
1999]
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ICCPR protects a prisoner's right to masturbate is ridiculous. It is clear that
one purpose of the NSE declaration was to ensure that litigants do not flood
the already crowded dockets of federal and state courts with frivolous treaty-
based human rights claims.359 Hence, the court properly dismissed this
claim.360
2. Is Relief Available Under Some Other Provision of U.S. Law?
If the relief the claimant seeks is available under state or federal
constitutional, statutory, or common law, then the court should grant the
claimant the relief he seeks without addressing the treaty-based human rights
claim. This proposition is axiomatic in "easy cases," in which the relief the
claimant seeks is clearly available under other provisions of domestic law.
However, "hard cases" that could be decided either way under other
provisions of domestic law merit further discussion.
For example, suppose that U.S. law enforcement officers forcibly
abducted a Honduran national from his home in Honduras, tortured him,
extracted a confession as a result of torture, and then brought him to the
United States to stand trial on criminal charges.361 If the government
attempted to introduce the confession as evidence at trial, the defendant
could object that admission of the evidence would violate both Article 15 of
Committee said the following about prison conditions and U.S. compliance with Article 10(1):
The Committee is concerned about conditions of detention of persons deprived of
liberty in federal or state prisons, particularly with regard to planned measures which
would lead to further overcrowding of detention centres. The Committee is also
concerned at the practice which allows male prison officers access to women's
detention centres and which has led to serious allegations of sexual abuse of women and
the invasion of their privacy. The Committee is particularly concerned at the conditions
of detention in certain maximum security prisons which are incompatible with Article
10 of the Covenant and run counter to the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment
of Prisoners and the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials.
Human Rights Committee, supra note 240, at 640.
359. See, e.g., Carter Hearings, supra note 16, at 40 (prepared statement of Jack M.
Goldklang) (stating that the NSE declarations mean "that the treaties will not be a source of additional
litigation in our own courts"); RACE REPORT, supra note 65, at 25-26 (stating, as part of its
justification for the NSE declaration, that "there is no discernible need for the establishment of
additional causes of action or new avenues of litigation in order to enforce the essential requirements
of the Convention").
360. The court rejected the claim on two grounds: (1) that defendant was immune from
liability; and (2) the Ohio Court of Claims, in which plaintiff filed suit, lacked jurisdiction over the
allegations in the complaint. See Rodgers, 632 N.E.2d at 1355.
361. In United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995), U.S. marshals
forcibly abducted a Honduran national from his home in Honduras and brought him to the United
States to stand trial on criminal charges. The defendant alleged that "he was beaten and burned with a
stun gun at the direction of the Marshals. He claims that during his flight he was once again beaten
and tortured by a stun gun applied to various parts of his body, including his feet and genitals." Id. at
761. The government disputed his allegations of torture. Id. He apparently did not confess to the
crime for which he was charged.
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the Torture Convention and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. If the
confession was indeed obtained as a result of torture, Article 15 of the
Torture Convention clearly prohibits admission of the evidence. 62 The Due
Process Clause would also prohibit admission of the evidence if the
defendant made the confession in the United States, but it is uncertain how
the Fifth Amendment applies to a confession made by a non-U.S. citizen
outside the United States. 63 In such a case, the court should interpret the
Fifth Amendment to prohibit admission of the evidence, and decline to reach
the merits of the treaty-based claim.
There are two powerful arguments to support this result. First, the
treaty makers intended that victims of human rights abuses would be able to
vindicate their treaty-based rights by relying on preexisting state and federal
constitutional, statutory, and common law,3" without having to invoke the
treaty rights directly. Indeed, the treaty makers justified the NSE
declarations by claiming that neither self-execution nor implementing
legislation was necessary for the United States to carry out its treaty
obligations, because preexisting U.S. laws already provided greater
protection for human rights than the United States was obligated to provide
under the treaties. 6 With respect to the Torture Convention, in particular,
362. Article 15 of the Torture Convention obligates the United States to "ensure that any
statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as
evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement
was made." Torture Convention, supra note 8, art. 15.
It would be unreasonable to interpret Article 15 to apply only to acts of torture committed
within the geographical boundaries of the United States. The language of Article 15 is quite broad; it
suggests no geographical limitation. Moreover, it is clear that the treaty makers intended for at least
some provisions of the Convention to have extraterritorial application. Indeed, the purpose of the U.S.
implementing legislation was to establish federal criminal jurisdiction for acts of torture committed
outside the United States. See supra notes 168-170 and accompanying text. Moreover, with respect to
Article 14, the United States adopted an understanding to clarify that it applies only to acts of torture
committed in the United States. See 136 CONG. REc. S17,492 (1990). If the treaty makers had
intended to establish a similar geographical limitation on Article 15, they presumably would have
adopted an understanding to that effect.
363. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261, 264 (1990) (holding
that the Fourth Amendment does not apply "to the search and seizure by United States agents of
property that is owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country," but suggesting that
different considerations might apply to Fifth Amendment claims); see also United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) ("Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in
pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens.").
364. See supra Subsection V.C.2.
365. See, e.g., ICCPR REPORT, supra note 44, at 19 (stating, in the context of justifying the
NSE declaration for the ICCPR, that "existing U.S. law generally complies with the ICCPR; hence,
implementing legislation is not contemplated"). The Clinton Administration stated the following to
justify the NSE declaration for the Race Convention:
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the Reagan Administration assured the Senate that any confessions obtained
in violation of Article 15 would be inadmissible under the Fifth
Amendment.366 In short, the treaty makers intended for the courts to
construe other provisions of domestic law to provide remedies for violations
of rights protected under human rights treaties, thereby avoiding the need
for direct judicial application of the treaties. Therefore, in the hypothetical
case discussed above, the court should interpret the Fifth Amendment to
prohibit admission of the coerced confession, and decline to reach the merits
of the treaty-based claim, because that is precisely what the treaty makers
intended.
Even apart from the treaty makers' intent, there is a separate argument
that supports this result. Almost two hundred years ago, in Murray v. The
Schooner Charming Betsy, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that "an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains."367 The Supreme Court has invoked this
maxim both to avoid conflicts with general principles of international law,36
and to avoid conflicts with specific provisions of international agreements.69
Although the Supreme Court has typically applied this maxim in cases
involving statutory construction, the underlying principle applies with equal
force, regardless of whether a court is interpreting constitutional, statutory,
or common law.37 The decision for the United States to violate an
As was the case with the prior treaties, existing U.S. law provides extensive protections
and remedies sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the present Convention.
Moreover, federal, state and local laws already provide a comprehensive basis for
challenging discriminatory statutes, regulations and other governmental actions in
court, as well as certain forms of discriminatory conduct by private actors. Given the
extensive provisions already present in U.S. law, there is no discernible need for the
establishment of additional causes of action or new avenues of litigation in order to
enforce the essential requirements of the Convention.
RACE REPORT, supra note 65, at 25-26.
366. See TORTURE REPORT, supra note 46, at 24-25 ("Statements made under torture
generally would be subject to exclusion under U.S. rules of evidence. . . .The United States rules
against admissibility of illegally obtained evidence and involuntary confessions are stricter than is
provided for under the Convention.").
367. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
368. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814-15 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (contending that the Sherman Act should not be construed to apply extraterritorially,
because such a construction is contrary to customary international law); McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963) (holding that the National Labor
Relations Act does not extend to maritime operations of foreign flag ships employing alien seamen);
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 593 (1953) (holding that there is "no justification for interpreting
the Jones Act to intervene between foreigners and their own law because of acts on a foreign ship not
in our waters").
369. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (holding that Section 106 of Pub. L.
92-129, which prohibits employment discrimination against U.S. citizens on military bases overseas,
did not abrogate executive agreements between the United States and foreign countries that provide for
preferential hiring of local nationals on U.S. military bases overseas).
370. For fuller development of this argument, see Gordon Christenson, Using Human Rights
HeinOnline  -- 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 206 1999
Non-Self-Executing Declarations
international legal obligation is a political decision, best entrusted to the
political branches of government. Therefore, the judiciary should, whenever
possible, construe state and federal constitutional, statutory, and common
law in a manner that is consistent with the U.S. international legal
obligations, absent a clearly expressed decision by the political branches to
violate those obligations. 7 The political branches have not expressed an
intention for the United States to violate its obligations under human rights
treaties; to the contrary, they have clearly expressed their intention to
comply. 72 Therefore, in accordance with the Charming Betsy maxim, courts
should, wherever possible, construe other provisions of U.S. law in a
manner that is consistent with U.S. obligations under human rights treaties.
3. Is There an Alternative Forum Available?
As noted above, the United States has an international legal obligation
under human rights treaties to ensure that any person who raises a non-
frivolous allegation that his or her treaty rights have been violated is entitled
to an individual hearing before an impartial tribunal that has authority to
adjudicate the merits of the claim. However, the treaties do not obligate the
United States to ensure that all such claims are adjudicated before an Article
Ill judge.373 Moreover, the NSE declarations clearly reflect a general
reluctance on the part of the treaty makers to permit litigation of treaty-based
human rights claims in Article HI courts. Therefore, in cases where some
other forum is available that can satisfy the U.S. treaty obligation to provide
an individual hearing before an impartial tribunal, judges should decline to
reach the merits of treaty-based human rights claims.
Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U. CN. L. REv. 3 (1983); see also
PAUST, supra note 20, at 191-96 (presenting Supreme Court recognition of human rights as useful
content for the explication of constitutional and statutory norms).
371. Applying this principle in cases involving treaty obligations, the Court has stated that "a
treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on
the part of Congress has been clearly expressed." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.,
466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (quoting Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933)); see also
Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979)
("Absent explicit statutory language, we have been extremely reluctant to find congressional
abrogation of treaty rights."); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13
(1968) ("the intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to the Congress"
(quoting Pigeon River Co. v. Cox Co., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934))). In Trans World Airlines, the
Court relied on this principle to sustain its conclusion that the Warsaw Convention's cargo liability
limit was enforceable in U.S. courts, notwithstanding subsequent acts of Congress that could
reasonably have been interpreted to render that Convention unenforceable. See Trans World Airlines,
466 U.S. at 251-53. In Cook, the Court relied on this principle to reach its conclusion that a 1924
Treaty with Great Britain controlled the disposition of a liquor smuggling case, and that a subsequent
act of Congress had not superseded the 1924 Treaty. See Cook, 288 U.S. at 119-20.
372. See supra Subsection V.C.1.
373. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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For example, In re Extradition of Cheung374 involved a request by the
United Kingdom for the United States to extradite John Cheung to Hong
Kong. Cheung claimed that, if he were extradited, "he could be subjected to
inhumane treatment, torture and possibly execution."37 He argued that
extradition would therefore violate his rights under Article 3 of the Torture
Convention and Articles 6 and 14 of the ICCPR.376 Neither Article 6 nor
Article 14 of the ICCPR addresses extradition;377 accordingly, the court did
not address the merits of Cheung's ICCPR-based claims. However, Article 3
of the Torture Convention expressly prohibits extradition "where there are
substantial grounds for believing" that a person would be "in danger of
being subjected to torture."378 The United States adopted an understanding
with respect to Article 3, stating that it interpreted this provision to prohibit
extradition "if it is more likely than not that he would be tortured. "M" The
court reached the merits of Cheung's Torture Convention claim, holding that
"[tihe factual proof offered by Cheung . . . meets neither the 'substantial
grounds' nor the 'more likely than not' standard of proof with respect to the
Convention Against Torture."
380
With respect to the NSE declarations, the court added the following in
a footnote:
Even if there were sufficient factual grounds, Cheung's reliance on the ICCPR and the
Covenant [sic] Against Torture will not prevent extradition. . . . [B]oth treaties were
ratified with the express proviso that they were not self-executing. Since Congress has
not enacted any implementing legislation, Cheung may not rely on them to avoid
extradition.3 81
The court's conclusion that Cheung could not rely on the treaties to avoid
extradition exhibits a fundamental confusion about the meaning of the NSE
declarations. Suppose, hypothetically, that it was "more likely than not" that
374. 968 F. Supp. 791 (D. Conn. 1997).
375. Id. at 802. The court might well have dismissed these claims as baseless, but for the fact
that the decision was rendered shortly before Hong Kong's long-awaited return to China, and Cheung
submitted extensive documentation regarding China's human rights abuses.
376. See id.
377. Article 14 provides a variety of procedural safeguards for criminal defendants. See
ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 14. Although the United States, as a party to the ICCPR, is obligated to
ensure that criminal defendants in the United States receive the benefits of Article 14, that article does
not prohibit the United States from extraditing a person to a country where the procedural safeguards
for criminal defendants fail to satisfy the requirements of Article 14. Article 6 protects the right to
life. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 6. Although Article 6 says nothing, on its face, about extradition,
one could make a plausible argument that the United States would violate Article 6 if it extradited a
person to a third country, knowing that the third country intended to execute the person, and knowing
that the criminal justice system in that country lacked adequate procedural safeguards with respect to
the imposition of the death penalty.
378. Torture Convention, supra note 8, art. 3, para. 1 (emphasis added).
379. 136 CONG. RPEc. S17,492 (1990) (emphasis added).
380. Extradition of Cheung, 968 F. Supp. at 802.
381. Id. at 803 n.17 (emphasis added).
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Cheung would be tortured if he were extradited to Hong Kong. In that case,
the United States would have an international legal obligation under the
Torture Convention to refrain from extraditing Cheung.382 Moreover, even
under the Foster concept of non-self-execution, that treaty obligation has
domestic legal force. The fact that it is not self-executing means only that it
is not a "rule for the courts."383 In Cheung's case, however, the question
whether Article 3 of the Torture Convention is a "rule for the courts" is
unimportant, because under U.S. law the Secretary of State, not the court, is
the final decision-maker in extradition cases.384 Moreover, the Secretary of
State has a constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed. "385 This duty applies to treaties as well as other laws.386 Thus, the
NSE declaration notwithstanding, the Secretary of State has a duty to ensure
that no one is extradited in violation of the Torture Convention, and Cheung
is entitled to expect that the Secretary will perform his duty. Therefore, the
court's conclusion that Cheung could not rely on the treaties to avoid
extradition is erroneous.
The "legislative history" of the Torture Convention is consistent with
the preceding analysis. As noted above, Article 3 prohibits extradition in
cases "where there are substantial grounds for believing that [a person]
would be in danger of being subjected to torture."387 Article 3 also states:
"For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the
competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations
.... "388 When President Reagan transmitted the Convention to the Senate,
he proposed a declaration stating that "the phrase, 'competent authorities,'
as used in Article 3 of the Convention, refers to the Secretary of State in
extradition cases and to the Attorney General in deportation cases." 389
382. This follows from Article 3 and from the U.S. understanding. See supra notes 378-379
and accompanying text.
383. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) ("Our constitution declares a
treaty to be the law of the land.... [But a non-self-executing] treaty addresses itself to the political,
not the judicial department."). The Foster formulation makes clear that non-self-executing treaties are
binding on the political branches.
384. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184-3186 (1994). Section 3184 provides that if a judge "deems the
evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper [extradition] treaty or
convention, he shall certify the same, together with a copy of all the testimony taken before him, to
the Secretary of State." 18 U.S.C. § 3184. Section 3186 provides that the "Secretary of State may
order the person ... to be delivered to any authorized agent of such foreign government." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3186 (emphasis added). Thus, the judge's responsibility under the statute is simply to determine
whether the "evidence is sufficient to sustain the charge" under the relevant treaty. However, the
Secretary of State has the discretion to choose not to extradite the person, even after the judge
determines that the requirements of the extradition treaty have been satisfied.
385. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
386. See HENKiN, supra note 97, at 50.
387. Torture Convention, supra note 8, art. 3, para. 1.
388. Id. art. 3, para. 2.
389. TORTURE REPORT, supra note 46, at 17.
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President Bush later recommended deleting the declaration on the grounds
that it was unnecessary, but stated that "it remains true that the competent
authorities referred to in Article 3 would be the Secretary of State in
extradition cases and the Attorney General in deportation cases."39 These
statements show that the NSE declaration was not intended to preclude the
government from granting relief under Article 3. Rather, the treaty makers
intended for the Executive Branch, and not the courts, to decide the merits
of individual claims under Article 3.39'
In the U.S. legal system, of course, Article III courts are the most
common fora in which individuals seek remedies for violations of their
rights. Hence, many cases will undoubtedly arise in which litigants seek
judicial remedies for violations of treaty-based rights, and no alternative
forum is available. The Cheung case, though, demonstrates that Article Ill
courts are not the only bodies capable of adjudicating treaty-based human
rights claims. Since the NSE declaration reflects a general reluctance on the
part of the treaty makers for Article IR courts to adjudicate such claims,
courts should exercise appropriate restraint whenever an alternative forum is
available.
4. Is the Treaty Being Invoked as a Defense to a Civil or Criminal
Action Initiated by the Government?
Thus far, this Section has discussed cases in which it is not necessary
for judges to reach the merits of treaty-based human rights claims, because
the United States can fulfill its treaty obligations either by providing judicial
relief under some other provision of domestic law, or by adjudicating the
claim in an alternative forum. The more difficult cases are those in which
the litigant raises a non-frivolous claim, there is no alternative forum in
which to adjudicate the claim, and there is no relief available under other
provisions of domestic law. If a judge declines to reach the merits of such a
claim, the judge would contravene the treaty makers' intent for the United
390. Id. at 37.
391. Thus, even if the United States had not attached an NSE declaration to the Torture
Convention, it would still be appropriate for the courts in extradition cases to refrain from
adjudicating claims under Article 3, because: (1) the treaty makers intended for the Secretary of State
to decide the merits of such claims, and (2) federal statutes give the Secretary the final decision-
making authority.
Individuals facing the threat of deportation to countries where they are likely to be tortured
have also begun to raise claims under Article 3 of the Torture Convention during hearings before U.S.
immigration judges. 'See supra notes 308-313 and accompanying text (discussing Matter of Abu).
Since immigration judges are members of the Executive Branch, not the Judicial Branch, the NSE
declarations do not preclude enforcement of Article 3 by U.S. immigration judges, even under the
Foster concept. See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text. However, deportation cases differ
from extradition cases insofar as federal statutes explicitly provide for judicial review of decisions by
immigration judges in deportation cases. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1994).
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States to comply with its international treaty obligations. But if a judge
reaches the merits and decides that the claim is meritorious, he would be
contravening the treaty makers' intent to avoid domesticating human rights
treaties. How should judges resolve this dilemma?
Consider once again the case of the Old Order Amish. In Minnesota,
police issued traffic citations to members of the Amish religion for
noncompliance with a statute that required slow-moving vehicles to display a
fluorescent orange-red sign.3" The Amish claimed that the statute infringed
on their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. 3 The
Minnesota Supreme Court agreed and dismissed the charges against the
defendants. 4 The State of Minnesota petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for
a writ of certiorari. Unfortunately for the Amish, the Supreme Court
decided Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith395
while the petition for certiorari was pending. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, vacated the judgment and remanded for further consideration in
light of Smith.396 On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to
decide the federal constitutional issue; instead, it invalidated the traffic
regulation, as applied to the Amish, on the ground that it was inconsistent
with the religion provisions of the Minnesota Constitution.397
Suppose, hypothetically, that the Amish could not obtain relief under
state law. The Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted
in Smith, does not entitle the Amish to a religious exemption from a "valid
and neutral law of general applicability,"398 such as the Minnesota traffic
regulation. There is no federal statute on which the Amish could base a
defense to the traffic citations.399 If this case arose after the United States
became a party to the ICCPR, however, the Amish could invoke Article 18
392. See State v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. 1989).
393. See id.
394. See id. at 289-90.
395. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding that, with certain exceptions, "the right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes)'" (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (1982))).
396. Minnesota v. Hershberger, 495 U.S. 901, 901 (1990).
397. See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1990).
398. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
399. Congress attempted to overrule the Supreme Court's holding in Smith by passing the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). However, in City
of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997), the Supreme Court ruled that RFRA was unconstitutional
because Congress had exceeded its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress is
still weighing possible responses to the Supreme Court's decision in Flores. One possible response
would be to re-enact RFRA, or something like RFRA, as implementing legislation for Article 18 of
the ICCPR. See Neuman, supra note 5, at 49-51. Such a law would almost certainly be constitutional.
See id. Regardless, as of the date of this Article, Smith defines the scope of federal constitutional
protection for the free exercise of religion.
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of the ICCPR as a defense. 00 While such a claim may or may not be
meritorious, it is certainly non-frivolous. 0 1 Since the ICCPR is a duly
ratified treaty, it supersedes inconsistent state law, even if it is non-self-
executing. 4° Thus, the question is whether the Amish can invoke Article 18
as a defense to criminal charges, and whether the judge should reach the
merits of that claim.
The NSE declaration is ambiguous in this respect. If the NSE
declaration is interpreted in accordance with the Foster concept of non-self-
execution, then it would preclude the judge from reaching the merits of the
Amish's claim.0 3 If the NSE declaration is construed in accordance with the
"private cause of action" concept, however, it would not preclude the judge
from reaching the merits of the claim because the Amish are not relying on
the ICCPR to establish a private cause of action. To the contrary, they seek
to invoke the ICCPR to establish a defense to a criminal charge. The
400. Article 18 provides, in relevant part:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching ....
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 18 (emphasis added). The United States did not adopt any reservations or
understandings with respect to Article 18.
401. Commentators generally agree that Article 18 provides greater protection for freedom of
religion than is available under the Free Exercise Clause, as interpreted in Smith. See, e.g., NowAK.
supra note 349, at 324-25. In defense of their ICCPR claim, the Amish could argue that their right to
a religious exemption from the traffic regulation is covered by Article 18's guarantee of the right to
manifest one's religion in public. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 18, para. 1. In response, the State
could argue that the regulation is "necessary to protect public safety." Id. at para. 3. Commentators
generally agree that the "requirement of necessity implies that the restriction must be proportional in
severity and intensity to the purpose being sought." NOWAK, supra note 349, at 325. See also U.N.
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 48th Sess., General Comment No. 22 (1993), reprinted in INT'L HUM.
RTs. REP., May 1994, at 31-32 (stating "that paragraph 3 of Article 18 is to be strictly interpreted..
. Limitations may be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be
directly related and proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated."). Nowak adds
that "the relevant criterion for evaluating whether interference is necessary is not a common,
democratic minimum standard but rather solely whether it was proportional in the given case."
NOWAK, supra note 349, at 325. In light of these standards, reasonable people could disagree about
whether the requirement to display a fluorescent orange-red sign is "necessary to protect public
safety." Inasmuch as reasonable people could disagree, the Amish's ICCPR claim is non-frivolous.
402. See, for example, the Bush Administration's response to Senator Helms's inquiry, supra
note 203 and accompanying text, which stated that "properly ratified treaties can and do supersede
inconsistent domestic law .... [T]he Supreme Court has long distinguished between treaties which
are self-executing and those which are not, the latter being said not to create directly enforceable
rights absent subsequent implementing legislation." This answer clearly implies that even a non-self-
executing treaty would supersede inconsistent state law. The self-execution question, as explained by
the Bush Administration in this passage, does not relate to the status of a treaty within the domestic
legal hierarchy. Rather, it relates to the invocability of treaty rights.
403. See supra Subsection II.A.2.
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"legislative history" of the ICCPR is of little use in deciding whether to
construe the NSE declaration in accordance with the Foster concept or the
"private cause of action" concept because the Bush Administration explained
the NSE declaration differently at different times.4"
This Article has already referred to the Charming Betsy maxim-that
"an Act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains. " 4°5 The Supreme Court
has given this principle its greatest reach in cases where a statute is designed
to implement a treaty, because it is unreasonable to suppose that Congress
intended to abrogate or violate a treaty commitment in the very process of
implementing it, unless no other interpretation is possible.4 6 Similarly, the
principle applies with even greater force when interpreting a declaration
included in the U.S. instrument of ratification for a treaty, because, in the
words of Justice Harlan, "it would be wanting in proper respect for the
intelligence and patriotism of a co-ordinate department of the government" 7
for a court to assume that the very instrument in which the United States
accepted international treaty obligations manifested an intention to violate
that treaty, unless no other interpretation is possible. Thus, in cases where a
defendant seeks to invoke a human rights treaty as a defense to civil or
criminal charges brought by the government, courts should not construe the
NSE declarations to violate U.S. treaty obligations, "if any other possible
construction remains.""'
404. See supra Section IV.D.
405. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); see supra
notes 367-371 and accompanying text.
406. See, e.g., Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884) (applying the Charming
Betsy principle to avoid an apparent conflict between an 1880 treaty, which seemingly secured the
petitioner's right of entry into the United States, and a subsequent statute that was purportedly
intended to implement the treaty, but that appeared on its face to conflict directly with the right of
entry secured by the treaty). Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, argued that "the Court should be
slow to assume that Congress intended to violate the stipulations of a treaty, so recently made with the
government of another country." Id. at 539. Moreover, he added:
Aside from the duty imposed by the Constitution to respect treaty stipulations when
they become the subject of judicial proceedings, the Court cannot be unmindful of the
fact that the honor of the government and people of the United States is involved in
every inquiry whether rights secured by such stipulations shall be recognized and
protected. And it would be wanting in proper respect for the intelligence and patriotism
of a co-ordinate department of the government were it to doubt, for a moment, that
these considerations were present in the minds of its members when the legislation in
question was enacted.
Id. at 540. Thus, relying on the fact that Congress had not explicitly stated its intent to abrogate or
violate the 1880 treaty with China, the majority deliberately overlooked apparent inconsistencies
between the treaty and subsequent statutes, and interpreted the subsequent statutes in a manner that
was consistent with the treaty's promised right of entry.
407. Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 540.
408. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118.
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The United States has a treaty obligation to ensure that any person who
raises a non-frivolous claim that his or her treaty rights have been violated
obtains an individual hearing before an impartial tribunal. If the judge in the
Amish case construes the NSE declaration in accordance with the Foster
concept of non-self-execution, and refuses to reach the merits of the claim,
then the United States would be in violation of its treaty obligation to
provide an individual hearing before an impartial tribunal, because there is
no alternative forum in which the Amish's claim can be heard. In this case,
the treaty violation is unnecessary because a different interpretation of the
NSE declaration is possible. Specifically, the judge can and should interpret
the NSE declaration in accordance with the "private cause of action"
concept, reach the merits of the claim, and avoid the treaty violation.
More broadly, in any case where a defendant in a civil or criminal
proceeding initiated by the government invokes a human rights treaty as a
defense to the government's charges, the court should reach the merits of the
defendant's claim, unless the claim is frivolous, relief is available under
some other provision of domestic law, or there is an alternative forum
available in which to adjudicate the claim. Failure to reach the merits of the
claim in such cases would be inconsistent with the Charming Betsy principle,
and with the general intent of the treaty makers to ensure U.S. compliance
with its treaty obligations.
5. Is the Plaintiff Relying on the Treaty to Establish a Private Cause
of Action?
Consider the following case:
The Atlanta Police arrested Michael Hardwick. .. because he had committed the crime
of sodomy with a consenting male adult in the bedroom of his own home. Charges
were brought as a result of the arrest ... [but] the District Attorney's office decided
not to present the case to the grand jury unless further evidence developed. Hardwick
then filed . . . suit asking the federal district court to declare unconstitutional the
Georgia statute that criminalizes sodomy.'
The Supreme Court upheld the Georgia statute, ruling that the U.S.
Constitution does not protect the right of adult homosexuals to engage in
private consensual sexual activity. 1 °
Suppose, hypothetically, that Hardwick was arrested in 1996, and his
complaint alleged that the Georgia statute violated his right to privacy under
Article 17 of the ICCPR.4'1 Nicholas Toonen, a homosexual Australian
409. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S. 186, 192
(1986).
410. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (declining to "extend a fundamental right
to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy").
411. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 17, para. 1. ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
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citizen residing in the Australian state of Tasmania, made a similar claim in
a case presented to the Human Rights Committee.4"2 The Committee ruled
that Tasmania's criminal sodomy statute violated Mr. Toonen's Article 17
right to privacy.4"3 In similar cases, the European Court of Human Rights
has also ruled that criminal sodomy laws violate the right to privacy4"4
protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.4"5
Thus, Hardwick's claim that he has been deprived of his ICCPR rights is
non-frivolous and nonredundant." 6
Even so, if Hardwick does not adduce any other provision of law that
provides an independent cause of action to support his claim, the court
should dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.4 7 Although the Executive Branch's explanations of the NSE
declaration changed over time, the one constant factor in those shifting
explanations is that the NSE declarations preclude plaintiffs from relying on
human rights treaties to establish a private cause of action.4 ' Thus, if a
plaintiff attempts to use a human rights treaty to establish a private cause of
action, the judge should cite the NSE declaration and refuse to reach the
merits of the claim, even if this places the United States in violation of its
treaty obligation to ensure that individuals obtain an individual hearing
before an impartial tribunal. The Charming Betsy principle, as applied to the
NSE declarations, says that judges should interpret the NSE declarations in a
manner that is consistent with U.S. treaty obligations, unless no "other
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on
his honour and reputation."). The United States did not adopt any reservation or understanding with
respect to Article 17; it is therefore binding on the United States as a matter of international law.
412. See Toonen v. Australia, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPRC/501DI48811992 (1994), reprinted in INT'L HUM. RTs. RFp., Sept. 1994, at 97 [hereinafter
"Toonen Case"]. The Toonen case arose under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which permits
citizens of state parties to file individual complaints against their governments before the Human
Rights Committee, a quasi-judicial body established by the ICCPR. As the United States is not a party
to the Optional Protocol, a U.S. citizen could not file an individual complaint with the Human Rights
Committee.
413. "The Human Rights Committee . . . is of the view that the facts before it reveal a
violation of Article[ ] 17, paragraph 1 ... of the Covenant .... In the opinion of the Committee, an
effective remedy would be the repeal of Sections 122 (a), (c) and 123 of the Tasmanian Criminal
Code." Toonen Case, supra note 412, at 105-06. For a more detailed discussion of the Toonen case,
see Brenda Sue Thornton, The New International Jurispudence on the Right to Privacy: A Head-On
Collision with Bowers v. Hardwick, 58 ALB. L. REv. 725 (1995).
414. See Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,
45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
415. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 230. Paragraph 1 of Article 8 provides: "Everyone has the right to
respect for private and family life, his home and his correspondence."
416. The Human Rights Committee's decisions are not legally binding on the United States,
but they constitute persuasive authority for proper interpretation of the ICCPR's provisions.
417. See FaD. R. Cirv. P. 12(b)(6).
418. See supra Part IV.
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possible construction remains. "4 '9 Here, no other possible construction
remains. The NSE declaration, if it means anything at all, means that
plaintiffs cannot rely on these treaties to establish a private cause of
action.42 The treaty makers' general intent to comply with U.S. treaty
obligations cannot override their specific intent to preclude reliance on the
treaties to create a private cause of action.
6. Other Factors
There are a variety of ways in which plaintiffs might seek to raise
treaty-based human rights claims by relying on federal or state statutory or
common law to establish a private cause of action.4 21 For example, plaintiffs
could potentially raise treaty-based human rights claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, habeas corpus statutes,422 the Administrative Procedures Act,423 the
Declaratory Judgment Act,4" or a variety of state statutes.4z Such cases
differ from the above criminal sodomy example, because plaintiffs would
not technically be relying on the treaties to establish a private cause of
action. Instead, they would be relying on statutory or common law to
establish a private cause of action.
When a plaintiff raises a non-frivolous claim in reliance on a statutory
or common law right of action, there is no alternative forum in which to
419. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
420. One could argue that the treaty makers intended for the NSE declarations to preclude
only frivolous and/or redundant claims, and that judges should therefore reach the merits of non-
frivolous, nonredundant treaty-based claims, even in cases where the plaintiff is relying on the treaty
to establish a private cause of action. The difficulty with this argument is that it essentially discounts
the NSE declarations entirely. Assuming the NSE declarations are valid, courts must give them some
effect. This Article has argued in favor of a narrow construction of the NSE declarations. However,
there is a key difference between: (1) a relatively narrow construction that still gives some effect to
the declaration, which this Article contends is legitimate; and (2) an extremely narrow construction
that gives no effect to the NSE declarations, which this Article contends is illegitimate.
421. See generally Vazquez, supra note 33, at 1141-57 (describing rights of action and
remedial rights).
422. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255. Of particular relevance are sections 2241(c)(3) (providing
that the writ of habeas corpus extends to prisoners who are "in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States") and 2254(a) (stating that courts "shall entertain an application
for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States").
423. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (providing that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of
[federal] agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.").
424. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1994) (authorizing "any court of the United States," if presented
with an "actual controversy within its jurisdiction," to "declare the rights and other legal relations of
any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought").
425. See, e.g., Kazi v. Dubai Petroleum Co., 961 S.W.2d 313, 315-18 (Tex. App. 1997,
writ granted) (holding that the ICCPR establishes "equal treaty rights" between the United States and
India within the meaning of the Texas wrongful death statute, and that therefore the lower court erred
by dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a wrongful death action by Indian citizens).
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adjudicate the claim, and there is no relief available under other provisions
of domestic law; courts are faced with a dilemma. A blanket rule precluding
courts from reaching the merits of any such claim would be inconsistent with
the treaty makers' intention for the United States to comply with its treaty
obligations. A blanket rule permitting courts to reach the merits of all such
claims would effectively deprive the NSE declarations of any legal force
whatsoever. Different considerations will arise, depending upon whether the
claimant is relying on the federal habeas corpus statute,426 42 U.S.C. §
1983,427 or some other provision of law to establish a private cause of
action. In each case, courts should balance the need to give some legal effect
to the NSE declarations against the need to give effect to the treaty makers'
intent to promote compliance with U.S. treaty obligations.
As a practical matter, courts are likely to give great weight to any
views expressed by the Executive Branch.428 In cases involving treaty-based
human rights claims against the federal government, or federal officials, the
Executive Branch will presumably oppose direct judicial application of the
treaty. 429 In cases involving treaty-based human rights claims against state or
local governments or officials, however, it is conceivable that the Executive
Branch might submit an amicus brief in support of a plaintiff who claims a
human rights treaty violation.430 Indeed, given the President's duty to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," 431 the Executive Branch arguably
has a constitutional duty to speak in favor of treaty compliance if a case
426. See, e.g., White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 437-39 and 440 n.2 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding,
in a habeas case, that the prisoner's claims based on the ICCPR and the Torture Convention were
barred by the nonretroactivity doctrine of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)).
427. See, e.g., Weber v. Brayton, No. C-95-20154 RMW, 1995 WL 429238, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. July 13, 1995) (dismissing § 1983 claims against state and local government officials for alleged
violations of ICCPR rights).
428. See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) ("While courts interpret treaties for
themselves, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with their
negotiation and enforcement is given great weight.").
429. If a person alleges a human rights treaty violation by a federal official, the Executive
Branch will presumably decide before the case ever goes to court whether it believes there is any
merit to the claim. If the Executive Branch decides that the claim has some merit, it can try to resolve
the matter before it goes to court. Thus, once a case gets to court, that is probably an indication that
the Executive Branch has decided that, in its view, the claim lacks merit.
430. In its "federalism" understanding attached to the ICCPR, the United States stated: "to
the extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction over such [treaty] matters, the Federal
Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end that the competent
authorities of the state or local governments may take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the
Covenant." 138 CONG. REc. S4784 (1992). The United States adopted similar understandings for the
Torture Convention and the Race Convention. See 140 CONG. Rc. S7634 (1994); 136 CONG. RFc.
S17492 (1990). In a case where the United States Government believed that a state or local
government or official had violated an individual's treaty-based human rights, the filing of an amicus
brief might be a "measurei appropriate to the Federal system," 138 CONG. REc. S4784 (1992), to
promote treaty compliance.
431. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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arises where a court's failure to apply the relevant provision would place the
United States in violation of its treaty obligations.
Of course, the President would not wish to provoke charges from the
Senate that he was breaching a promise, implicit in the NSE declaration, that
the Executive Branch would oppose direct judicial application of human
rights treaty provisions. 432 The risk of provoking such a response, however,
will vary greatly, depending upon the nature of the claim. In light of recent
battles between Congress and the Supreme Court concerning freedom of
religion,433 if a sympathetic plaintiff presented a plausible freedom of
religion claim under Article 18 of the ICCPR,434 many in Congress would
applaud an amicus brief filed by the Attorney General in support of the
plaintiff. Similarly, a court ruling in favor of the plaintiff would be unlikely
to provoke charges of judicial activism. On the other hand, if a homosexual
432. In any case where the Executive Branch supports direct judicial application of human
rights treaty provisions, Senators opposed to the domestication of international human rights treaties
are likely to argue that the Executive Branch is reinterpreting the NSE declaration in a manner
inconsistent with Executive Branch statements to the Senate during ratification hearings. Analogies to
the ABM reinterpretation debate come readily to mind. See generally Abram Chayes & Antonia
Handler Chayes, Testing and Development of "Exotic" Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The Great
Reinterpretation Caper, 99 HARV. L. Rv. 1956, 1958-59 (1986) (criticizing the reinterpretation of
statements made by Secretary of State Rogers to the Senate during the ABM ratification hearings);
David A. Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of Arms Control
Treaties, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1353, 1371 (1989) (discussing the hostile reactions of Senators to the
Executive's attempts at reinterpretation); Abraham D. Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic
Defense Initiative, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1972 (1986) (defending the Reagan administration's broad
interpretation of the ABM treaty). In the ABM debate, the "broad" interpretation would have
permitted testing and development of exotic systems, whereas the "narrow" interpretation would have
prohibited such testing and development. In the NSE controversy, the "narrow" ("private cause of
action") interpretation would permit direct judicial application of the treaties in some cases, whereas
the "broad" (Foster) interpretation would prohibit it. In the NSE debate, like the ABM debate, both
sides can selectively quote from the Senate record to bolster their preferred positions.
There are at least two important distinctions, however, between the ABM controversy and the
NSE interpretation issue. First, if the Executive Branch argues against direct judicial application of a
human rights treaty in a case where failure to apply the treaty would place the United States in
violation of its treaty obligations, some Senators might rightly argue that the Executive Branch had
breached its promise that the United States would comply fully with its treaty commitments. Thus, in
any hard case that presents a stark choice between treaty compliance and avoiding changes in domestic
law, no matter what position the Executive Branch advocates, it is vulnerable to charges that its
actions are inconsistent with assurances provided to the Senate. In contrast, in the ABM debate, no
one ever claimed that adoption of the narrow interpretation would be inconsistent with Executive
Branch assurances to the Senate.
Second, the proposed reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty (the "broad" interpretation) was
designed to weaken the treaty regime and was arguably inconsistent with the object and purpose of the
treaty. See Chayes & Chayes, supra, at 1963-65. In contrast, this Article's proposed reinterpretation
of the NSE declarations is designed to strengthen U.S. compliance with the treaty regimes and is
entirely consistent with the object and purpose of the human rights treaties. Indeed, the chief criticism
of the "broad interpretation" (the Foster interpretation) of the NSE declarations is that such an
interpretation is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the treaties.
433. See supra note 423.
434. See supra Subsection VI.B.4.
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challenged a state sodomy law on the basis of Article 17 of the ICCPR,435
the Executive Branch would incur greater political costs if it chose to
support the plaintiff, and a ruling in the plaintiff's favor would be widely
decried as unwarranted judicial activism. In principle, the distinction
between a freedom of religion claim under Article 18 and a gay fights claim
under Article 17 should have no bearing on a court's decision about whether
to reach the merits of a treaty-based human rights claim. In practice, though,
these types of distinctions are likely to be critical because the courts will
show great deference to the views of the Executive Branch, which are likely
to be heavily influenced by political considerations.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has focused on the universe of cases in which: (1) an individual
alleges that federal, state, or local governments and/or officials have
infringed his or her human rights; (2) the right is (at least arguably)
protected under the ICCPR, the Torture Convention or the Race
Convention; and (3) the right is (at least arguably) not protected under
constitutional, statutory, or common law to the same degree. Eyen if the
United States had not adopted any reservations when it ratified these human
rights treaties, the set of cases satisfying these criteria would have been
relatively small. By adopting reservations for each of the treaties, the United
States further diminished the size of an already small set. Yet the examples
discussed throughout this Article relating to freedom of religion, state
sodomy laws, transnational forcible abductions, and deportation to countries
where the individual is likely to be tortured demonstrate that the set of cases
that satisfy the above criteria is not a null set.
During the ratification process for the ICCPR, the Torture Convention,
and the Race Convention, the Executive Branch assured the Senate that the
NSE declarations were entirely consistent with U.S. treaty obligations,
because the reservations and understandings included in the U.S. instruments
of ratification had successfully eliminated any discrepancies between treaty
requirements and preexisting domestic law. The Executive Branch must now
acknowledge that it was mistaken, that certain discrepancies remain, and that
the NSE declarations are inconsistent with U.S. treaty obligations, insofar as
those declarations preclude judges from reaching the merits of non-frivolous,
nonredundant, treaty-based human rights claims. The Executive Branch has
the primary responsibility within the U.S. government for ensuring U.S.
compliance with its treaty obligations. Therefore, the Executive Branch
should take steps to bring the United States into compliance with its
435. See supra Subsection VI.B.5.
1999]
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obligation to ensure that plaintiffs who raise non-frivolous, nonredundant
claims under these treaties receive an individual hearing before an impartial
tribunal.
The best way to ensure U.S. compliance with its treaty obligations
would be to enact legislation to create a private cause of action in federal
court for all treaty-based human rights claims. With vigorous lobbying by
the President, it is conceivable that Congress might enact such legislation. If
the President cannot persuade Congress to enact legislation to create a
private cause of action for treaty-based human rights claims, then legislation
in specific areas in which the United States falls short of substantive
international norms should be advocated. Freedom of religion, in particular,
is an area where Congress is eager to augment federal protection for
individual rights.436 Given the President's duty to "take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed,"" the President should lobby Congress to strengthen
federal protection for freedom of religion to conform with the requirements
of Article 18 of the ICCPR.
In addition to lobbying Congress, the Executive Branch should also
take an active role in court cases where litigants raise treaty-based human
rights claims. In particular, the Executive Branch should file amicus briefs
to support interpretation of the NSE declarations in accordance with the
"private cause of action" concept. If the Executive Branch supports the
"private cause of action" concept, courts are much more likely to interpret
the NSE declarations in accordance with this concept, and therefore are
more likely to act in a manner that is consonant with U.S. treaty obligations.
Courts need to recognize the ambiguity of the term "not self-
executing" as used in NSE declarations attached to human rights treaties. In
light of the treaty makers' manifest intention for the United States to comply
with its treaty obligations, courts should construe the NSE declarations in
accordance with the "private cause of action" concept of non-self-execution,
thus minimizing conflicts with treaty obligations. Accordingly, courts should
reach the merits of treaty-based human rights claims when individuals raise
those claims as defenses to civil or criminal charges filed by the
government. Courts should decline to reach the merits of treaty-based human
rights claims when plaintiffs seek to rely on human rights treaties to create a
private cause of action. In intermediate cases-where plaintiffs seek to raise
treaty-based human rights claims by relying on federal or state statutory or
common law to establish a private cause of action-courts should ask
whether allowing the claim to go forward would effectively deprive the NSE
declarations of any legal force whatsoever. If the answer is "no," then the
court should reach the merits of the claim.
436. See supra note 423.
437. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
220
HeinOnline  -- 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 220 1999
Non-Self-Executing Declarations
The United States is likely to ratify other human rights treaties in the
future. The President and the Senate, in their role as treaty makers, can
draw several important lessons from past experience. First, they should
assume that, no matter how thorough they are in crafting reservations and
understandings to human rights treaties, there will inevitably be some
discrepancies between treaty requirements and preexisting domestic law that
are overlooked in the treaty ratification process. Therefore, to ensure
compliance with treaty requirements, when the treaty makers ratify a human
rights treaty they should either: (1) agree on implementing legislation to
fulfill the requirements of the treaty; or (2) agree that the treaty will be self-
executing. If the President remains convinced that NSE declarations are a
political necessity in order to obtain Senate consent for ratification of human
rights treaties, then the Executive Branch should decide which concept of
non-self-execution to adopt. If something like an NSE declaration is
politically necessary, then the Executive Branch should propose language
that is unambiguous, by, for example, declaring that the treaty does not
create a private cause of action instead of declaring that it is not self-
executing.
1999]
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